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Introduction                                                                 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse how different relational 
structures, in the field of social interaction, can generate different 
institutional arrangements. A specific focus of  research will be the 
development of relationships through credit markets, and the specific 
contribution of microfinance institutions.  
The exploration of the linkages between ‘horizontal’ (non-
hierarchical) and ‘vertical’ (hierarchical) relational structures is 
required in order to bring out the basic determinants and features of 
alternative institutional arrangements. In this area of research,  the 
emerging ‘practices of trust’ as well as the identification of different 
levels and dimensions of interactions, play a critical role.  
A central area of interest will be how specific institutions tend 
to enable and sustain the formation of social capital. The analysis of 
those institutions ‘that would enable people to have a good chance of 
pursuing well-lived lives’, will carry significant policy implications as 
to the  governance of  market institutions and  the process of  social 
capital formation. In this respect, some features of microfinance 
institutions will be considered.     
Moreover, the provision of an analytical framework for the 
study of social and economic interactions will allow to reconsider  the 
microfinance literature presented towards a relational approach. In this 
direction, it will be recognized that the economics of social networks 
could be a useful frame in which to consider both the concept of social 
capital in its multidimensionality and the credit-debt relation.   
This thesis is structured in four chapters.  
In chapter I, the conceptual analysis will be supported by 
historical considerations of different practices of  ‘relational credit’. 
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We will examine some experiences from the past, such as the late 
medieval Montes Pietatis in Italy, up to Muhammad Yunus’s system 
of group lending or Maria Nowak’s individual methodology, in which 
the community takes up a fundamental role. The aim of this chapter is 
to provide an overview of the phenomenon of microfinance and to 
focus on the structural problems that the credit-debt relation presents.  
The solutions to these informative problems developed in 
microfinance institutions, especially by establishing an overlapped 
credit-debt relation, will be considered both in an analytical and 
empirical frame. At this point, the idea of social capital as a sort of 
‘social collateral’ will emerge. 
This result leads, in chapter II, to a critical analysis of the 
concept of social capital. The framework proposed by Partha 
Dasgupta and the concept of ‘enabling institutions’ will be proposed 
and deeply analysed also with respect to microfinance literature. 
Moreover, just the development of the idea of ‘enabling institutions’ 
and the relevance of ‘multiple and overlapping memberships’ will 
underline the relevance of civil society, particularly of the ‘model of 
open proximity’. 
The aim of chapter III is to introduce an analytical framework 
for the study of economic and social interactions in view of assessing 
the phenomenon of microfinance and the working of enabling 
institutions. This effort will be conducted by distinguishing different 
levels and dimensions of interaction. The interplay between objective 
and institutional features of economic structures will be the first 
relevant aspect to study. Following this line of analysis, theories of 
non-selfish economic behaviour and the role of trust will be studied. 
Finally, this framework will allow the identification of a fundamental 
level of interaction. At this level, Adam Smith’s concept of ‘fellow 
feeling’, developed in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, will emerge for 
its centrality. 
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In chapter IV some reflections will be proposed in order to 
understand the credit-debt relation. This objective will be pursued by 
overlapping those analytical instruments considered in previous 
chapters. These conceptual schemes will found a frame into the 
economics of social networks that provides a starting base of 
understanding. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
Chapter I       
 
Microfinance: towards a new paradigm in 
economics 
 
 
1.1    Starting from history: new ideas looking for a new 
paradigm of relational credit 
 
1.1.1 From history to economic theory: reasons for a 
methodological approach 
To understand the reasons of the birth and worldwide diffusion, since 
the seventies of the twentieth century, of microfinance institutions so 
that some have spoken about a real revolution (Robinson, 2001), it is 
necessary to look for in history the original ‘genus’ of this process 
which has very old roots. Such a study will give the possibility to 
analyse the innovation introduced in practice, particularly concerning 
credit and saving, understanding the original intentions and 
inspirations. In this paragraph attention will be focused on some 
institutions and organizations, particularly: the Mons Pietatis, the 
rotating savings and the credit associations, up to the most advanced 
types of cooperative credit banks, trying to show how these ones form 
an organically congruent cluster of historical experiences, which is at 
the basis of the modern microfinance. 
 As Hicks suggests in his Theory of Economic History (1969) 
the effort to be done is to identify those events that may be situated 
inside the groups of events which have a common interpretative 
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scheme, still remaining conscious that each one has its own 
specificity. Only making use of such interpretative structure, it is 
possible to get the dynamics and the way in which some 
transformations take place in the historical process. The analysis of 
such phenomena will also be focused on that imperfect great number 
of non market organizations which were born in order to satisfy some 
specific economic and coordinating needs. These ones are to be 
considered as ‘living things’, that means they are to be thought not as 
some simple systems of rules that will ‘reduce them to some 
formulas’, but as to some structures of ‘rules and understandings by 
which the various grades in its hierarchy are fitted together’ (Hicks 
1969, 11). The way in which such structures of rules are formed, 
articulated and sustained, as we will see afterwards, may have a 
decisive weight. 
 According to Hicks, the first central stage in the historical 
process of elaboration of the credit-debt relation is constituted by the 
birth of the market and of trade skilled figures, the merchants. For 
them, still before the introduction of money, the contractual relations 
of commercial type had as natural extension those ones of 
credit/financial type. For these persons the need of a legal or a quasi-
legal context, of a system of rules, which granted the protection of the 
property rights and the enforcement of the agreement, was an 
immediate need. As Hicks underlines (1969): ‘The bargain has three 
constituents which soon become distinguishable; the making of the 
agreement, the delivery one way, and the delivery the other. As soon 
as this distinction is made, the agreement itself becomes no more than 
a promise to deliver. Trading is trading in promises; but it is futile to 
trade in promises unless there is some reasonable assurance that the 
promises will be kept’. 
Such a need of granting that the promises will be kept, necessary 
condition for the development of a market economy, found its own 
answer within the same mercantile community. As a matter of fact, 
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the merchants, both in terms of commercial relations and of credit 
relations, based the possibility of taking up relations on credibility and 
so on the reputation they had within their own professional 
community. A reputation of good or bad contractor, related to 
previous relations, was sufficient to grant the creditor and, at the same 
time, gave to the ‘credit worthy borrowers’ the possibility of seeing 
practiced an interest rate lower than that one he would have got 
elsewhere. 
 It is important to observe, for the successive development of 
the analysis, how such type of credit relation implied a repeated and 
horizontal type relation among the merchants. They were linked by a 
system of relations, first of all of commercial nature, that strengthened 
to such a degree the credit-debt relation to make it possible without 
using other legal systems of enforcement. Moreover, they were put 
within that society called by Hicks the ‘society of merchants’, inside 
which any possible conflicting relations came to composition.  
 The process of development of a mercantile economy found 
therefore ‘inside’ the market what the legal institutions, the courts of 
laws, where not able to offer, that is a system of enforcement of the 
credit-debt relation. Such process has its own moment of turning point 
with the Renaissance, when the foundations for the development of 
modern finance were laid through the creation of a series of 
instruments fit for the composition of the credit relation (Hicks 1969; 
Bruni, Zamagni 2004).  
First of all there was a problem to be solved, that is to make 
possible an enlargement of the group of those who were considered 
credit worthy and this initially was realized through the creation of a 
system which used an indirect knowledge. The use of the so-called 
‘bill of exchange’ in the commerce and then the specialized use of 
personal guaranties was the first way through which the group was 
enlarged. A person could exploit the fiduciary and informative relation 
which had with another one who became the guarantee, in order to get 
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credit from a third person with whom he had not a direct relation. This 
kind of relation will be examined more deeply because it presupposes 
a not at all immediate relational structure and that presents elements of 
circularity among the three persons involved. The other way used was 
the specialization of ‘middle men’ that is of financial brokers who 
receive as a loan some money that they lend again to persons they 
trust in. The institution which specialized in such intermediation 
transaction is the bank whose existence is however fully linked to the 
possibility of applying an interest rate (1).  
 The credit relation outside the community of merchants appears 
even more complex. In such context the legal institutions are those 
which try to give an answer to the same problem of enforcement of 
the contracts. The instruments which are introduced to answer the 
demand for ‘security’ are mainly the pledge or the mortgage. Such 
material guarantees constitute, both from a legal and economic point 
of view, a very good instrument of insurance for the creditor. The first 
one, the pledge, even provides for a profit for the creditor who, in the 
event of insolvency, will have gained the right of property on a good 
which has a value higher than the loan itself. In the second case, that 
concerning the mortgage, the condition of the creditor appears weaker 
because the mortgaged property remains in property of the debtor and 
only the recourse to law enables him to acquire possession of the 
goods. 
 But such instruments showed immediately their intrinsic limit. 
As a matter of fact, those who have not sufficient goods to guarantee 
their debt are automatically excluded from the possibility of setting up 
a relation of credit. The other possibility is that they suffer the absence 
of guarantee with the payment of particularly high interest rate, usurer, 
because the transaction in absence of guarantee appears riskier.  
 Actually, as we will better notice dealing with the rotating 
savings and the credit associations (ROSCAs), at the same time and 
sometimes even before the development of credit relations inside the 
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community of merchants and the birth of the first financial brokers, 
informal methods of access to credit developed mainly in the village 
communities in a rural context. If for the merchants the financial 
relations are co-structured to those ones of exchange, at the same time 
in an agricultural economy, credit relations were present from the 
beginning. They were often “material” relation of credit necessary to 
give an answer to the needs concerning the productive process (2).  
 This kind of needs can hardly find an answer in the informal 
and not at all structured practice of mutual loans among members of a 
family or of a little community. Although very frequent, these 
relations substantiate in little prepayments and compensations without 
the practice of interest. Although this limit diffusely recognized, these 
practices, as recent studies show (Morduch and Rutherford 2003), are 
a very widespread and complementary instrument to the formal sector 
of credit.  
 This ‘historic-theoretic’ picture has shown how the birth and 
the development of the market and of those institutions necessary to 
its working ‘is largely a matter of finding way of diminishing risks’ 
(Hicks 1969, 48). In the following subparagraphs attention will be 
focused on three answers which have been given to the fundamental 
problem that the credit-debt relation presents. Such problem 
substantiates in the need of finding structures of relation and rules, 
institutions, inside which the relation between the lender and the 
borrower can take place.       
   
         
1.1.2 The institutional innovation of “Mons Pietatis”  
From the 11th century, with a significant acceleration between the 
13th and 14th century, the increased dimension of commercial 
relations encouraged, together with the figure of the merchant, the rise 
of the merchant banker.  Particularly two figures of ‘bankers’ were 
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taking shape: on one side the great merchant banker who was able to 
mobilize huge resources for a large quantity of goods bought or sold 
in the various European markets as well as in the fairs of exchange; on 
the other side the smallest lenders who had a smaller ray of action 
often circumscribed to the urban context. On these last one who had as 
referent target the social categories of lower level, the condemnation 
of the church was stronger. This opposition reduced the credit supply 
creating a gap which was for a long time filled by specialized Jew 
agents. In such context the Mons Pietatis, which is considered ‘the 
first great institution of civil economy’ was born (Bruni, Zamagni 
2004 personal translation). 
Though there were some previous similar experiences, the first 
model of this new ‘institutional species’ can be found in Perugia in 
1462. It started a long series of foundations, at first in the regions of 
Umbria and Marche and then in the Centre-Southern Italy, and then 
slowly it expanded in some European regions. Instead of focusing on 
the numbers of such phenomenon and on the evolution which will 
cause their transformation and will inspire the phenomenon of 
cooperative credit and of the popular banks, I will try to identify the 
inspiring principles and the newest methodologies which derive from 
the Franciscan reflection.       
In my opinion, the decisive intuition which comes back as a 
fundamental element in the revolution of microcredit, considered as an 
instrument of economic inclusion, is that ‘the good Christian charity’ 
was not sufficient to support the less leisured classes in conditions of 
marginality in the great urban centres and generally all those who 
could not established a credit relation. Such intuition is very well 
expressed by Muzzarelli (2001, personal translation) when she says 
that ‘it was necessary to sensitize and convince that to invest one’s 
own money in taking care of men who needed an economic support, 
not of charity, was good for the others and themselves. It was a very 
good thing not only because a spiritual advantage would come from it 
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[…] but also for the concrete and immediate benefit consisting in 
making society more balanced and the city safer”.   
Therefore, money was lent with a different “disposition”: the 
client was an active and virtuous person towards whom the city felt a 
debt of attention. The community, the civic, seems to enter in the 
affair as an element which certifies legitimacy not only to exchange, 
but also to credit. For this reason the civic community was led by the 
“Franciscan hammerers” to constitute a starting fund from which to 
draw for loans and the municipality to offer places where the Mons 
could be instituted. Reading the statutes ‘which seems to be written by 
A.Sen’ (Bruni, Zamagni, 2004) we can detect the instruments and the 
procedures used to ‘cure’ the need of credit.   
 Following San Bernardino’s (from Feltre) inspiring reflection, 
at the centre of the transaction which consisted in the anticipation of 
small sums of money, there was a pledge whose value had to exceed 
at least one third of the loan. If at the due date the loan had not been 
honoured the attached object was sold in periodical auctions. The 
Mons had as institutional duty the task of heading off such 
eventuality, making use of a high level of professionalism in the 
transaction which, at the same time, was charitable and banking.  Let 
us examine how these two characteristics translated into practice.  
The loans had to be of little value and the applicants had to 
swear to be really needy persons. The borrower’s revealed aims had to 
be lawful and virtuous. Such criterion was further limited excluding 
the strangers and all the applicants who did not present personally at 
the Mons (sometimes an intermediation was accepted on condition 
that guaranties were given on the borrower’s respectability) stressing 
besides an unavoidable condition which was the aim of the loan.  
The loan which was typically of short term, from six to twelve 
months, could be honoured previously and, even when it had been put 
up to auction for default, the possible profit of the sale was given back 
to the owner. Finally, the features of efficiency and professionalism of 
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the banking transaction which had to be fully documented and follow 
standards of openness of the transaction, excluded from the credit-debt 
relation the typical usurer behaviours. 
Immediately it can be understood how such structured 
organization had some significant costs of management. For this 
reason the Mons Pietatis practiced a lower interest rate compared to 
the market (generally from 4% to 12%, in the first period) and 
moreover it was calculated, unlike the private banks, considering the 
effective number of days.      
The description done, could lead to a misunderstanding: the 
Mons, actually, had not as customers only the needy but also little 
artisans and farmers, that is ‘micro economic actors’ at different levels 
who, thanks to a small loan, could get through a period of crises 
relating to the economic situation or vice versa could lay the basis of 
the development of their business.   
At the end of the 19th century in Italy there were 596 Montes 
Pietatis with huge capital that were no more only addressed to micro 
credit but also, together with Popular banks born, as Luzzati says, 
‘with the same enthusiasm’, were a propulsive factor in the process of 
growth of Italy. Although the idea of constituting saving banks is the 
daughter of the passage to the manufacturing and industrial society of 
the 19th century, it shares with the Mons Pietatis not only a strong 
territorial attachment but also general social aims and a practice of 
credit on fair basis in terms of low interest rate. 
  
 
 
1.1.3 Rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs)  
Notwithstanding the multiplicity and the variety of forms that such 
organizations have assumed in all the regions of the world, from 
tontine to the hui in Tapei, form tanda and polla in Mexico to the chit 
in India, from the “merry go rounds” in Africa till going back of six 
hundred years in Japan, the analysis that will be developed will try to 
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highlight the main features of the model to which these experiences 
refer to. The study concerns how a group of persons, tied by any 
degree of proximity, can put together some sums of money in order to 
make them then available to the members of the group.  
 A useful scheme to a better understanding of these structures is 
given by Rutherford (2000) who distinguishes three possible ways of 
saving/access to capital: 
(i) Saving up: that is to accumulate some savings in a continuative 
way in order to have then an amount of capital to draw from; this 
methodology is generally adopted through the help of deposit 
collectors who grant safe the accumulated money; 
(ii) Saving down: that is to get into a debt by a “money lender” to 
pay it off with a series of successive installments; 
(iii) Saving through: in this category we find the ROSCA’s or more 
in general all types of Saving Clubs which are based on a very simple 
and efficient structure. 
The main element of this last modality is given by a group of persons 
(from 15 to 100 members) who together set in motion a continuous 
action of savings collection and transformation of savings into credits. 
Considering the simplest case, the fifteen members of the group meet 
regularly and deposit a pre-concerted fixed sum creating a capital 
which is given by turn to each member of the group. After fifteen 
rounds, all the members of the group will have deposited their fifteen 
shares of saving and received the deposited amount. At this point the 
cycle closes and it may start again with the same or other members. 
Such structure presents some extraordinary advantages: it is a 
transparent process which does not require costs of management 
(mainly of safe deposit because savings are immediately transformed 
into credits) and it is also based on horizontal relations inside often 
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homogeneous groups of persons. The sequence with which the 
members of the group receive the fund collected at each round is fixed 
in various ways:  according to a previous agreement, a lottery or, 
finally, putting the members in the condition of gaining the right to get 
first to the fund, compensating the others for their patience in waiting 
for the successive rounds. But it is clear that such mechanism presents 
two main points of weakness: 
(i) all the participants except for the last one have an evident 
advantage compared to the saving outside the group: in fact, for 
example, the one who obtains the sum in the fourteenth round can 
have the same amount of money that he would have obtained alone 
after fifteen periods of saving. In this sense for the last one it is the 
same to save into the group or alone in fifteen periods, that is to 
recognize that there is no economic incentive;       
(ii) once that for a member of the group the turn to receive the 
collected fund of the round arrives, what is the reason that makes him 
to remain and pay all the shares of saving which will enable the others 
to have the same fund he had previously received?           
(iii) From a theoretical point of view the first objection should make 
impossible the existence of the ROSCAs. As a matter of fact, the last 
member should have no incentive to take part in a mechanism which 
imposes him a rigid scheme of saving and that allows him to obtain a 
fund that he could accumulate autonomously in the same time 
(Armendariz de Aghion, Morduch 2005). That is there is a lack of 
what Anderson, Baland, Moene (2003) call the “early pot motive”. 
 Really the same authors speak about the existence of other 
advantages in being members of the group in which also the last one 
benefits and which explain the diffusion of the ROSCAs. The first one 
highlighted is the so called ‘household conflict motive’: the members, 
in the most part of the cases are women, find difficult to succeed in 
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saving in a domestic context ‘it is difficult to keep money at home as 
demands are high’ (from an interview to a member of a ROSCAs in 
Gugerty 2003), mainly because of their husbands’ pressure. For this 
reason, in order to take care of their sons’ education or to ensure their 
commercial activity a continuous flow of commodities to sale 
(Rutherford 2000) they prefer to take out of their houses, moreover in 
a surer place, the little sums set apart daily.    
 Starting from a sample of ROSCAs examined by Gugerty 
(2003) in his study in Kenya, it is possible to add another motive 
called ‘commitment to savings’. When one is not forced to save or 
better one is not put inside a containing system, structured according 
to some rules which stimulate and motivate continuously to the saving 
of little sums, saving becomes more difficult. Such empirical 
observation is supported by contributions of behavioural economics 
(Thaler 1994) in which the role of such mechanisms of commitment, 
especially in the case of weak self control, is stressed. Finally, the first 
problem highlighted comes partially to be solved with mechanisms 
and internal rules, for example the lottery for the settlement of the 
order, which reduce the perception of the inequity and leave space to 
certain degrees of flexibility.      
 As for the risk of not respecting the agreement by a member, 
several mechanisms of enforcement have been created. As I have 
previously underlined for the merchants, the first one consists in 
making the relation among the members of the group continue, that is 
to do so that there is the disincentive to defect from the game because 
this would involve the exclusion from future relations and so the loss 
of possible future gains. Therefore, cycle after cycle, would be 
selected only the “good” members excluding the others. For this 
reason Rutherford (2000) speaks about a relation of trust which is 
built through action: ‘trust is something that has to be built and rebuilt 
and thereby reinforced over and over again’. The role of trust, that will 
be deeply examined later on, remains a basic point to sound in the 
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analysis of the credit-debt relation in any form it occurs. It is 
interesting to observe how in Kenya the order, according to which the 
members of the group get to the fund, is decided on the basis of a sort 
of scale that puts in the last position those who are considered less 
reliable, that means less trustworthy (3).    
 This first instrument of enforcement could not be sufficient. 
The anthropologist Ardner (1964) remembers us that ostracism and 
exclusion from the participation to the public, social and religious life, 
also only potential, could constitute a further instrument of 
disincentive to defect. Finally, certainly the incentives to be part of a 
group of which we were speaking about, combined with the 
impossibility to accede to other financial basic services, constitute a 
great push to be and remain part of the group.     
 Some of the problems pointed out as well as some limits that 
the ROSCAs present, as for example the small amounts of money to 
which it is possible to accede, the impossibility of having some forms 
of long term insurance savings as well as the little flexibility of the 
system, are partly solved in more advanced institutions. These are for 
example the credit associations (also called ASCA) or the recent 
SafeSave group in which the greater capacity to answer to these needs 
discounts the introduction of a third subject external to the group who 
manages the fund (Harper 2002; Armendariz de Aghion, Morduch 
2005).         
 The ASCA (accumulating savings and credit associations) 
presume the presence of members some mainly as borrowers and 
others mainly as savers. They are disengaged from the rigidity of the 
ROSCAs and can therefore save and accede to some capitals, 
according to the needs and not to a fixed program. In their more 
formal and advanced arrangement the ASCA are nothing but credit 
cooperatives. 
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1.1.4 Credit Cooperatives: more complexity towards more   
flexibility 
The credit cooperatives, for a lot of aspects similar to ‘village banks’ 
promoted by FINCA, Pro Mujer and other ONG in the seventies, are 
rooted in Germany during the second half of the nineteenth century.  
Still before the known experiences of the credit cooperatives based on 
Hermann Schulze Delitzsch and Fredrich Raiffeisen’s  models, in 
Germany at the end of the eighteenth century, the so called Sparkassen 
spread with the aim of offering a place where it was possible to 
accumulate in security savings receiving a modest interest (Guinnane 
2002). Though these ones present interesting aspects and are often 
undervalued, we will concentrate in a comparative analysis of some 
aspects of the two main experiences referable to the two mentioned 
figures. These two models, the first one more linked to an urban 
context while the second to a rural one, spread in Germany during the 
19th century and inspired the birth of a lot of similar experiences in 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, America, India as far as Bangladesh, where 
symbolically the birth of microcredit is recognized today.  
 The cooperatives of credit, based on Raiffeisen’s model, were 
private local institutions owned and controlled by their own members 
who acceded mainly to financial services of deposit and credit, but 
also to integrated services of providing and access to market. The 
decision-making process was based on the rule of ‘one head one vote’ 
and all the decisions concerning interest rates, amount of the loan etc., 
were taken in a democratic way within the frequent meetings 
organized. All those who came from the same local parish could enter 
the cooperative, regardless of income. A significant datum is that in 
1912 over the 70% of these cooperatives were situated in places with 
less than 2000 persons (Guinnane 2002). Besides as the members 
were almost always active in the agricultural sector, a feature of the 
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loan, which met the needs of the productive process, was given by the 
structure of the loan with a period of amortization usually of ten years. 
On the contrary in the case of the cooperatives based on 
Hermann Schulze Delitzsch’s model, being mainly addressed in an 
urban context to artisans, merchants and small business men, short-
term loans were practiced so as to meet the needs of more dynamic 
activities. But the substantial difference between the two models 
consisted in the fact that the Raiffeisen’s model cooperatives 
presumed an unlimited responsibility of all the members which was 
not present in the urban credit cooperatives. This undoubtedly 
influenced greatly the institutional arrangement both on the decision 
making process in terms of participation and in the efficiency and 
enforcement of the creditor - debtor relations. Some signals of this can 
be found noting how in general, in the Raiffeisen cooperatives, there 
were mainly long term deposits granting an almost constant interest 
rate and that, unlike the others, did not need a considerable availability 
of liquidities (Guinnane 2002; Prinz 2002). Besides the unlimited 
responsibility of the members led these ones to a constant 
participation to the life of the cooperative so that to make them feel 
‘the Raiffeisen cooperative more and more an extension of their own 
business’ (Prinz 2002). 
 The constant relation “face to face” in a context of proximity 
inside the village, the fiduciary links among the members and so the 
great weight that possible social sanctions acquired, were all 
mechanisms of enforcement which made stable and lasting such 
institutional models. Together with these mechanisms, which we can 
collect in the concept of “long term interaction”, it is necessary to 
consider also the peer monitoring which was initially examined by 
Stiglitz (1990) and which then was developed by Banerjee, Besley and 
Guinnane (1994) specifically in the context of credit cooperatives. 
Their model focalizes the attention on the intervening relations among 
the members of a cooperative, in which, against a subject who obtains 
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a credit in order to make a productive investment, there are others who 
have a role of guarantee and of monitoring. It is evident that such 
model is potentially applicable also to a group of microcredit where 
each stands surety for the other one. In fact each member has an 
incentive to control because, from this, his future possibility to accede 
to credit will depend. We will go back to the problem of peer 
monitoring analysing recent contributions which try to individuate the 
fundamental dynamics and mechanisms of the group lending 
methodology.                  
 
 
 
1.2 The microfinance revolution 
 
1.2.1   From pioneers experiences towards a global phenomenon: 
leading concepts  
The slow and complex process of birth and diffusion of microfinance 
in the world has seen such a multiplicity of actors, as well as a variety 
and a richness of answers to the problem of credit access, and more in 
general to basic financial services, that it would be difficult to describe 
it in an exhaustive way. The aim of this paragraph is to provide a 
picture to the phenomenon which then allows a reading and a 
systematic comprehension of some of the most interesting experiences 
and methodologies.    
In the seventies the approach followed by the international 
institutions in the creation of policies for development, specifically in 
the sector of credit, was based on the constitution of governmental 
agencies able to offer a subsidiary and low cost credit to productive 
activities in conjunction with the creation of credit cooperatives on the 
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Raiffeisen’s model which were involved in the raising and 
management of saving. The modest results, especially the great losses 
and inefficiencies accumulated by the governmental agencies, brought 
the system and the methodologies adopted into question leading to a 
new ‘bottom-up’ approach.    
At the end of the seventies the first pilot projects were set up by 
Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh (1976) and in Brazil by ACCION 
(Americans for Community Cooperation in Other Nations), while in 
Africa the first saving and credit banks spread. With a decade of delay 
the first experimentations arrived in the north of the world in the 
United States in Chicago with the South-shore Bank and in Europe 
mainly thanks to Maria Nowak’s initiative in France and in Eastern 
Europe (mainly Bosnia and Albania). 
 The microfinance was born, therefore, starting from an 
afterthought of development economics so that Ledgerwood (1999) 
clarifies that microcredit ‘is not banking, it is a development tool’. It 
substantiates in the creation of institutions that recognize the right to 
the access of basic financial services to all those who are excluded 
from the financial system. It does not realize therefore only in granting 
credits, in such case we speak of microcredit but also in saving 
services, insurance, payment, money transfer and generally services to 
the productive activities. To such services others of non financial type 
are added. These are as decisive in the process of development such as 
for example the direct or indirect supply of social services (education 
and health), training and consulting services to enterprise. Such 
integrated approach has been adopted by a lot of institutions leading 
them to have the role of “social intermediation” especially for those 
persons who were in situation of social and economic marginality.  
 At about thirty years from the first loan in the village of Jobra 
in Bangladesh by M.Yunus, we analyse some data which allow to 
understand the dimension of the phenomenon and suggest some 
instruments of analysis. In the following tables are reported some 
 21 
significant data taken from the Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 
2005: the numbers (see Table 1.2.1) speak about a rapidly growing 
phenomenon which involves about 92 million of persons in the world 
with a current loan, 66 million among the poorest (about a half of 
these persons, before getting a loan were under the line of poverty in 
their country or received an income lower than 1 US $ a day). 
Considering this last category of poorest it is significant that the 83% 
are women, that in absolute term means 55 million of persons.  
If we separate the world aggregate datum into a regional one 
(Table 1.2.2) emerges how in Asia, a continent with huge needs (the 
67% of the poorest in the world live there, that is of those under the 
poverty line of 1 US$), it is possible to find about the 90% of the 
beneficiaries of microfinance services even if probably the data on 
Latin America are underestimated. 
 
 
Table 1.2.1: Dimensions of the phenomenon and trend of growing from the 
first MSC Report 1997         
 
Source: State of the Microcredit Summit CampaignReport 2005 
 
 
With regard to the microfinance institutions, about three thousands in 
the world (even if there are a lot of small dimension not quoted), a 
great variety in the dimensions and in the forms emerges. This is 
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immediately visible from the data concerning the number of 
beneficiaries of  each institution (Table 1.2.3).  
 
 
Table 1.2.2:  Microfinance on regional base 
 
Source: State of the Microcredit Summit CampaignReport 2005 
 
 
Table 1.2.3:  Institutions of microfinance and their dimension 
 
Source: State of the Microcredit Summit CampaignReport 2005 
* into networks are considered three great net institutions: NABARD (the National Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development) in India; ACCU (the Association of Asian Confederation of 
Credit Unions) in Asia and BRDB (the Bangladesh Rural Development Board) in Bangladesh. 
 
 
 
Finally, if we consider the estimated number of families for each 
region in the world under the line of poverty and compare it with the 
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number of families reached by the microfinance services, we can 
understand how there is an enormous unfulfilled demand and a huge 
potential of development for such institutions (table 1.2.4).  
 Although a great expansion, a lot of institutions still meet big 
difficulties in reaching acceptable levels of sustainability exposing in 
this way the process and the same beneficiaries to a strong weakness. 
Though the problem of sustainability has become one of the main 
issues in the debate on microfinance it will not be the object of our 
analysis, which, on the contrary, will try to focalize on the interactions 
inside the institutions and precisely on the relation of credit-debt  and 
on the methodologies used to realize it. 
 
 
Table 1.2.4:  Number of families reached by the microfinance    
 
Source: State of the Microcredit Summit CampaignReport 2005 
 
 
 
As the only knowledge of data is not sufficient to understand a 
phenomenon, afterwards we will concentrate briefly on the exam of 
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the typologies of clients who are reached, the institutions that offer 
microfinance services and finally the products and methodologies 
adopted. In this way, when the analysis will get to its main focus, it 
will be possible within this frame to understand why some choices and 
methodologies are adopted. Let us give then a face to the numbers. 
 
 
1.2.1.1  Analysis of demand: beneficiaries/clients 
The demand of basic financial services is constituted by all those 
persons excluded by the traditional financial system, from the poorest 
workers in the informal sector to the self-employed workers and 
finally to the small entrepreneurs in the various sectors from trade to 
services in general, from the agricultural sector to the artisanship. 
Some of these, mostly of them are women, ask for a credit in 
order to start some activities or to invest in their already existing small 
activities to make them stable and not occasional. The context in 
which they operate maybe of an urban or a rural type, typically it 
concerns villages so as it may concern contexts of developed or 
developing economies. This is reflected both on the types of activities, 
which present different needs of credit and are addressed to different 
markets and on the applicable methodologies.  
Though different levels of poverty are present, the lowest 
common denominator has to be looked for in the fact that they are 
“active poor”. This means that they are able to use the received credit 
for the creation of productive activities and are able to express a “debt 
capacity”. In other terms they can generate a flow of income which 
enables them to honour the loan and to develop their activity. So it is 
not the level of poverty that is particularly significant but, on the 
contrary, the possibility of making full use or not of the credit in order 
to produce their own income and reach an economic autonomy.  
The target of the so called “ultra poor”, requires therefore an 
integrated and coordinated approach with other forms of intervention 
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able to grant the satisfaction of the functionabilities of such persons 
before offering a possibility of development of their capabilities.  
The acknowledgment of the heterogeneity and 
multidimensionality of the poverty phenomenon is a  fundamental 
starting point for the creation of appropriate instruments of struggle 
(4).  
 
 
1.2.1.2  Analysis of supply: institutional typologies 
It is possible to detect a scheme of the different institutional 
typologies inside which to consider the experiences of microfinance 
which have been developed. In the following scheme (table 1.2.5) 
they are distinguished on the base of the fact that they are their part of 
the formal or semiformal sector of credit (it depends on the system of 
rules, authority and laws to which they are subjected). In the last 
column we have considered those informal circuits of credit and 
saving which are still complementary and widely practised, especially 
in places in which the communities have maintained strong their 
systems of relations and live also the memory of old practices. 
 
 
Table 1.2.5:  Institutional typologies  
FORMAL SECTOR  SEMIFORMAL 
SECTOR  
INFORMAL SECTOR 
Public Banks of 
Development 
Saving and Credit 
Cooperatives 
Rotating Savings 
Credit Associations 
Self-help Groups 
Private Commercial 
Banks 
Non banking 
organizations  
Moneylenders and 
saving collectors 
Microfinance Banks  Family and neighbour 
circuits 
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Let us consider some features of these typologies. 
 
Public Banks of Development 
They are public banks formed in the seventies thanks to funds of 
international institutions with the aim of giving mainly a state-
sustained rural credit. They have known deep crises but some 
succeeded in learning from their mistakes. It is the case of the BRI 
(Bank Rakyat Indonesia) which just in 1983, from the reorganization 
of the base level of the bank, ‘desa unit’, followed a different 
commercial approach which led it to reach two millions and half of 
current microloans in 1999 and to give a service to the rural areas of 
Indonesia where the 80% of the population live. Other banks of 
development opened special counters often looking for some 
partnerships with commercial banks in Latin America and Central 
Eastern Europe.  
 
Private Commercial Banks 
In the last years, mainly in the industrialized countries, commercial 
banks have started microfinance projects in a direct way or as second 
level institutions financing ONG in the south of the world. On the 
contrary the institutions of microfinance which have the legal form of 
commercial banks to all intents and purposes are few. Among these 
the experience of Banco Solidario (BancoSol) in Bolivia, born in 1992 
from Prodrem a non banking association, emerges. It financed more 
than a million of microenterprises and counts in 2004 almost eight 
thousand of current loans and almost as many deposits. It offers all the 
financial services: from individual loans to in a little part group loans, 
loans to the production and consumption, guaranties, saving accounts, 
international transfers, services of current account and bank cards. It 
has been quoted at the American financial market since 1994. 
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Microfinance Banks 
Such category includes all those banks born as microcredit bank on 
the model of the Grameen Bank and which have often special legal 
statutes. The “rural bank” founded in 1983 by Muhammad Yunus, 
who is called the “banker of the poor”, counts more than five million 
of beneficiaries. Such experience will be widely examined in the 
following paragraph. In Bangladesh we can find also two other 
organizations, the ASA and the BRAC, both with a number of clients 
which is about from three to four million. Other experiences of those 
ones we could call “quasi-commercial banks” which follow a 
commercial approach and operate thanks to special state laws can be 
found in Peru for example with the MiBanco (Accion Comunitaria del 
Peru) and in Bolivia with Cayas de Ahorro. 
 
Credit cooperatives    
The diffusion of such cooperatives, as we have seen above, dates back 
already to the 19th century, on the inspiration of the Raiffeisen’s 
model. For this reason, given their strong identity, the process of 
cooperation and integration with microfinance institutions has been 
almost slow. Such relation has been particularly profitable and 
allowed for example in France the rise of ADIE which is recognized 
today as the guide institution in Europe. They are wide spread in 
America, in the form of Credit Union, in Africa ( suffice it to think to 
the Credit Mutuel in Senegal or to the bank of cereals, which reminds 
us the idea of “mons” of cereals and pietas) and obviously in Europe 
both in Western and Eastern Europe (Bosnia, Albania, Poland, 
Rumania) where they had a main role in the process of transaction to a 
market economy, as Maria Nowak testifies (5).  
 
Non banking organizations 
For the most part they are projects born from non governmental 
organizations (ONG) and private and public foundations. As the 
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collection and the saving management require a quite structured legal 
form, often such organization are mainly concentrated in the exclusive 
disbursement of microloans adding to them training services of “social 
intermediation”. In general, however, it can be said that the 
institutional type which commonly has been used in microfinance is 
just that one of the ONG independent and non profit oriented. If they 
have in common with the cooperatives and the Self Help groups a 
strong territorial and local rootedness unlike these ones, they are 
managed by microfinance operators and not by the same beneficiaries 
of the services. If these characteristics make them particularly flexible 
and sometimes more effective than governmental institutions, 
unfortunately often they are very weak realities because of their 
dimension and little efficiency and professionalism. However  some of 
them have succeeded in giving themselves a long term prospect in a 
process of institutional development. In this direction they have 
become significant realities, recognized by governments, up to be able 
to influence national laws. In Europe, some case studies of particular 
success can be found such as the ADIE in France, First Step in 
Ireland, the WEETU and Street UK in England etc. All these are 
members of the most important network of microfinance institutions 
in Europe, the EMN (European Microfinance Network) 
 
Rotating savings, credit associations and Self Help groups  
We have already widely spoken about this institutional type and its 
diffusion. Particularly they have a main role in the rural economies, 
such as in Africa, where they have constituted, together with the 
Peasant Banks, the only possibility to accede to credit and the only 
way to get over the problems in agricultural production. There are 
different levels of complexity and specificity that such institutions can 
reach from the simple rotating savings of tontine to more developed 
forms of credit associations which in addition to the collection of 
money allow forms of saving investment. They are so solid structures 
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that in Nigeria the person who does not respect the agreement is 
considered “dead”, that is definitely excluded from the social group. 
 
In such a complex situation there are some networks of support and 
inter-institutional cooperation. They are interested in diffusing the 
knowledge of the “best practices”, in guiding the process of 
development of little realities and in providing guaranties and 
emergency founds coordinating the strategies of intervention. A 
symbolic case is given by the network of financial and technical 
support that Accion has created. It involves 15 countries in Latin 
America, 5 in Africa and a lot of cities in the United States for an 
amount of almost one million active clients. FINCA shows a 
comparable experience operating in three continents where it has 
spread the model of village banking. Another international network is 
CGAP (Consultative Group to Assist the poorest) constituted by the 
World Bank, while in Europe we can find EMN in the West and Mfc 
in the East since 1998. The last example is given by the Grameen 
Trust, which supports replication programmes on the base of the 
Grameen model all around the world.  
      
1.2.1.3  Analysis of services and commodities offered 
It is possible to consider a synthetic scheme (table 1.2.6) of activities 
which a microfinance institution can do. Such consideration is basic 
because it allows us to distinguish two approaches: the “minimal” one 
followed by some microfinance institutions which presumes the 
almost exclusive supply of basic financial services; the “integrated” 
one which starting from a multidimensional view of the client, 
provides for additional services to the person and to the activity 
financed. Such choice is congruent with the belief that poverty is a 
multidimensional condition and the only way to slip through the trap 
that it generates consists in acting on several fronts.  
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Table 1.2.6:   Integrated and minimal approaches 
INTEGRATED Approach 
 
       MINIMAL approach 
 
Financial intermediation Enterprise development services 
Credit  
- for the investment in productive 
activities 
- for consumption (to a lesser degree) 
Collection and saving management 
Insurances 
Credit and smart card 
Payment services 
International transfer of money 
(remittances) 
Business plan development  
Technological and marketing 
services     
Commercial and accounting 
consulence 
Production and selling services 
(facilities in the access to market 
both for the relation with providers 
and final clients and the creation of 
support networks ) 
Social intermediation Social services 
Training courses and investment in: 
Development of Human capital 
(through the financial and economic 
literacy, the development of 
entrepreneurial and professional 
skills) 
Development of Social Capital 
(management of group resources and 
incentives to the formation of 
parallel systems of assistance, 
coordination and cooperation)  
Creation of a relation on fiduciary 
basis between the client and the 
microfinance institutions 
Educational programmes 
Literacy programmes 
Health and public welfare 
programmes 
 
(Scheme adapted from Ledgerwood 1999) 
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We can distinguish four classes of services corresponding to 
two different approaches. Just because they are financial and non 
financial services it is necessary that the approach in the supply of 
each one is inspired by different specific criteria, in other terms, not 
all the institutions are due to offer the complete range of services 
considered.          
 As it comes to be evident each of these services  gives an 
answer to different aims and this may cause difficult settlements of 
trade off. As Ledgerwood (1999) suggests, it is necessary to pass to a 
systemic approach which presumes an inter-institutional cooperation 
in order to obtain different goals through different institutional 
typologies.       
    The category of services particularly interesting for the 
development of the analysis of interactions and relational structures, to 
which, in my opinion, none of the microfinance institution can 
renounce, is that one of the social intermediation. 
In fact it concerns ‘the process of creating social capital as a 
support to sustainable financial intermediation with poor and 
disadvantaged groups of individuals’ (Bennett 1997 quoted in 
Ledgerwood, 1999). If for social capital we refer, as we will see in the 
second chapter to those  networks, systems of norms and trust that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation, then it is evident how it is 
central to study in which terms microfinance institutions can be 
considered “enabling” institutions in the development of the 
endowment of social capital of a given community. But at the same 
time it is necessary to consider in which way, the social capital and the 
existing relational structures influence the credit methodologies 
adopted and more generally the credit-debt relation between 
institution and beneficiary.  
 In the following paragraphs we will deal with the analysis of 
the methodologies developed by microfinance institutions, particularly 
concerning the distinction between group and individual lending. In 
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the second chapter the complex relation between microfinance and 
social capital will be considered.  
 
1.2.2   The system of Group lending: a new methodology of credit  
Although the most known methodology of group lending is that 
created by M.Yunus, at least other two can be identified: the first one, 
often called “solidarity group” has been created by Accion; the second 
one, the “village banking” has been promoted by FINCA since its 
origins. The basic idea which gets inspiration from informal systems 
of credit and savings, is to allow people without collaterals to obtain 
an individual loan through the constitution of a group. Although the 
loan is individual all persons in the group are linked: in fact if one 
member of the group meets some problems in repayments each 
member will suffer the consequences.  
 Starting from this common basis we are going to describe the 
main features of each methodology considering as case studies the 
three institutions mentioned before. The economic problems, typically 
of informative nature at the basis of the credit-debt relation and the 
possible set of methodological answers, will be considered in the 
paragraph 1.4.  
 
The Grameen Bank: the creation of the “grameen group” 
M.Yunus’s experience started in 1976, at first in the ‘laboratory’ of 
the village of Jobra (near the University of Chittagong) where he tried 
‘to unlearn theory and to draw lessons from reality’ (Yunus 2001).  It 
was just this experience that offered him an economic problem, often 
mentioned as ‘Sufia’s problem’ (7). The woman was in a condition 
which the development economists call “poverty trap”, that is a trap 
that makes impossible to go out from a condition of poverty because 
the possible process of saving and capital accumulation is stopped. 
The story, told by M. Nowak (2005), clarifies the problem:  
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“in a street of Ouagadougou, in Burkina Faso, I have known a little 
bootblack called Moussa, who wanted at all costs to polish my 
sandals. I have asked him: 
How much do you earn?     
Three hundred francs Cfa 
How do you use this money? 
I keep a half to eat and give the remaining part to my employer 
Who is your employer? 
The shoe brush owner 
At first Yunus tried to rediscover the deep as well as etymological 
meaning of the word credit, that is to believe, to trust that the 
borrower is able to create richness. The following step was to devise 
‘an institutional system’ that allowed to set up the credit-debt relation 
following some new methodologies which would have given the 
unbankable persons the possibility to get a loan and to honour it. Such 
system materialized in the Grameen Bank founded in Bangladesh in 
1983, then it spread thanks to Grameen replication programs all over 
the world. 
 The basic unit is represented by a group of five persons, ‘like 
the fingers of a hand’, who choose to constitute autonomously in 
group. The members of the group, almost the totality are women, are 
persons that have no possibility to access to credit from the formal 
financial sector (so they are called unbankable) and want to start 
autonomously a productive activity. All the members of the group 
must come from the same village but not from the same family group. 
Moreover generally they must constitute groups homogeneous with 
regard to the sex and the assets they are endowed. Eight groups, 
coming from the same village constitute a ‘Centre’ which can be 
considered their ‘big group’ of reference; in turn 60/70 centres form a 
‘Branch’ until to arrive at The Head Office in Dhaka through a 
brunched system.  
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 After the group has been formed and trained by a Grameen 
operator, they start to meet weekly. The meetings take place in a 
building of the village; a Grameen operator, generally a man, and the 
eight groups that form the Centre participate. Belonging to the 
Grameen family implies to adhere to a series of rules, called the 
‘sixteen decisions’ that aim to carry on an educational process that 
would have an impact in their living habits. The loan, individual and 
generally annual, is given to the members of the group in a sequential 
way 2-2-1 (temporally the sequence occurs with a scheme that 
presumes an intermediate time from four to six weeks).  
Each group appoints its own president, who at the beginning is 
just the person who will be the last to receive the loan. He has the task 
of collecting and giving all the group’s instalments to the Grameen 
operator. The sequence carries a well definite responsibility: if those 
who have received a loan do not respect the rules and the weekly 
repayments during the meetings, they exclude automatically the other 
members of the group from the possibility to access to any other loan 
from the Grameen Bank. For this reason all the decisions concerning 
each funds and the sequence of the loans are taken inside the group.  
In addition to the weekly instalments, the members of the group 
have to set apart some saving amounts half of which will be put on a 
personal account and the other half on the so called Centre Fund. 
Besides in this last one they deposit the 5% of initial loan when they 
obtain the credit. Each member of the group can accede to such 
common fund only after the repayment of the loan or if at least five 
years have passed. The Centre manages this fund and uses it to cover 
contingent emergency situations (scarcity of food, natural calamities, 
etc) or also sometimes to do so that the repayment of the instalments 
is complied. Such fund is the only financial link between the ‘little 
group’ of the five and the Centre, but not the only relational link as we 
will see analysing the role of the mechanism of peer pressure. 
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 The Grameen Bank is a typical example of integrated approach 
because other types of loans can be practiced (housing loan, higher 
education loan, beggars’ loan) with different interest rates and times 
of refunding. Moreover ‘the Grameen family’, as they use to call 
themselves revealing a perception of community entity, presents in 
addition to the Grameen Bank some institutions which offer other 
services. For example the Grameen Uddog offers channels of trade to 
the textile producers, while the Grameen Phone allows to introduce 
communication technologies among the villages and finally the 
Grameen Shikkha develops educational programmes. Such 
methodology, inspired by the great success obtained in terms of 
capillary growth and of rates of refunding always around 98%, has 
shown some problems and rigidity that made necessary to rethink 
about the classical model and produced the so called Grameen Bank II 
in 2002. As such new methodology implies the introduction of the 
individual loan outside the group we will deal with it later on, 
comparing it to other experiences. 
 
The solidarity group    
Such credit methodology was initially created and experimented in 
Latin America by ACCION international. Today it is spread all over 
the world, especially in Africa and Latin America. In this case the 
group is composed by three/ten members, mainly women, active in the 
informal sector of trade. They need little amount of working capital, 
that is a loan that they repay in almost short terms with weekly 
instalments. Their impossibility of giving some collaterals is 
overcome through the self constitution of a group in which each 
member is jointly responsible for the repayment of everybody’s loans. 
Only in the case of regular payment of all the instalment the group can 
have access to further loans. These ones will tend to increase in their 
amount and in the repayment schedule as the beneficiary will 
demonstrate to have increased his/her debt capacity.  
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The total amount of the loans is given by the operator to the 
leader of the group who immediately gives it to all the members (the 
amount of the first loan is equal for all the members while there is 
flexibility for the successive loans). Therefore there must not be a 
direct relation between the operator and the beneficiaries even if the 
operator has the task of evaluating the profitableness of the economic 
project for which the loan is required and sometimes he/she goes 
directly to examine the running of each activity. Besides, social 
intermediation and training programmes, in which the operators have 
direct contacts with the beneficiaries, are provided.  
Finally, it is constituted an initial saving fund, as in the 
Grameen case, that functions as guarantee to a part of the loan but, 
instead of using compulsory saving, they prefer to encourage the 
formation of informal nets of saving. 
 
The  village banking     
They are credit and saving associations, particularly common in the 
rural communities, that make use of self-constituted big groups from 
30 to 100 members. The village bank, is managed by some of its 
elected members who are then trained by microfinance institutions 
which besides have the task to lend the initial funds to the village 
bank. The bank, in turn, with those funds issues the first loans to its 
members who will have to save the 20% of the loan received step by 
step. The first loan is usually of short-term and the repayments are 
weekly. The microfinance institution goes on financing for ten/twelve 
cycles the village bank proportionally to the process of capitalization 
that follows that one of accumulation of saving of its members, until 
the bank starts an autonomous path. Such institutions present a high 
level of independence and democratic nature in the decisional 
processes which realize during frequent weekly and monthly 
meetings. There are a lot of different variations to this scheme created 
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by FINCA in the second half of the 80s that then spread in Africa, 
Latin America and Eurasia.  
Though the ‘original and old’ idea of setting up the credit-debt 
relation on a group methodology is considered the braking off element 
with the ‘tried-and-true banking practices’, really the revolutionary 
idea of a new practice of credit and of financial services is also 
expressed through a series of devices and innovation in the individual 
‘credit technology’. The element of identity of microfinance consists 
in the recognition of the right to have access to credit and in the belief 
that adapting the services to the persons’ needs, it is possible to set up 
a credit relation also with those who are excluded by the traditional 
banks. In the 90s the practice of group lending and the discovery of 
some of its limits led a lot of its original promoters to elaborate new 
approaches based on the use of the individual methodology. 
 
1.2.3   New ideas and approaches looking for best practices 
The methodology of individual loan, adopted together with the group 
lending scheme in the last years by a lot of institutions all over the 
world (as Bancosol in Bolivia), has had a particular success in the 
urban context with heterogeneous population or in rural areas with a 
low density of population. The loan is on average bigger in its amount 
than the group loan and is addressed to unbankable persons who want 
to start or invest on an autonomous enterprise. 
 The access to credit takes place only after an accurate analysis 
of the business project to which the client works followed by an 
operator of the microfinance institutions. At such phase, the 
preliminary investigation of credit places a great role as the Irish 
experience of First Step testifies. The credit received covers a great 
part of the investment in working capital even if generally a 
contribution, even minimal, of borrower’s own capital is required.   
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 As for the guarantee in the absence of joint responsibility, an 
almost flexible approach is adopted:  
(i) no request of guarantees but analysis of the subject’s debt 
capacity and of his/her family group; 
(ii) ‘notional’ collateral: the guarantees are given by some 
goods which are estimated not on the basis of the expected 
value of their selling on the market, but considering the 
value that they have for the borrower. It is the case of the 
BRI in Indonesia or of the BancoSol in Bolivia where, for 
example, an inventory of minimal assets possessed by the 
beneficiary is made and documents of property rights or 
commercial contracts are excepted as guarantees. Looking 
back, such approach was adopted also by the first  Mons 
Pietatis that, as historians testify, had a very flexible 
approach to collaterals. Because of the high cost of a legal 
action relatively to the market value of goods, very often 
these guaranties are not used by the creditors; 
(iii) Guaranties or ‘moral-relational collateral’: they are normal 
contracts of guarantee, as we have seen already practiced by 
the first merchants. In such case the credit-debt relation 
becomes of triangular type and the guarantor warrants first 
of all the beneficiary’s morality and then he applies himself 
in monitoring the beneficiary in the repayment of the loan. 
Only in the extreme case of not repayment he also stands 
surety for the loan materially. Such approach is adopted 
with success in France by the ADIE. A significant element 
which we will recall, is that the guarantor can also be an 
association of which the potential beneficiary is member 
and mainly the microfinance institution does not investigate 
on the goods owned by the guarantors.  
In all these experiences the loan follows a progressive dynamics, as in 
the original Grameen model, that means the borrower can accede to 
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loans with growing amounts proportionally to the development of the 
enterprise and the improving of his/her debt capacity. The repayments 
take place on a weekly or monthly basis and sometimes it is made use 
of the so called public repayment. Generally the contractual clauses 
are inspired by criteria of flexibility so as to give a better answer to the 
productive activities providing for pre-amortization periods together 
with rearrangement of the debt as in the case of Grameen II model. 
Finally a particular attention is given to the services of consulence and 
mentoring to the productive activities mainly in the first years. 
 A recent research presented by Microbanking Bulletin 2002 
proposed by Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 2005, shows as the 
microfinance institutions that adopt the individual loan tend to have 
the following characteristics: a) they are on average smaller in terms 
of number of clients; b) they give loans on average of a greater 
amount; c) the payees are fairly distributed between women and men 
with a light predominance of these last ones; d) they practice some 
lower interest rates in view of lower costs (the significant datum is 
that for each dollar lent in the individual loan the operative costs 
affects of 20% while in the group loan of 37%).  
Though these data highlight important differences, they present 
a very strong bias given by the place of greater/lower diffusion of the 
two methodologies and by the different type of target they are 
addressed to. It is significant the fact that the Bancosol uses the group 
loan (Solidario) for persons with more modest enterprises providing 
them little sums and the individual loan (Sol individual) for persons 
who come from medium high segments of poor and also want to 
develop more structured activities.                      
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1.3    The credit-debt relation: structural problems, new  
solutions  
 
The study and the comprehension of the ratio at the basis of the new 
financial methodologies and particularly of practices of credit 
elaborated, require a structural analysis of the credit-debt relation. 
This will permit the settlement of an analytical frame inside which to 
detect the problems and the answers of the different approaches, as 
well the results and the limits that each of them presents. Besides it 
will allow us, after giving space to the description of the phenomenon 
of microfinance starting from its inspiring origins, to analyse in a 
comparative way credit relational structures on vertical and horizontal 
base, as well the role of the collateral and the way in which the group 
compensates for its absence.  
 As it has been widely highlighted, the sector of credit is 
characterized by a considerable complexity that requires the analysis 
not only of its formal horizon, but also of the informal one where the 
moneylenders play a first level role. On this point literature 
particularly pose over starting from Amit Bhaduri’s works in the 70s 
of the 20th century.  
The root problem which such field of research detected 
concerns the position of moneylenders’ monopoly, that would allow 
the practice of usurer interest rate. This situation puts in motion 
mechanisms of expropriation and disincentive to the innovation and 
development (Bhaduri, 1973). On the other hand, as some assert, the 
problem of high interest rates would reflect high transaction costs as 
well as the risk of the financial venture in the absence of collateral.  
Though in the course of the analysis we will not pose over such 
wide debate, it must be taken into account that microfinance and its 
methodologies were born to give an answer not only to a difficulty of 
the formal sector of credit to grant the request of the so-called 
unbankable subjects, but also in order to deactivate mechanisms 
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present inside the informal system of credit in which the credit 
relation is invalidated by an imbalance between the two contractors. 
 The analysis will focalize on the study of the informative 
problem which the credit-debt relation presents in the vertical relation 
(creditor-debtor) and the way in which the setting up of a relation 
creditor-group, that uses the horizontal relation inside the group, can 
move on a different level the informative problems so as to 
compensate to the lack of collateral.  
At this point it is essential to analyse the horizontal relational 
structure inside the group in order to understand the possible dynamic 
and the effect that these ones generate on the relation with the 
creditor. The study of problems which such intra group relations can 
present will lead to highlight possible strategies of answer and 
possible new methodologies.  
In this area the development of overlapping relations and 
triangular relations combined with the adoption of dynamic incentives 
and mechanism of monitoring that the modern technologies of 
individual loan are developing, become interesting.  
 
 
 1.3.1   The ‘Informative problem’ behind the credit-debt relation 
The credit-debt relation presents two main actors: a subject who wants 
to invest in a project or in general wants to have access to a capital of 
which he/she is not the owner; another subject who has an availability 
of capital that under certain conditions he/she is disposed to lend.  
The interaction between these two actors who decide to set up a 
credit-debt relation can be analyzed as a problem of agency: the 
principal (the person who disposes of the capital) has to face a series 
of informative problems.  
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The first one is related to the difficulty and often impossibility 
because of high costs that it would entail, to know deeply the 
characteristics of the potential borrower (the agent) both on personal 
terms and for what concerns the investment.  
The second one is given by the difficulty of observing and 
monitoring the agent’s actions and non actions when, received the 
credit, he/she carries out the investment. The last problem is 
represented by the impossibility to check the investment return and to 
obtain that the credit is honoured.  
 In literature the first problem which substantiates in the 
difficulty of selecting the potential credit worthy beneficiaries is 
called of adverse selection, while it is used the term moral hazard to 
define the problem of monitoring and enforcement in the repayment of 
a loan. Such informative problems, at the basis of the relation, 
therefore realize in three times as it is possible to see in the following 
scheme: 
 
 
Figure 1.3.1: Dynamic of the credit-debt relation and of informative  
problem 
 
                   Credit is given           Investment generates returns                             
adverse selection                   ex ante                                    ex post  
                     moral hazard                             moral hazard 
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 The request of collateral, as well as the constitution of legal 
institutions aimed to grant the enforcement (for example the court of 
law), were born just from the necessity of giving an answer to 
problems of informative nature. At the same time from history we 
have seen how such problems were less present in contexts in which 
the actors involved in the credit relation belonged to a group, for 
example the ROSCAs or the society of merchants. In both these cases, 
they were linked by a set of relations which reduced the problem of 
the valuation of the credit worthy as well as that one of monitoring 
and enforcement of the relation. Moving from this observation it is 
possible therefore to detect two types of relational structures: a 
vertical credit-debt relation and a horizontal one.   
  The vertical credit-debt relation has been already described 
using the interpretative scheme of the principal-agent. It is 
characterized by the fact that the subjects involved are “strangers” that 
is they are not linked by other relations besides the credit-debt one. 
For this reason they are unable to reduce the informative problem and 
the problem of adverse selection is maximum. Moreover, the 
enforcement of contract realizes thanks to a mechanism external to the 
relation that is implemented by institutions and norms, as well thanks 
to the presence of a collateral. This is the relation that typically is 
present in the formal sector of credit, where not only persons are 
unable to offer a collateral but also the costs to obtain information are 
very high. In this way they become unbankable subjects.  
  The relation on horizontal base, that for example we find again 
in the credit associations, is characterized by the fact that the subjects 
directly or indirectly involved in the relation are more than two. In 
fact such subjects belong to a group, inside which the members are 
linked by a system of relations that precedes the credit-debt one. This 
allows to use the existence of an informative stock of knowledge 
which reduces the problem of adverse selection as well as enables 
mechanisms of monitoring and enforcement among peers. In other 
 44 
words each member of the group has a story and a future.  
 Besides, unlike the credit-debt relation of vertical type, the credit 
which is given often comes from the same group in which each one is 
in different times creditor and debtor. Finally, it is to be noticed that 
enforcement is realized internally to the horizontal structure through 
the same group and the system of internal rules recognized among 
peers.               
 The credit-debt relation that microfinance institutions have 
developed, as we have already seen, can be considered coming from 
an overlap of the two structures just described. The microfinance 
institutions which adopt the group methodology do not establish a 
vertical relation with a single subject but with a subject who is 
embedded inside a group that takes up a form joint responsibility. 
Therefore, it is possible to think to a creditor-group relation in which 
the group is a subject that has internal resources capable to solve the 
informative problem.        
 As a matter of fact it is on the system of horizontal relations 
inside the group that the informative problems, emerging in the 
vertical principal-agent relation, are transferred. The fact that the 
members of the group are called to assume the responsibility of self 
forming in a group, and so of self selection, makes the microfinance 
institution to get through the first problem of adverse selection. Not 
only the costs of finding some information on borrowers are 
eliminated but also the selection is more effective, because the 
existence of a reciprocal responsibility leads each member to choose 
carefully his ‘mates of adventure’.      
 Besides, as the possibility of having access to credit of each 
member depends on the others’ behaviour in the Grameen group, or 
even there is a joint liability, in the case of the solidarity group some 
mechanisms of peer monitoring and peer enforcement begin 
automatically.  
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 A possible graphic of the three structures of the credit-debt 
relation is the following: 
 
Figure 1.3.2: Three different credit-debt relations 
 
     
 
 
 
    Vertical C-D relation                                     Horizontal C-D relation                           
 
 
 
 
Overlapped C-D relation 
 
 On the basis of this distinction, in the following paragraphs the 
informative problems present in a vertical credit-debt relation will be 
studied. The aim is to detect how the problem of agency is solved by 
the methodologies of group lending. Such study will require then to 
concentrate on the horizontal relation inside the group to understand 
its dynamics. Also we will focus on the theoretical models presented 
through recent empirical contributions which have underlined how in 
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reality such methodology realizes. This will enable us to highlight the 
potentialities and the limits that the group lending presents and to 
analyse the possible strategies and methodologies which in the last 
years a lot of institutions of microfinance are creating and 
experimenting. 
 
1.3.2   Group lending: the solution of the informative problem 
The analysis of the informative problems highlighted finds in 
literature its model of reference in Stiglitz and Weiss’s contribution 
(1981). It is necessary, therefore, to take into consideration this 
analytical scheme because it will allow us then to analyse those 
successive contributions in which the credit-debt relation is studied 
considering the mechanisms of peer selection, monitoring and 
enforcement inside the group (Ghatak 1999; Ghatak and Guinnane 
1999; Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 2005).    
  In the presentation and development of these models will be 
adopted the formulation proposed by Armendariz de Aghion and 
Morduch (2005) in which at first the problem of adverse selection is 
considered and then that one of moral hazard. These informative 
problems are studied in a context of limited liability, that is a situation 
in which the debtor is not able to give a collateral and therefore the 
repayment of the loan will depend exclusively on the investment 
return. This model shows the reason why the formal financial system 
excludes those subjects that are unable to offer some collaterals. This 
implies that the credit relation will present high operative costs. 
1.3.2.1  A model of Adverse Selection    
Let us consider an economy in which only two subjects, neutral with 
regard to risk, are present. They want to maximize their profits and are 
distinguished for only one characteristic: their ‘inherent’ risk for 
which one will be safe debtor-investor and the other one a risky 
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debtor-investor. Both of them want to invest 1 US$ and not having the 
necessary capital have to apply to a bank which we assume operates in 
a competitive market (in such way it is avoided to analyse the case of 
monopoly from the side of the credit offer). The fact that both of them 
are not provided of collaterals implies that the repayment of the loan 
will take place only on the basis of the income flow that the 
investment produces.  
The bank is not able to distinguish the ‘types’ of subjects, in other 
terms it is not able to select the risky subject from the safe one.  
Besides, let us suppose that the investment returns can be of the type: 
 
(i) in the case of the safe subject:  
Investment =1 US$  Certain return = yS    
(ii) in the case of the risky subject:  
Investment =1 US$ 
    Return = yR    with probability     p     0<p<1 
    Return  = 0    with probability  (1-p) 
 
In order to simplify the model, let us suppose that the expected returns 
for the two types of investors are equal (yS=pyR).  
Besides we know that the risky subject with probability p will 
obtain a yR greater than yS, while if he is unlucky he will not be able to 
pay back the loan having a return equal to zero. On the contrary the 
safe subject will be always able to repay his/her loan. 
The bank supports a cost for unit of dollar lent equal to k 
because it will face transaction costs and will have to pay some 
interests to the savers.  
The presence of these costs implies that k > 1 US$. In a 
competitive market these are the minimum costs which the bank must 
cover and which define the minimum level of expected return that an 
investment must have to be financed. In other terms the condition of 
efficiency requires that:  yS> k  and  pyR > k. 
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If in the economy considered only subjects of ‘safe’ type were 
present, the bank should have to apply an interest rate equal to k 
because subjects are always solvent. But since also ‘risky’ types are 
present and the bank is not able to distinguish the types of debtors, it 
will have to apply an interest rate R > k that allows it to cover the 
costs. This interest rate applied irrespective of the type of debtor must 
be such that the expected return from the lending activity is equal to k 
for unit of dollar. In fact the bank only knows that a part q of the 
subjects who apply for the loan is of safe type and the remaining (1-q) 
of risky type therefore it will establish: 
[ q + (1-q) p] R = k 
from which we will derive an interest rate:         
R = k / [ q + (1-q) p] 
Collecting from that, we will have:                     
 
R = k + A    con A = [k(1-q)(1-p)] / [ q+(1-q)p] 
 
It means that the interest rate the bank will have to apply to both types 
of subjects will be greater than in the safe situation. If R becomes very 
high this might discourage or even prevent the safe subjects from 
applying for a loan, even if their investment would be to be financed 
because it is ex ante efficient: (yS> k).  
It is the same type of inefficiency that is present in Akerlof’s 
model of ‘the market of lemons’ (1970). This inefficiency comes from 
the fact that the safe investors are forced implicitly to support the risky 
investors. The problem that this model highlights is therefore of credit 
rationing so that, in the present of adverse selection, the bank is not 
able to practice an interest rate which at the same time makes possible 
to cover the costs and allows the access to all the credit worthy 
subjects.  
This model also suggests how the increase of the interest rate 
from the bank is not always profitable because this strategy 
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exacerbates problems of incentives. On the basis of this model then 
we can consider how the group methodology solves the problem of 
adverse selection and leads the problem to an efficient solution.    
 
1.3.2.2  Adverse selection and ‘Peer selection’ 
Let us suppose that the bank decides to adopt a methodology of group 
loan with the aim of solving the inefficiency and differentiate 
implicitly the interest rate for the two types: safe and risky, such as it 
is lower for the safe investor.  
Though the bank continues not being able to distinguish the 
types of costumers, the fact that they are required to constitute 
autonomously into groups linked by any form of responsibility makes 
the problem of adverse selection moved on a horizontal plan. At the 
group level, as each subject is not conditioned by the information 
problem of the bank, knowing the ‘types’, the bank will be able to 
select those with whom constitute into a group. This possibility 
implies that the safe type will form groups of only safe types through 
self selection, so that they do not have to support the risky types in 
case of insolvency. Consequently the risky types will be able to 
constitute only into groups with as many risky types. This process, 
called of “assortative matching”, enables the bank in the lack of 
information to operate applying the same contract to the two types and 
at the same time reducing the risk.  
The fact that the bank is greatly insured against the risk 
depends from the fact that through the responsibility of the group the 
risky investors come to pay more often than in the case in which the 
relation was vertical: creditor-debtor. This implies the possibility for 
the bank to reduce the interest rate practiced, facing at the same time a 
smaller risk, permitting the reintegration of safe investors who 
previously were excluded.  
 Taking again the same formulation, let us suppose that the bank 
asks the persons to constitute into groups of two persons. If a fraction 
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q of the population was of safe type when they will constitute into a 
group, the number of groups (safe, safe) will still be q and 
consequently we will have (1-q) pairs of type: risky, risky.  
Given the joint liability, in the case of groups (s,s) there are no 
possibilities of insolvency, while in the case of the groups (r,r) the 
activities are risky.  
Therefore there are two possibilities: 
 
(i) one of the members runs into a failure (this may happen 
with probability (1-p) ) and the other one pays for both, 
under the assumption that the investment return will allow 
him to do so (yR > 2R); 
(ii) both the members run into a failure and this may happen 
with probability (1-p)(1-p). 
This last probability is of default for the bank and we call it   
g = (1-p) (1-p) = 1-(1-p)
2 
 
From this scenario the bank has expected payments equal to: 
[q + (1-q)g] R
G
      (RG : interest rate with group methodology) 
which implies the application of an interest rate  
R
G
 = k/ [q + (1-q)g] 
in order to cover the costs k.  
This interest rate is lower than that one the bank can apply without 
joint liability: 
 
RG = k/ [q + (1-q)g]          <           R = k / [ q + (1-q) p] 
 
This depends mathematically on the fact that g > p , that is the risky 
borrowers pay more often (with an high probability) compared to the 
individual loan. 
 In the opposed case in which the bank chooses to require a 
collateral, it will be able to offer two different types of contracts: one 
with a high interest rate and a limited collateral; one with a low 
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interest rate and a higher collateral. In such way the two types of 
clients will self select themselves because the risky types would 
choose the first form of contract while the safe types the second one. 
Following this line Ghatak (1999) shows how it is possible to activate 
a mechanism of “assortative matching”  using the group methodology 
and replacing the collateral with a different level of joint liability. This 
allows the bank to know which type of customers are by the company 
they keep.  
 
1.3.2.3  A model of Moral Hazard 
As it has been highlighted, the problem of moral hazard realizes in 
two moments. In the first one the bank is not able to monitor if the 
borrower is doing all the possible so as the investment has a good end 
and he is able to refund the loan. In such case it is spoken of ‘ex ante’ 
moral hazard.  
In a second moment, once the investment has produced a 
return, the bank could not be able to know the true return because the 
agent would have an incentive to declare the failure of his/her 
investment and in such way to free him/herself from the repayment of 
the loan. Such problem is in literature also called ‘auditing costs’ 
referring to the informative costs.  
Besides, even if the bank knew the value of the return, it ought 
to be able to have such legal instrument to force the debtor to refund 
the loan. But if the loan is granted to a poor the bank will not be able 
to apply any form of financial sanctions because of the client’s 
condition. This second problem is called “ex post” moral hazard or 
also “enforcement problem”.  
 Taking again the same formulation presented for the problem 
of adverse selection we see what is the role played by collateral. We 
have in this case only one type of debtor-investor, as before lacking in 
collateral. He/she wants to invest 1 US$ and applies to a competitive 
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bank which practices an interest rate R > k (k is again the cost for unit 
of lent capital supported by the bank).  
Unlike before when the riskiness was a characteristic intrinsic 
to the subject, here the agent can do actions or non actions which have 
an influence on the degree of riskiness of the investment and therefore 
on the possibility or less for the bank to have the loan refunded.  
 
Ex ante        
The debtor-investor may choose: 
(i) to bear a cost in terms of working effort equal to c and to 
obtain with certainty (p=1) a return equal to y and therefore 
to be able to refund with certainty the debt of 1 US$. In this 
case the investor will have a net return equal to (y – R – c); 
(ii) not to bear any cost in terms of effort and obtain a return 
equal to y with probability p <1 to which an expected net 
return equal to (y – R)p  corresponds. 
Comparing these two possibilities the debtor-investor will decide to 
bear the cost c only if: 
(y – R) – c    >    (y – R)p 
which for the bank results in a commitment on the interest rate 
‘incentive compatible’ (IC): 
R < y – [c/(1-p)] 
That is if the rate is higher to this level the subject is incentivated not 
to make working efforts. 
The ex ante condition of efficiency for the investment is obviously 
that y – c > k. The bank has no instrument to force the agent to 
support c except that one of fixing a rate lower than that incentive 
compatible. Here the problem comes: if the application of this rate 
does not allow the bank to cover the costs that is   
k > y – [c/(1-p)] 
the bank will be obliged to fix an interest rate higher than that 
incentive compatible so running into a higher level of risk (p<1).  
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Facing this problem the collateral appears as the possible 
solution because it represents a credible commitment, a guarantee for 
the bank that the borrower will do the possible for the good result of 
the investment. Let us examine how the possibility of offering to the 
bank a collateral of value w modifies the terms of the problem. Even if 
the collateral has a value w < k so that, in the case of the borrower’s 
insolvency (with probability 1-p) the bank can not cover all the costs, 
the only existence of the collateral solves the incentive problem. In 
fact for the agent the commitment becomes: 
(y – R) – c    >    (y – R)p - w(1-p) 
In such way the bank will be able to practise a higher interest rate  
R <  y + [w-c/(1-p)]. 
In the case in which w > k the bank will be able to apply a rate to 
some levels which always allows to grant any loan. 
 
Ex post 
The enforcement problem substantiates in the difficulty for the bank to 
obtain the payment of the loan legally, given the possibility for the 
agent to adopt the strategy “take the money and run”. Let us suppose 
that the investment is always successful because the problem ex ante 
has already been handled and let us consider the role of the collateral. 
Let us suppose that the debtor has given the bank a material guarantee 
of value w and that the bank is able to tackle this object in guarantee 
with probability (1-s). In fact there is a probability s of default for the 
bank when the debtor succeeds in taking the money (y and w) and run.  
Comparing the payoffs ex post for the debtor: 
(i) if he/she does not escape and pays:   y + w – R  
(ii) if he/she escapes and does not pay: (1- s)(y + w) + sy  
It is possible to notice how the incentive commitment becomes:    
y + w – R  >   (1- s)(y + w) + sy 
which is satisfied for values of R < sw. This shows how in the lack of 
collateral (w = 0) or in the case in which the value of w is not such to 
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allow the bank to apply a rate R to cover the costs k, the bank can not 
grant a loan. 
 
1.3.2.4  Moral Hazard and the mechanisms of ‘Peer Monitoring’   
             and ‘Peer Enforcement’  
At this point it is possible to notice how the group methodology finds 
in the horizontal relations an effective substitute of the collateral, 
activating mechanisms that solve the problems ex ante and ex post of 
moral hazard. 
 
Ex ante 
Let us  consider the case in which the bank requires the debtors to 
constitute themselves into groups of two persons linked by a joint 
liability. Each debtor-investor, as before, may choose to support or not 
the cost c, but this time belonging to a group, he/she will have to do 
this choice knowing that in the case in which he/she will not pay 
shuffling off the responsibility on the group he/she will incur in social 
sanctions. The existence of joint liability produces inside the group a 
mechanism of peer monitoring, because each person wants to be sure 
that the other one is doing the possible, that is he/she is supporting the 
cost c in order to reduce the risk of failure. The possible pay-offs 
associated to the choices of the members of the group are: 
(i) both apply in the economic activity and sustain a cost c, so 
the return of the two activities will be (2y – 2R) – 2c  
(ii) both decide not to apply and not to support the cost c. In 
this case, as they are unprovided of collaterals,  they will 
pay back the debt with probability p2 because if a person 
does not make the effort c the probability of success will be 
p < 1. Their expected return will be:  (2y – 2R) with 
probability p2. If only one of the two subjects incur in a 
failure, the other one will be jointly responsible to the bank . 
In this case it is assumed that his/her investment return will 
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be completely used to honour the two debts. 
The incentive compatible commitment with the group methodology 
becomes: 
(2y – 2R) – 2c     >      (2y – 2R)p
2 
which for the bank results in an incentive compatible interest rate:  
R < y – c/(1- p
2
) 
but as p <1 then (1- p2) > (1- p) which means that the bank, thanks to 
the joint liability, has seen relaxed its commitment on the interest rate.  
In this analysis following Stiglitz’s assumption (1990) the costs 
of monitoring and enforcement are not considered, while really they 
influence the choice of the agents and the capacity of the group 
methodology to reduce the inefficiency previously pointed out.  
 
Ex post 
Once the bank is able to satisfy the IC commitment and so to fix a R 
which allows to cover the unitary costs k, the borrowers linked by the 
joint liability will find convenient the cost c and therefore both the 
projects will be successful.  
At this point let us consider how the group is able to monitor 
and to oblige to payment each one of its members. Let us suppose that 
each member of the group is able to know the true return of the 
investment with a probability q and in the case in which one of the 
members tries not to pay, a social sanction equal to d is applied. In this 
case each member of the group will decide to pay only if: 
 
y – R > y – q(d+R) 
R < [ q/(1-q)] d 
 
The case in which q = 0 is that one the bank faces in a vertical relation 
where there is no possibility of knowing the true investment return. 
The presence of a group gives the possibility of having such piece of 
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information with a probability 0<q<1 and makes possible the 
imposition of a sanction d.  
 As the joint liability leads to a peer monitoring in the problem 
ex ante, in the same way and for the same reason, that is to pay for the 
insolvent member, ex post mechanisms of peer monitoring and peer 
enforcement will begin. Even if the group methodology is not based 
on the joint liability as in the case of Grameen group, all that matters 
is that there is a reciprocal responsibility in the horizontal relation 
according to which the consequences of the actions/non actions of the 
members affect the others. This consequence may be the repayment of 
the insolvent subject’s loan (as we have considered in the model) or 
the impossibility of having access to a loan and to benefit of other 
advantages.  
 This model could be considered in a context where the 
monitoring as a certain cost z. Here in order to have an incentive to 
monitoring it is necessary that the cost z is not too high: in other terms 
the information cost would not exceed the benefit that this information 
produces. 
 
 
1.3.3   Going inside the group: the horizontal relation, problems  
            and some issues from evidence 
 
After analysing the informative problem and how at the level of the 
group mechanisms of peer pressure are applied, it is necessary to 
focus on the relational structures inside the group in order to find out 
the origin of these mechanisms.  
The aim of the analysis is to understand the nature of the 
horizontal relation and to discover how the dynamics which they 
generate impact on the single persons involved and on their relations 
both on terms of efficiency and of well-being. 
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 With reference to the first aspect, we will examine the role that 
social capital has at the level of the horizontal relations inside the 
group and therefore how the existence of social ties permits to 
microfinance institutions to set up an overlapped credit-debt relation. 
 In this first part we will consider the principal contributions 
(Karlan 2003; Gomez and Santor 2003) which recognize in the social 
capital the basic reason that would explain the functioning of the 
group lending methodology. We will also examine other researchers 
that bring into question the role of social capital, underlining the 
possibility of opposite effects in terms of guarantee and solvency 
(Wydick 1999; Abbink and al 2002; Ahlin and Townsend 2003a,b).  
The relation between social capital and microfinance 
institutions will be developed in the second chapter where the social 
capital will be considered both as an important element in the 
development of microfinance institutions and also as a possible 
‘emergent result’ of them. In this sense it will be spoken of 
microfinance institutions as ‘enabling institutions’.  
 The study of the second aspect, that is the dynamic of relations 
and mechanisms of peer pressure into the group, will allow us to 
evaluate the impact of these methodologies in terms of: 
(i) efficiency: it concerns the functioning of the mechanism of 
group lending and its possible points of weakness in the 
cases of “too weak” or of “too strong” horizontal relation 
into the group (8).  
(ii) well-being: it takes into consideration the initial aim of 
economic and social inclusion, for example in the cases of 
excessive pressure and/or sanctions of the group 
(Montgomery 1996). 
The contributions presented will try to throw light on the main 
variables occurring and the problems deriving from the relational 
structures inside the group. These problems have led some institutions 
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to experiment new forms of credit-debt relation on an individual base. 
These methodologies will be considered in the subparagraph 1.1.4. 
 
1.3.3.1  Relations as ‘social collateral’      
Contemporaneously to the development of theoretic models which 
could give a conceptual scheme to consider the structural problems of 
the credit-debt relation, in literature a debate has opened in order to 
individuate the factors that could explain the functioning of the group 
as ‘collateral’. In other words it has been made the attempt to 
understand the conditions necessary to the functioning of the 
mechanisms of peer pressure.  
 In this debate some have recognized in the social capital and in 
the possible role played by the social sanctions the main reasons of 
success of the group lending methodology. The thesis is that these 
institutions ‘provide credit on the basis of social collateral, through 
which borrowers’ reputation or the social network to which they 
belong, take place of traditional physical or financial collateral’ (Van 
Bastelaer 1999, 4). In such case the peer monitoring would realize for 
example through the control of everyone’s activity and the possibility 
to report to the community the behaviour adopted by the subject.  
To this mechanism, another of enforcement would be added 
given by the fact that each subject wishes to defend his/her own 
reputation. This is because to preserve a good reputation is a necessary 
condition to avoid various types of repercussions: economic as for 
example the loss of future contractual relations, social as the exclusion 
from the communitarian life or finally psychological as the loss of self 
esteem.  
 Karlan’s contribution (2003), based on data collected in Perù in 
some projects of village bank, seems particularly significant for the 
resilience of the result obtained. It will confirm the thesis of a positive 
correlation between high level of social capital and high rates of 
repayment as well as high rates of saving accumulation. In this 
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analysis the concept of social capital which is used refers to that by 
Adler and Known (2000) according to which social capital has to do 
with that set of links ‘which can give these collective actors 
cohesiveness and its associated benefits’ (9).  
 The methodology developed by FINCA in the city of Ayacucho 
presupposes the creation of groups of thirty women that constitute a 
village bank according to the basic methodology explained previously. 
The peculiarity of the group examined by Karlan consists in the initial 
mechanism of formation of the group: the women typically go to the 
FINCA office and register themselves on a list. When the list reaches 
the number of thirty persons, many of them may not know each other, 
the village bank is constituted. During its life the future new members 
generally are on the contrary relatives or friends of those who have 
constituted the bank initially.  
Excluding from the sample these last ones, Karlan secures the 
possibility of being able to consider that set of the initial groups which 
present an exogenous level of social capital. Only in this way it is 
possible then to see how much some proxies of the social capital as 
the ‘cultural heterogeneity’, the ‘geographic dispersion’ and an 
ensemble of demographic variables (matrix X) can explain the 
dependent variable given by the rate of default. So the econometric 
instrument used is: 
 Default = β1 Geographic dispersion + β2 Cultural similarity + γ X + εj + εij 
The results obtained not only show how both the explicative 
variables are significant in the case of default, but also how applying a 
similar model, a positive relation between social capital and 
communitarian level of savings exists. A possible explanation may be 
according to Karlan the increased level of safety of the deposits inside 
the village bank. Finally, it would be highlighted how the social 
capital helps the groups to distinguish some insolvent debtors in good 
faith from those ones in bad faith. This permits to introduce some 
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intermediate sanctions or some possible strategies of recovery before 
arriving to the exclusion of the subject from the group.  
 Some very similar results are those obtained by Gomez and 
Santor (2003) for whom both high levels of trust and social capital and 
the self selection of the group will reduce the probability of default. 
But these results present a basic limit because, as Armendariz de 
Aghion and Morduch (2005) underline, they depend in a critical way 
on the type of explicative variables put in the equation. For example 
their analysis implied the comparison of experiences developed by 
two Canadian microfinance institutions that applied both the group 
methodology and the individual one. The result obtained, according to 
which the group would have better performances than in the case of 
individual loan, seems not to keep into consideration the fact that 
different persons, for example with a different level of riskiness, might 
choose different contractual conditions, such as for example the 
individual loan rather than the group one.  
 Apart from the problems that these empirical models present, 
the basic thesis is that it is possible to get through the structural 
problems of the credit-debt relation as well as the possible 
inefficiencies deriving from it, using some ‘small scale institutions’ 
characterized by a certain degree of social capital, that is by networks 
of social relations and pre-existing social ties.  
 At this point Widick’s contribution (1999) enables us to 
introduce the terms of the debate. Together with him others put in 
doubt  the fact that ‘social cohesion’ is the basic explanation of the 
functioning of the group lending. Precisely for them it is necessary to 
understand the basic role that pre-existing social ties and therefore 
social capital can play and how much, on the contrary, the group holds 
on internal self sufficient mechanisms.  
 The results presented by Karlan (2003) can be criticized 
starting from this point of weakness: considering the geographical 
proximity and the homogeneity of the subjects as proxies of the social 
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capital we can not know how much the default variable is explained 
by the social ties among the subjects. As a matter of fact instead the 
default variable might depend on the fact for example that the 
geographical proximity and the similarity of the activities and 
conditions of life allow a process of more effective peer monitoring. 
 With regard to this point Widick distinguishes in his analysis 
three different concepts of ‘social cohesion’: (i) peer monitoring, (ii) 
social ties and (iii) group pressure. His object is to find out which 
degree of correlation they present compared to the performance of 
payment of the group. Using data collected in a programme of 
Grameen replication in Guatemala, he finds out that the pre-existing 
social ties do not affect the dependent variable, that the group pressure 
has a light significance while the mechanism of peer monitoring has a 
central role. The fact that this last one is not linked to the initial 
endowment of social capital and therefore may be established also in a 
horizontal relation with persons initially unknown, seems to configure 
a different conceptual scheme of reference: ‘via peer monitoring, 
borrowing groups appear to function both as miniature insurance 
networks and as juries’ (Widick 1999).  
The imagine which is presented to us is therefore that of a 
group which may function regardless from previous ties among the 
members and that we only need an institution of microfinance which 
legitimizes the operating work of the ‘internal jury’. This last one can, 
in this way, credibly value and take actions against each one of its 
members. Moreover in this case, as the members of the group would 
not be tied by relations of friendship, the menace of exclusion would 
be greatly credible. These arguments could appear therefore to 
discourage those institutions like FINCA which for example promote 
the formation of social capital and trust at the horizontal level among 
the members of the village bank through programmes of social 
intermediation.  
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 Most of the contributions and empirical results obtained 
however are influenced by a substantial bias linked to the data 
collection and to their comparison. For this reason, as Murdoch (1999) 
highlights it is necessary to improve the empirical set of instruments 
used in order to understand how the different methodologies affect the 
performance of microfinance institutions looking for the best 
practices. 
 An interesting attempt in this direction is that one of Abbink, 
Irlenbusch and Renner (2002). They propose the approach of 
experimental economics, which in spite of some of its intrinsic limit, 
allows in a controlled setting to analyse a lot of the factors involved as 
the role of social ties as well as the dimension of the group and the 
efficacy of the dynamic incentives. The principal limit consists in an 
artificially built context where the persons involved are students who 
do not live the potential condition of a beneficiary of a microfinance 
programme. Moreover they are asked to take part to a process of 
strategic interaction, a game, but without a real granting of loans and a 
real start of economic activity. Instead the laboratory is made the most 
possible isolated by external influences and for this reason there is no 
mention of the aim pursued and of the backstage of microfinance.  
As the aim is to value in which way the social ties influence the 
performance of the group, two cases are considered: in the first one 
the groups of four persons self select and for this reason tendentially 
they will choose among known persons, while in a second case it is 
followed the FINCA methodology of the ‘list’ that allows to obtain 
groups constituted in a random way.  
The advantage of the laboratory emerges just at the moment in 
which these two different cases are compared because it is possible to 
modify an only variable, for example the way in which the group is 
formed or the dimension of the group, leaving all the rest unchanged. 
The game realizes in ten rounds: in each one the members of the 
group receive a loan and they will have the possibility to participate to 
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the successive rounds only if, in the previous rounds, all the members 
of the group have been solvent.  
The possibility of repaying the debt in each round depends 
exclusively in the investment return of each person’s activity which in 
the ‘lucky’ case has a payoff that will enable him/her to pay; in the 
“unlucky” case he/she will obtain a payoff equal to zero. This last 
possibility implies that the other members of the group have to pay for 
him/her if they want to have access to the successive rounds. The 
significant element is that each subject could be incentivated to cheat, 
that is to have a free rider behaviour declaring failure of his/her 
activity in the round. In order to study the role of social ties each 
member of the group is not in the condition of verifying that it has 
really been a failure of the activity.  
The result obtained do not keep into consideration the last 
round where obviously there is no longer the incentive from the 
subjects to honour the joint liability because the game has no future.  
 A part from some critics to this approach the results obtained 
are particularly interesting. First of all it can be seen how in general 
the two types of groups considered, the one formed by persons tied by 
previous relations and the one of strangers, obtain some performance 
of payment very similar lightly better than in the case of groups of 
known persons. Nevertheless these last ones would show a greater 
instability in the payments compared to that of strangers. The 
explanation is that among friends the free rider behaviour is more 
unexpected and therefore, when it occurs, subjects show less 
tolerance. In other terms the cheating of the trust has a certain impact 
in the interpersonal relation. In any case the main result in line with 
Widick’s study (1999), reduces a lot the role of social ties. 
 The data collected by this experiment would support the thesis 
of a general better performance of the group methodology compared 
to the individual one in payments as well as a critical role of dynamic 
incentives. This last observation is related to the fact that the incentive 
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to pay decreases, even if not dramatically as they come closer to the 
last round.  
If we consider the issue of the group dimension, the growing 
number of members implies from one side a greater presence of 
incentives to free riding, at the same time this problem would be 
counterbalanced by a greater differentiation of the risk. Therefore the 
final results that could be obtained with a different group size will be 
not so much different. Finally it would be reconfirmed the gender 
effect: women in general show a greater attitude to pay compared to 
men.  
 A further aspect which could be considered adopting such 
approach is the role played by the diversity inside the group. As a 
matter of fact, if the thesis of the role of social capital and therefore of 
the necessity of forming groups the most possible homogeneous, it 
could be thought that a certain degree of diversity may have some 
positive effects. This both in terms of reduction of the possibility of 
colluding among the members and in terms of differentiation of the 
risk (Sadoulet 2003).  
Besides the group must be considered a dynamic subject, 
mainly when each member pursues his/her economic project and for 
this reason the initial homogeneity could, in the different moments of 
the life of the group, fade. The consequence in this case is that the 
horizontal relation will be no longer balanced so creating possible 
tensions or centrifugal forces (11).  
 The last contribution which suggests an interesting element to 
keep into account when we try to explain the mechanisms which 
permit the functioning of the group is that one by Ahlin and Townsend 
(2003a,b). First of all, they show how in different contexts different 
explicative factors can be detected: some are more relevant than others 
but surely an external factor which reflects in the dynamics of the 
horizontal relation is the existence of alternatives, that is of other 
possible sources of credit. In the moment in which the members of the 
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group have different outside options the enforcement mechanism 
becomes much less effective and this reflects in the rate of suffering of 
microfinance institutions.  
 Some of the issues raised by the debate will be re-examined in 
the following chapters where we will try to apply to the study of the 
horizontal relation inside the group some conceptual scheme which 
will call into question in detail the role of different dimensions of 
interactions among persons and the role of trust in interpersonal 
relations.                        
 
 
1.3.3.2 Peer pressure: problems of efficiency and congruence with   
             the objectives 
Moving the attention on the dynamic of the relations inside the group, 
we can detect a series of problems that put into question the results of 
theoretical models which find in the group the solution of the 
informative problem.  
The first one, as it has been anticipated, lies mainly in the fact 
that the monitoring such as the application of sanctions presume a cost 
even when the subjects are tied by very strong relations and we are in 
the presence of a high level of proximity. The first signal of such 
problem comes from the cost represented by the weekly meetings of 
the group that can cause, as some studies underline (Women’s World 
Banking 2003) the outgo from the group of some members. This 
prescinds from the acknowledgement of the utility of the meeting, in 
terms of offering possibilities for the creation and strengthening of the 
relations (as results from the interview to the sample of women in 
Uganda and Bangladesh). But these benefits come to be 
counterbalanced by a cost.  
 These problems become more marked particularly in the urban 
context where the cost of the monitoring, given the low degree of 
proximity and the presence of more complex activities, grows 
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enormously. To this it is added a great degree of mobility of the 
subjects which reduces the level of cohesion of the group and the 
strength of the relation as well as it raises the risk of the single 
persons.  
As a matter of fact, because of the ‘overlapped’ relation permits 
to shift on an horizontal level the informative problem and the risk of 
insolvency, the single persons belonging to the group will have to face 
not only the risk of their own activity but also that one of the other 
members’ activity. In the case of subjects particularly adverse to risk 
this can constitute a deterrent because being part of a group would 
imply a significant raising of the cost perceived.  
Besides the fact that the loans must be covered by the joint 
liability implies that their dimension remains almost low. This could 
create strong difficulties for those who, inside the group, have a great 
developing activity and in order to follow their process need a higher 
loan for the investment. For this reason in the presence of a certain 
level of income and dimension of the activity, in a lot of institutions 
some clients ask for the possibility of going out from the group in 
order to obtain a loan individually (Madajewicz 2003b).  
Another source of tension comes from the possible elements of 
lack of homogeneity inside the group due, for example, to the fact that 
the fundings are of a different amount while the responsibility is 
divided into equal parts.  
 Therefore in the presence of a horizontal relation ‘weakened’ 
by the high costs and the emerging tensions as well as discouraged by 
an increase of the risk, the microfinance institution would see highly 
limited its possibility of using the social collateral. The group would 
no more reduce the risk of the moral hazard because of the low level 
of mutual monitoring and the menace of social sanctions could be not 
credible or not have such a weight to counterbalance the incentive to 
defect. In fact, in the urban context, characterized by a stronger degree 
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of anonymity, the group often has not a communitarian external 
reference, as the village or the ‘Centre’ in the Grameen model can be.  
This argumentation finds support in Montgomery’s study 
(1996), which underlines how in Bangladesh also in a rural context, 
the peer pressure to which the persons are subject is not mainly that of 
the members of the group but that one of the village or in other terms 
of the big group, the community.  
For this reason a lot of projects, for example of Grameen 
replication in the USA in an urban context, turn to the group only in 
the presence of a linguistic religious community of reference for the 
members of the group. Such community, as we will see later, presents 
an informal system of social rules which permits to reduce the risk 
making predictable the other subjects’ actions and permits the 
application of social sanctions external and internal to the person.  
 The result is that the microfinance institution is no more having 
a dialogue with a group as a unique subject, but instead with its single 
members to which it would remain linked only by mechanisms of 
dynamic incentives which prescind from the group.  
The mechanisms of peer monitoring and  peer enforcement are 
moreover applicable in an imperfect way also in the opposite case of a 
‘pre-existing too high’ horizontal relation. In this context, as a matter 
of fact, the menace of social sanctions or of exclusion from the group 
could not be credible. This hypothesis, that inspires the Grameen Bank 
rule according to which groups composed by closer relatives are not 
allowed, finds an empirical confirmation in Ahlin and Townsend’s 
study (2003a,b).  
Therefore an excessive level of social capital, as also Wydick 
underlines (1999), might weaken the role of the group as instrument of 
‘social collateral’. Just the presence of very strong social ties and of a 
high degree of information exchanged, so that the cost of peer 
monitoring is reduced, lead to an opposite paradoxically situation. 
Being the group so cohesive, the relation between the microfinance 
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institutions and the group comes again to be of vertical type because 
inside the group the mutual control is no more present. In the extreme 
case this could lead the subject to collude establishing a one to one 
relation with the institution, as the theoretical model developed by 
Laffont and Rey (2003) shows. 
 Taking again the scheme previously proposed we can visually 
configure the two inefficient situation in the following way.  
 
 
Figure 1.3.3:  two extremes cases: collusion and weak relation 
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Going again to the ideal case in which the horizontal relation is 
able to activate efficient mechanisms of peer monitoring and peer 
 69 
enforcement, it is necessary to take into consideration if, aside from 
the problem of justice, it is efficient to impose to the subject a so 
strong punishment as for example the exclusion from the group or the 
social ostracism.  
As a matter of fact, the subject could run in difficulties in the 
payment of the instalments because of exogenous factors, that is 
which prescind from his/her behaviour and his/her good faith. The 
economic activities may be subject to a series of risks, linked to the 
running of the productive process as well as to negative economic 
trends making impossible the repayment of the loan. A crisis of 
liquidity might, even in the presence of a sound activity, make the 
subject run an enormous risk.  
Perhaps just in such context comes again into play the role of 
social capital in the sense of allowing a more flexible use of the group 
which becomes a containing scheme of reference. In modern 
microfinance institutions such problem is faced with the recourse to 
some forms of micro insurance which protect the subject especially in 
the case of external disasters or other calamities. 
 However it is to be solved the problem of the mechanism of a 
too rigid monitoring, which has to be made the most possible rational. 
One of the possible theoretical suggestion is the adoption of a system 
of ‘cross-reports’ such as to make possible a more effective and 
preventive process of monitoring. This also can be combined with 
frequent repayments (Rai and Sjostrom 2004).  
 Until now the consideration of this aspect has not taken into 
account problems of equity and congruence with the final object 
which the microfinance institutions want to obtain. As Montgomery 
(1996) reminds us, in fact, it has been often asserted how ‘the social 
objectives of mutual self help and poverty alleviation remain 
fundamental to the broader goals of these peer group lending 
schemes’.  
 70 
Montgomery’s contribution (1996) is particularly interesting 
because he proposes the comparison of two institutions, the BRAC in 
Bangladesh and the SANASA in Sri Lanka. This analysis allows to 
consider in the first case some degenerations of the group lending 
methodology and in the second one allows to consider virtuous 
processes of development on horizontal relational basis.  
 Even if the BRAC makes use of groups from 5 to 7 members 
linked by joint liability, in reality it does not exploit peer pressure 
inside the group but it uses an indirect mechanism of pressure through 
the village. In fact, if one of the members of the group in the village is 
insolvent, the BRAC agent addresses to the whole village to cover the 
insolvency, treating the possibility of closing the future line of credit 
not only to the members of the group with the insolvent subject but 
also to the other groups. This creates a so high psychological and 
social pressure on the single persons that in case of no repayment 
often leads the weaker and more vulnerable subjects in the village to 
suffer forms of material expropriation or of social exclusion.  
This degeneration has been the result of a process of 
vertiginous expansion in the 90s which has seen these institutions to 
give prominence to the numbers of loans and to the reduction of the 
rates of suffering.  
In the accounts given by Montgomery, it is significant the 
changing of the beneficiaries’ perception of the BRAC operators: in 
fact there is a shift from a ‘bhai (brother) culture to a sir culture’. This 
is strengthened by the fact that often the agents are men while the 
beneficiaries are women and this implies a certain degree of verticality 
in their system of norms of behaviour. In addition to the  indirect 
hierarchization of the relation borrower- microfinance operator which 
produces a high social cost, another problem is given by the lack of 
flexibility in the financial instruments adopted.  
 The credit cooperatives show on the other side the possibility of 
using the horizontal relation to create some ‘small scale institutions’ 
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managed with democratic criteria and with a high degree of flexibility 
and variety. In this case the SANASA plays a role of a second level 
microfinance institution that provides the network of credit 
cooperatives with an initial external capital, as we have seen in the 
case of the village banking. Just thanks to the high level of democratic 
nature in its management which is done by some of its voluntary and 
elected members, each cooperative succeeds in developing high levels 
of social capital as well as a great capacity of adaptation to the 
context.  
This produces a great variety of financial instruments adopted 
which goes from the individual loan to the ‘instant loan’ for 
consumption, as well as personal deposits and flexible systems of 
repayment of loans. Besides it is registered a high capability of 
inclusion of marginal subjects. 
 A particularly interesting element (which presents some 
similarities with the ADIE methodology) is given by the fact that in 
SANASA it is encouraged the adoption of a system of moral relational 
guarantees. This mechanism permits the new member to become part 
of the cooperative thanks to two or more friends already members, as 
guarantors.  
Another element of guarantee is given by the so called 
‘member pressure’ which is based on the corporate ideology that 
animates the members of the cooperative. The idea of being members 
and therefore the recognition of the existence of a society, has been 
already met in the Raiffeisen cooperatives where members were 
engaged in the life of the cooperative, considering it ‘as an extention 
of their own business’ (Prinz 2002).  
In the case of SANASA cooperatives it is used a metaphor that, 
in a very clear way, explains the difference between a vertical credit-
debt relation in which the subjects are ‘strangers’ and a horizontal 
relation in which the subjects involved are ‘members’. The metaphor 
distinguishes two different types of money: the “hot” and the “cold” 
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one. For hot money they mean that one which circulates in the 
horizontal relation. It belongs to the members of the cooperative who, 
in different moments, are savers and so creditors, investors and so 
debtors. Money is made hot by the fact that it belongs to a large extent 
to a ‘neighbour’ with whom there is an interpersonal relationship of 
trust and cooperation and for this reason such money has to be 
respected and used with attention. The cold money, on the contrary, 
comes from the outside of the cooperative, that is from donors or from 
the formal system of credit. 
 In this sense, the “overlapped” credit-debt relation exploits the 
group introducing some money at a horizontal level in which the 
subjects, being tied by some forms of joint liability and social ties, 
will consider the insolvency not as an external damage but as an 
internal one. Therefore they will do everything to prevent it.  
 In the SANASA experience the cooperatives are organized in a 
pyramidal way, as a federation of ‘states’ or a sort of holding. It has 
on the top some subjects who relate with the external, take care in 
raising of founds and in the relations with the formal system. They are 
concerned with supplying with all the cooperatives of the federation 
services of financial and technical consulting and with making 
possible credit relations among cooperatives inside the federation. 
They also fulfil a fundamental role that consists in guaranting that the 
system remains ‘hot’. This means that they operate so as a high 
quantity of ‘cold’ money (external), which could incentivate the 
members to default, does not circulate in the internal network.  
 Undoubtedly the SANASA experience shows the possibility of 
creating some institutions which set in motion processes of creation of 
social capital as well as networks of cooperation that link a local level 
to a greatly spread higher one.  
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1.3.4   Trying to solve problems: new ideas towards an individual 
methodology 
The problems concerning the group methodology, which have been 
analysed, have led a lot of institutions to reconsider this approach and 
to embrace a new methodology of loan on individual base.  
 Before analysing the results of a recent empirical study which 
presents some performances of the two methodologies (Karlan and 
Ginè 2006), let us consider the alternative mechanisms of monitoring 
and guarantee applied in the individual methodology.  
Many of the new ‘technologies’ of credit-saving introduced, in 
reality, take again a great part of the innovation adopted by the first 
institutions of microcredit, such as, for example, the progressive 
lending and the repayment plans on a weekly base. This analysis will 
enable us to think carefully on the possibility of setting up a different 
credit-debt relation which does not exclude relational elements and 
does not blight the fundamental objectives of economic and social 
inclusion. 
 Though the Grameen Bank has not been the first to do this 
afterthought, we will start just from this bank. In 2002 it created a new 
model: the GGS (Grameen Generalized System), also called 
‘Grameen Bank II’, that introduced elements of flexibility just 
renouncing in part to the adoption of the group.  
This new approach is not simply the result of a period of 
difficulty that the Grameen Bank met at the end of the 90s, but mainly 
of the experience gained. It has allowed to understand how an 
excessively rigid system could motion mechanisms opposite to the 
objectives for which it has been created.  
 The principle innovation is given by the introduction of a third 
possible way in addition to the two extreme cases that are present in 
the classical model. In the first one the borrower can pay regularly the 
instalments; while in the second one he can not pay for various causes 
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and consequently a series of repercussions for his/her group and for 
the subject himself will derive. It had to be offered the possibility, in 
the case of exogenous factors (often linked to the productive process) 
which made temporarily impossible the repayment, not to incur into a 
so strong and inefficient sanction. The following strategy is adopted. 
 All the beneficiaries starts with the ‘Basic Loan’ (in Bengali 
‘Shohoj’) of the classic methodology even if elements of flexibility 
and creativity are introduced: “[the staff] can design his loan product 
to make it a best fit for his client in terms of duration, timing of the 
loan, scheduling the instalment, etc. The more a staff becomes a 
creative artist, the better music he can produce” (Yunus 2002).  
The members of the group who do not present difficulties in 
payments, cycle by cycle, will have the possibility of having access to 
loans of a greater and greater amount. In the case in which they find 
themselves in difficulties, it is offered an ‘exit option’ or, using the 
metaphor proposed by Yunus, an ‘emergency lane’ who substantiates 
in a ‘Flexy Loan’ (in Bengali ‘Chukti’). 
 
Figure 1.3.4:  The Grameen Generalysed System (source Yunus 2002) 
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This last one is nothing but the basic loan renegotiated in order to 
enable subjects to overcome the difficulties and go back to the 
Grameen microcredit “highway”. This flexy loan is obtained, this 
time, in an individual way that is without implicating a form of any 
type of group responsibility.  
In spite of this, some mechanisms of enforcement and dynamic 
incentives are provided. The flexy loan does not give the possibility of 
increasing cycle by cycle the loan which, on the contrary, tends to 
decrease in its amount. Besides, when the debtor succeeds in going 
back again into the basic loan, the credit history is wiped out so he 
must start again to accumulate a good credit history to obtain greater 
and greater loans. Moreover, this mechanism plays on reputation 
factors. It is interesting the distinction made between ‘unwilling 
defaulters’ and ‘willing defaulters’. While these last ones are those 
that have not accepted to use the flexy loan option and therefore come 
in default, the unwilling defaulters are those who use the flexy loan 
option but, in spite of this, are not able to repay the loan because of 
external causes.  
As Yunus (2002) underlines: ‘Now both the bank and the 
borrowers can be free from all tension - no more chasing of the 
problem-borrowers or defaulters. Nobody needs to look at anyone 
with suspicion. Group solidarity is used for forward-looking joint-
actions for building things for the future, rather than for the unpleasant 
task of putting unfriendly pressure on a friend. […] There are many 
exciting features in GGS, but I think removing tension from micro-
credit and permanently establishing full dignity to the poor borrowers, 
are the two most important features of them all’. 
 In the GGS the progressive lending is the principal mechanism 
of enforcement adopted. It introduces a dynamic incentive that 
prescinds from the use of the group. As it is shown in Armendariz de 
Aghion and Murdoch (2005) it is possible to study such mechanism 
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and to detect the compatible incentive commitment which makes the 
choice of default irrational.  
In general, as we will see for example for ADIE, it must be 
introduced the most possible dynamic elements in the creditor-debtor 
relation, according to a scheme of successive and progressive loans. 
Besides, in order to make effective the menace of not receiving a 
successive loan, it is necessary that the first loan is not of an 
excessively high amount or, in other words, that the activity being 
financed needs in a vital way of a flux of successive loans. Such 
instrument, used in the group loan as well as in the individual one, 
introduces not only an incentive but creates the condition of testing 
the beneficiary’s debt capacity and reduces the creditor’s economic 
exposure to the risk (Ghosh and Ray 2001).  
 As we have seen, the weekly repayment is another mechanism 
which has remained present in the GGS also in the case of individual 
loan. The reason is that it makes the creditor-debtor vertical relation 
more dynamic. A first confirmation of the fact that the payment of the 
debt, divided into little frequent instalment, is an effective solution 
comes for example from the BRAC experiences in Bangladesh and 
Bancosol in Bolivia. After adopting the system of monthly 
instalments, they have registered a significant worsening in the 
payments that have obliged them to turn back. The main reason which 
makes the frequency of the payments a practice of success is to be 
found in two mechanisms which this system generates (Gonzales-
Vega et al 1997). 
 The first one is the so called ‘early warning system’: the 
frequent meetings between creditor and debtor would enable the 
microfinance operator to monitor and intervene at the early signals of 
difficulty in the payment.  
Besides it implies the creation of a regular and continuous ‘face 
to face’ relation with important relational implications which, in their 
turn, would contribute to the reduction of the informative problem. In 
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a certain way the relation between the microfinance operator and the 
clients would become similar to that of the moneylender or of the 
‘susu’ collector in Ghana with the customers of the villages. Just on 
this base some have considered the possibility of creating, between the 
formal and the informal systems of credit a link which exploits the 
direct contact of the moneylenders with the debtors.  
This form of monitoring could be strengthened also 
maintaining in the individual loan some forms of group meeting for 
example with the public payment. For this reason Karlan and Ginè 
(2006) make a distinction between those who adopt the group 
methodology using the joint liability and those who give individual 
loans but adopt the group as an instrument of enforcement and 
monitoring of the relation. With regard to this last aspect, it is 
interesting the idea of the ‘cross-reporting’ according to which a 
debtor takes care of informing the bank regularly about another 
debtor’s behaviour (Rai and Sjostrom 2004).  
 The other reason which would be at the basis of better 
performances of payment lies, as we have underlined in the ROSCAs, 
in a problem ‘internal’ to the debtor that is on his/her capacity of 
setting apart some savings (Thaler 1994). The education to saving 
plays such a decisive role in the struggle to poverty and in the 
processes of development so that some have suggested the idea that 
more than a revolution on the front of credit, it has to do with a 
revolution on the front of saving (Rutherford 2000). 
 It is interesting to see how the saving capacity can be used to 
make a selection among the subjects asking for a loan. This is done in 
the ‘SafeSave’ programmes where, before securing the loan, a subject 
must set apart regularly a certain amount of money which will grant 
also in part his/her future loan. The constitution of a credit or a saving 
history can function as deterrent and as guarantee giving the subject 
the possibility of showing his/her own intention and capacity, as well 
as the possibility that he/she has to have access to other informal 
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sources of credit. For example, the fact of being able to face with a 
short situation of no liquidity, asking for help to family members and 
friends, as well as to be able to reckon on other sources of income are 
other important elements of security. 
 The saving commitment can act not only as an instrument 
which reduces the adverse selection, but combined with the access to 
credit it can create some hybrid and complementary financial products 
to such extent to induce the subjects little by little to self sufficiency. 
To this it must be added the fact that the setting up of a ‘double 
channel’ creditor-debtor would reduce the incentive to default, so 
acting as guarantee. Karlan (2003) registers, for example, how among 
those who have accumulated more savings less defaults are present 
and moreover the defaults decrease, little by little, in the successive 
loans.  
 These methodologies suggest that it is possible to improve the 
credit-debt vertical relation without making use of any type of 
guarantee. As a matter of fact, it is possible to make the relation more 
dynamic through more flexible amortization plans and with accesses 
to more frequent credit/repayments of loan. The credit-debt relation 
can be intertwined with other relations offering other services such as 
savings, micro insurance, and enterprise development, creating a 
‘bundle of relations’ which reduces those elements of verticality that 
make stronger the informative problem.  
 A particularly significant experience is the ADIE in France. In 
an urban context, for a lot of years, a methodology of individual loan  
has been applying with success. Besides some mechanisms as the 
progressive lending, the most interesting and innovating idea which 
we can detect in their methodology is the introduction of a moral 
relational guarantee. The subject that wants to invest in an economic 
activity must present  to the ADIE two o more subjects as guarantors 
for the loan. But this guarantee acquires a form which is different 
from the traditional one: the guarantors, usually friends and persons 
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who have a long relationship with the beneficiary, enable the bank to 
have some valuable information about the subject. Just the fact that a 
subject has the possibility of presenting some guarantors who attest 
his/her morality, that is he/she is credit worthy, is a significant 
element which allows a first selection of the beneficiaries.  
Besides the presence of two subjects linked by any degree of 
proximity with the debtor, permits to externalize the cost of 
monitoring and to make it more effective. The guarantors engage 
themselves towards the bank to play a role of tutor and assistance, as 
well as, of alarm in case of the guaranteed subject difficulty. It is 
interesting to observe how the request for this type of guarantors 
implicates a rational responsibility which prescinds from the classical 
group but absolves to many of its tasks often in a more effective way 
and without producing excessive tensions. The same enforcement of 
the contract is obtained through the guarantors’ pressure who, in 
extreme case, could be asked to honour the debt. In reality the ADIE 
does not bring a legal action in case of default because it would often 
be too expensive. Moreover, the guarantors’ signature is not followed 
by an investigation of the guarantors’ wealth and capacity to refund.  
 Developing this line, it seems therefore possible to think about 
a triangular credit-debt relation in which, as in the case of the letters of 
patronage or of references, the link of trust between the guarantor and 
the bank is important.  
 So summarizing the three typologies considered, it is possible 
to highlight their characteristics in a synthetic scheme. This last one 
will be referred to in the following chapters where the credit-debt 
relation will be studied, focusing on the interpersonal dimension and 
on the role of trust.  
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Figure 1.3.5:  the triangular and dynamic credit debt relation 
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Triangular and dynamic relation 
 
In the last years the diffusion of the individual methodology has made 
possible the beginning of a series of comparative studies which 
present a lot of difficulties in the collection of data. The success or 
less of a project and the performances in the payments depend on such 
a high series of factors, apart from the methodologies, which could be 
difficult to isolate the impact of each one.     
 Among these studies, however we take into consideration 
Karlan and Ginè’s very recent one (2006). They have analyzed for one 
year the Green bank, a microfinance institution in the Philippine, 
exploiting the fact that in 2004 this institution had converted part of its 
group loans into individual loans. The first result obtained is that the 
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passage to the individual loan has not implied a worse performance in 
terms of payment or an exacerbation of the problem of moral hazard. 
Instead it has been registered an increase of the loans caused by a 
reduction of the retirements from the group and an increase of the 
requests. The thesis which seems to emerge from the data collected is 
that ‘the innovators, finding methods of lending individually (and 
more flexy) to the poor are moving in the right direction’ (Karlan and 
Ginè 2006).         
 If other studies confirmed the possibility of solving the 
structural problems of the credit-debt relation also making use of an 
individual methodology it would be opened a further research line 
which would try to understand the best practices in different contexts 
in view of not purely economic objectives.    
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Notes chapter I 
 
(1) We will have to wait that the classical thinking, which for 
thousands of years has seen the financial activity object of ethical 
prescriptions, gets to accept the existence of an interest rate in the 
practice of credit. See Sen, 1999; Hicks 1969; Bruni and Zamagni 
2004. 
 
(2) This observation leads to underline how it is relevant the 
interplay existing between the productive process and the 
establishment of a credit-debt relation. This issue will be explicitly 
analysed in the third chapter referring to Georgescu Roegen’s (1965) 
analysis of peasant communities. 
 
(3) In the third chapter we will deeply consider the role of trust and 
trustworthiness in a game framework on the base of Pelligra’s (2005) 
psychological game. 
 
(4)  Important researchers have shown how the practices of 
microfinance achieve to impact in a more effective way when they are 
addressed to persons belonging to the middle poor more than to those 
ones who are collocated in the deepest part under the poverty line 
(Hulme and Mosley 1997). 
 
(5) See Maria Nowak (2005) in her reconstruction of the expansion 
of microfinance in Europe especially during the 90s. 
 
(6) The group may be constituted by three/five persons until ten in 
the first two methodologies while, in the case of the village bank, it is 
possible to have from thirty to one hundred members. 
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(7) See L.Costabile (2004)’s contribution that, starting just from 
the study of Sufia’s condition, analyses the employment relations in 
the context of underdeveloped countries  
 
(8) The first case of ‘weak relation’ realizes for example in the 
urban context with high costs of monitoring. The case of ‘too strong’ 
group relations refers for example to the existence of an excessive 
social capital and the possible emergence of collusive phenomena, so 
that to bring back the overlapped relation to a vertical one. See for 
both these issues  Madajewicz 2003; Rai and Sjostrom 2004; Laffont 
and Rey 2003.  
 
(9)  It is evident that this concept of social capital implicates, 
therefore, the role of the trust and of the mechanisms of cooperation 
and coordination and for this reason we will concentrate on them in 
the third chapter. 
 
(10) At such purpose Armendariz de Aghion and Murdoch (2005), 
express some doubt concerning the structure of the game because the 
fact that the game will finish at the tenth round, would cancel the 
possibility of a  cooperative choice starting from the first round. 
 
(11) The diversity, as we will see in the third chapter, plays an 
important role also from the point of view of the interpersonal 
relation. For example, in the processes of emergence of trust or when 
the problem of the sharing of emotion and the mirroring (Rizzolatti 
and Sinigallia 2006) are considered. 
 
(12) In other experiences as that of the Bancosol it is used a system 
of ‘credit scoring’ in which the relations with friends and family 
members have an important impact; or, as we have seen in the 
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SANASA, it is necessary that one or more members of the cooperative 
act as guarantors for the loan of a new member. 
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Chapter II 
 
Social Capital and Enabling Institutions   
  
   
2.1 Social Capital: a multifaceted concept  
  
 
2.1.1 Defining social capital: critical issues 
  
The concept of social capital has assumed a central role in the current 
social science research because it has been able to create a space, a 
table of comparison, around which psychology, anthropology, 
sociology as well as historical, political and economic sciences have 
had the possibility to sit, one in front the other. In this way they have 
had the opportunity to confront themselves fertilizing reciprocally in 
the study of man in his social and relational dimension. To such 
complex and for many aspects difficult dialogue is to be recognized 
the effort to introduce a ‘federating concept’ able to overcome that 
tendency to an ‘undersocialized conception of man’ (Granovetter 
1985), particularly present in the current economic science.  
 In the last thirty years, at first with the contributions of Bordieu 
(1986) and Coleman (1988) and then with that one more famous of 
Putnam et al (1993), it has been developed a wide literature that has 
tried to define and apply the concept of social capital in different 
contexts, among which as we have seen that one of microfinance. 
Starting from these authors different schools, internally very 
heterogeneous, have been structured. They have produced a ‘plethora 
of definitions’ as well as empirical researches on the causal role 
played by the social capital in the explanation of phenomena, both on 
macro or aggregated level and on micro or individual level. Although 
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this wide literature, as it is recognized by many authors the definition 
of social capital has remained almost vague and elusive (1). 
 Starting from the following definition by Coleman (1988, 598): 
‘social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a 
variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: 
they all consist of some aspects of social structures, and they facilitate 
certain action of actors – whether persons or corporate actors – within 
the structure’ 
which is enriched after words (Coleman 1990, 302): 
 ‘Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making 
possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable 
in its absence or could be achieved only at higher cost’ 
it can be noticed how in some authors the social capital is defined in 
terms of the outcome, that is of that sort of ‘group externality’ which 
would be able to generate.  
On the same line we find the contribution by Putnam et al 
(1993, 167): ‘social capital…refers to features of social organization, 
such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating co-ordinated actions’.  
Other definitions focalize greatly the attention on the structure 
of relations and interdependences among individuals from which such 
benefits on individual or group level would arise so that social capital 
comes to be defined as: ‘[…] connections among individuals – social 
networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise 
from them” (Putnam 2000, 19); or in Fukujama (1997, p.378): ‘Social 
capital can be defined simply as the existence of a certain set of 
informal rules or norms shared among members of a group that 
permits cooperation among them. The sharing of values and norms 
does not in itself produce social capital, because the values may be the 
wrong ones.” 
 
 87 
This last clarification is proposed again by Arrow (2000) who, 
recognizing a great consensus on the fact that social networks play a 
central role, for example affecting economic performance, reminds 
that it is necessary to take into account that ‘social interactions can 
have negative as well as positive effects’.  Moreover this last author, 
together with others, highlights how the little clarity in the concept of 
social capital is partly determined by the use of the term ‘capital’ that, 
as Solow suggests could be better substituted by that of ‘patterns of 
behaviour’. 
 A useful interpretative scheme is offered by Durlauf and 
Fafchamps’ contribution (2004) in which it is underlined how the 
various definitions can be articulated in the following way:  
(i) social capital generates externalities, both positive and 
negative, for members of a group;  
(ii) these ‘group externalities’ are achieved through shared 
trust, norms, and values and their consequent effects on expectations 
and behaviour;  
(iii) shared trust, norms, and values arise from informal forms 
of organizations based on social networks and associations. While in 
Putnam’s study these last ones substantiate in the set of “horizontal 
association” and “network of civic engagement”, in Coleman (1988, 
previously mentioned) horizontal as well as vertical associations and 
organizations as well as different entities among which firms 
(characterized by hierarchical relationships and an unequal 
distribution of power among members of a group) are included again. 
For this reason Coleman, as we have seen in Fukuyama’s definition 
(1997) recognizes the possibility that: ‘a given form of social capital 
that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even 
harmful for others’ (Coleman 1988, 598).  
 The type of positive or negative externality, as Serageldind and 
Grootaert (2000, 47) underline would come to depend ‘on the nature 
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of relationship (horizontal versus hierarchical), pre-existing norms and 
values, and the wider legal and political context’.  
The same authors aiming at the achievement of an integrating 
view of social capital, point out that the base network from which the 
social capital would be generated could include again that group of 
‘formalized institutional relationships and structures, such as 
governments, political regimes, the rule of law, court systems and 
civil and political liberties’(2). In such sense it is detected the 
possibility of achieving an ‘optimal mix’ of the different types of 
social capital which express themselves in different levels. The macro 
institutions would constitute an ‘enabling environment’ for all those 
micro institutions, local and horizontal associations, in a 
complementary and reciprocal strengthening relation. 
 The lack of a coherent methodological framework can be 
found, as many have underlined, in the numerous empirical studies in 
which a series of proxies of social capital have been used, in order to 
build some indicators as the famous ‘Putnam instrument’ (3). Though 
these contributions can be appreciable for their effort of 
experimenting and strengthening the relation between theoretical and 
empirical work, they show a series of limits in the econometric 
technology adopted.  
 Though we will not concentrate on the analysis of these studies, 
we propose some reflections that emerge authoritatively from recent 
contributions by Durlauf (2002) and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004). 
In addition to a first problem (often ignored in empirical works) 
concerning the use of individual data for the estimation of social 
capital’s benefits, it is stressed how there is a basic difficulty linked to 
the model specification.   
Typically these studies try to identify the effect of social capital 
on an outcome that is the variable of interest, for example called ωi. 
This variable can be measured both at the aggregate level and at the 
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individual level. In this last case, for example the regressive model 
would be of the type: 
    
ωi = γ Xi + π Yg(i) +J SCg(i) +εi 
 
in which Xi is a set of individual controls, Yg(i)  is a set of group 
controls and SCg(i) is Social Capital. In order to understand its role we 
must check the significance of the coefficient J. 
Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) stress, among the others, two 
main issues: the first one is a problem of observations, to which they 
propose to give a solution recurring to the concept of exchangeability; 
the second one is mainly a problem of identification of a causal 
relation between social capital and the outcome. Finally another signal 
of the lack of a theoretic rigorous model is that most of the 
contributions do not pose themselves the root problem of the existence 
of differences in the endowment of social capital for individuals or 
aggregates. It is explicative the passage by Durlauf (2002, 464) who 
declares: ‘These studies, in turn, typically do not incorporate a 
separate theory of the determinants of social capital formation, 
although they do often employ instrumental variables to account for 
the endogenity of social capital. However, without a theory as to why 
one observes differences in social capital formation, one cannot have 
much confidence that unobserved heterogeneity is absent in the 
samples under study’. 
As a matter of fact, in the last years, there have been many 
empirical contributions but not so many efforts in the direction of 
setting up a congruent theoretical framework which would enable to 
analyse the ontological status of social capital: its sources, forms and 
consequences. More precisely there have been some contributions that 
have studied the relation between the social capital externalities and 
the market, as we have seen for example in our microfinance review 
of literature. Others have mainly considered how the social capital 
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could affect on the development process. Surely, there has been a lack 
of ‘an inquiry into the character of those institutions that would enable 
people to have a good chance of pursuing well-lived lives’ (Dasgupta 
and Serageldin 2000, xii). In other terms just the lack of a formal 
structured theory of social capital, has not allowed the study of those 
that we can call ‘enabling institutions’, that is those institutions able to 
generate a process of creation of social capital. 
 Some attempts in the direction of embody social capital in the 
formal economic models have been made in a context of repeated 
Prisoner’s dilemma games in which the social capital is nothing but 
that factor which facilitates the emergence of cooperative equilibrium.  
For this reason it has been defined as the individual’s reputation for 
cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma games. Another line of research has 
tried to investigate the notion of trust and trust worthiness putting 
them into a structured analytical framework that we will consider in 
the third chapter.  
 Perhaps the most important contribution in which the relation 
between social capital and formal modelling has been systematically 
analysed is that by Dasgupta (2002) in which he ‘models social capital 
as a form of social network structure and uses the presence of that 
structure to understand how individual outcomes are affected in 
equilibrium’ (Durlauf, Fafchamps 2004, 61).  
 In order to conclude this short review on the research about 
social capital we could quote Solow’s impression (2000, 6): ‘I think 
that those who write and talk about social capital are trying to get at 
something difficult, complicated, and important: the way a society’s 
institutions and shared attitudes interact with the way its economy 
works. It is a dirty job but someone has to do it; and mainstream 
economics has puristically shied away from the task. My problem is 
that I would like to see the job done well, in the hope that serious 
research will uncover defensible answers. So far I have seen only 
vague ideal and casual empiricism”. 
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 In the following paragraph Dasgupta’s contribution (2002) will 
be analysed in detail going into the research of a theoretical model that 
provides defensible answers and mainly “if it is a good model […] 
some interesting questions” (Hicks 1969, 42). This analysis will be 
deepened in the third chapter where some approaches developed in 
economics to study social and economic interactions will be 
examined.  
 
 
2.1.2 Looking at social capital as a social structure: Dasgupta’s 
analytical framework 
  
The difficulties pointed out by many contributions in defining and 
using the metaphor of social capital, find an organic synthesis in 
Dasgupta’s work (2002) that explicitly, starting from the point of view 
of economic analysis, aims to develop a theoretical framework.  
The main weakness of the concept of social capital lies mainly 
in the fact that it ‘encourages us to amalgamate incommensurable 
objects, namely (and in that order), beliefs, behavioural rules, and 
such forms of capital assets as interpersonal links, without offering a 
hint as to how they are to be amalgamated’(Dasgupta 2002, 5). In 
other terms the social capital is defined as a sort of ‘black box’ inside 
which a set not well defined of concepts and structures that interact 
with each other and with the outside are put. The type of relations and 
causal nexuses inside the box are not well defined and moreover it is 
not offered an explanation of the way in which such structures have 
constituted.  
 Dasgupta’s work goes in the direction of opening the black box 
and make comprehensible and manageable theoretically and 
empirically concepts like trust, institutions (especially informal 
institutions), beliefs etc.  
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In order to build a rigorous theoretical framework he underlines 
how it is not possible to stop at some functional notions of social 
capital. This means that it is not sufficient to observe what arises from 
the black box, the externalities or spillovers, in order to be able to 
define it. Besides in order to be able to control or to induce the process 
of formation of this outcome in the case of positive externalities, it is 
necessary to know the social structures below the social capital and so 
to detect which can be the ‘enabling institutions’. 
 In this sense the following approach is proposed (Dasgupta 
2002, 6): ‘[…] social capital is most usefully viewed as a system of 
interpersonal networks. If the externalities, network formation gives 
rise to are ‘confined’, social capital is an aspect of ‘human capital’, in 
the sense economists use the latter term. However, if network 
externalities are more in the nature of public goods, social capital is a 
component of what economists call ‘total factor productivity’. There is 
no single object called social capital, there is a multitude of bits that 
together can be called social capital. Each bit reflects a set of 
interpersonal connections’. 
 The fundamental level of the analysis is therefore moved from 
the institutions that often erroneously are identified with the concept 
of social capital to the system of social networks from which 
institutions emerge. In fact different systems of networks are able to 
attain different equilibrium configurations. For each of them we can 
find a ‘distinct institutional structure, involving a distinct set of human 
relationships’ (Dasgupta 2000, 7).  
 The first step consists in trying to understand the way in which 
some social networks come to constitute and also the reasons that lead 
persons to look for each other, meet and interact. The concept of 
network is very malleable and dynamic so that it is possible to apply it 
in various levels of interactions. In fact each individual since his/her 
birth is put inside a network that in its turn is embedded in a system of 
networks. On the basis of this original network, each person can 
 93 
choose to extend his/her network opening some channels, that is 
acting to achieve an ‘optimal set of channels’. The creation as well as 
the keeping of the channels require the bearing of a cost that could be 
called ‘link cost’ or that in other context is called ‘transaction cost’. 
 The reason that can lead a subject to invest in a channel can be 
both of economic type and intrinsic one. This last one is strictly linked 
to the person and his/her need of relationships. Often these two 
reasons overlap and others, unknown at the moment of the creation of 
the network, are added to them according to a principle of 
‘serendipity’. 
 In this sense Dasgupta (2002, 22) speaks about networks: ‘as 
systems of communication channels for protecting and promoting 
interpersonal relationships’ underlining how the interpersonal 
relationships constitute the basic category inside which to detect the 
concept of trust and the deriving system of mutual beliefs. 
 Putting attention for a moment on this dimension we can detect 
an elementary channel that is a channel which links directly a couple 
of individuals. Just the concept of network presupposes the possibility 
of creating some indirect links and so the possibility to propose an 
interesting distinction (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004). On the base of 
a distinction of different kinds of links among persons it is possible to 
speak about:  
(i) ‘Club’: when each one has a direct link with each other 
member of the network so that it describes ‘finite, closed 
groupings’ ( this does not imply that each one has other 
external channels or is member of other networks) 
(ii) ‘Network’: when each one is only related to some other 
agents, not all persons involved. It represents a more 
complex structures in which we can distinguish some 
subjective networks from some indirect ones. 
Apart from this distinction between two different types of network 
that comes from the possibility of direct as well as indirect 
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relationships, the common element is given by the fact that:   
‘Networks are personal. Members of networks must have names, 
personalities, and attributes. Networks are exclusive, not inclusive, 
otherwise they would not be networks. The terms of trade within a 
network would be expected to differ from those which prevail across 
them. An outsider’s word would not be as good as an insider’s word: 
names matter’ (Dasgupta 2002, p 28). 
Using the similar schemes seen in the first chapter studying the 
credit-debt relation, these structures can be represented in the 
following way: 
 
Figure 2.1.1:  club and network 
 
 
This distinction can be used to introduce the concept of trust in 
its two different personalized and generalized dimensions. If at first 
we embrace the idea of trust as an expectation or belief regarding 
another’s agent behaviour, then we can say that: in the first case 
(personalized trust) we are dealing with a trust that comes from a 
repeated interpersonal relation; in the second one (generalized trust) 
the trust derives from a general knowledge of the social network of 
which a person is a part. An example of this second case is given by 
the community of merchants, presented in Hicks (1969), in which, 
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though not all the merchants knew each other personally, they were 
part of a network inside which a system of beliefs was shared.  
 Although the concept of trust will be developed in the third 
chapter, we anticipate some of the considerations proposed by 
Dasgupta (2002) because this concept is a sort of cornerstone essential 
to develop an analytical framework (4).  
The concept of trust ‘acquires an important role in the efficacy 
of various institutions when it is placed squarely within agency 
relationships’ (Dasgupta 2002 p 8). In such context trust is nothing but 
the expectation that the subjects involved in the relationships build in 
relation to the other subject’s behaviour and to the various possible 
states of nature. The formation of an expectation can derive from two 
types of situations: 
(i) the first one is given by the impossibility of observing 
other’s actions at the same time in which a person chooses 
his/her own action (this situation reminds that of moral 
hazard); 
(ii) the second takes place when other subjects have some 
information concerning themselves or some states of the 
world, information unknown to the subject that has to 
choose (this situation reminds that of adverse selection). In 
such case the concept of trust worthy comes into play.  
The trust, in both cases, is based on the reputation that the other 
interacting subject (an individual, a group or an institution) has. Such 
reputation is obtained as the time goes by on the base of the 
interaction, both through a direct and indirect relation.  For this reason 
is clear that: ‘Trust is of importance because its presence or absence 
can have a bearing on what we choose to do, and in many cases what 
we can do’ (Dasgupta 2002 8). Besides differing from the concept of 
‘confidence’  introduced by Luhmann (1988), that refers to an 
expectation concerning the capacity or less of the social institutions to 
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work, the concept of trust as expectation, implicates someone’s 
underlying ‘disposition, motivation and incentives’ to do something.  
 Going back to the process of formation of networks, we can 
observe how the creation of channels is nothing but a way to create 
trust, that is ‘for protecting and promoting interpersonal relationships’. 
Though the possibility of creating some expectations and trusting 
decreases when the relations becomes more and more indirect inside 
the network, that is when ‘I trust you, because I trust her and she 
assures me that she trusts you’ (Putnam 1993, 168) and so on, this not 
imply that ‘weak ties’ are less significant channels. In fact using this 
concept in the sense proposed by Granovetter (1973), these channels 
introduce the possibility to open more and more the network 
dimension and to wide the informative base.  
 In less developed countries, especially in the rural areas, there 
are systems of social networks based on strong ties more than on weak 
ties. This situation often involves the non exploitation of a wider 
information and cooperative base. Concerning this Wintrobe (1995) 
arguments how the networks emerge following ethnic lines that create 
some structures with entry barriers (to be members of a kin-group 
based on birth) and exit barriers in terms of group sanctions and social 
ostracism. The raise of this kind of social network may come from a 
root reason: investment in channels is irreversible and moreover the 
cost to be suffered to maintain the channel decreases with the increase 
of the number of interactions inside the channel. This would explain 
why there is a particular investment in the original club or family 
group. 
 Linked to this reflection, it is interesting to remember how the 
Grameen methodology requires a group composed by not strong 
related persons, that is belonging to the same ‘club of blood’. So they 
incentivate the creation of some social networks constituted by 
persons not necessarily directly linked, or in other terms linked by 
personal trust. This can be seen as an effort towards the enablement in 
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the creation of a generalized trust. The fact that persons come to be 
linked into a network inside which they can be incentivated to interact 
with unknown members is a way to widen the original club and to 
overcome the tendency stressed by Wintrobe.        
 The analysis of the possible structure of a network, in relation 
with trust, has to consider a relevant distinction between ‘horizontal 
versus vertical networks’. In Putnam’s contribution (1993, 174) we 
find a possible characterization of both: ‘A vertical network, no matter 
how dense and no matter how important to its participants, cannot 
sustain social trust and cooperation. Vertical flows of information are 
often less reliable than horizontal flows, in part because the 
subordinate husbands information as a hedge against exploitation. 
More important, sanctions that support norms of reciprocity against 
the threat of opportunism are less likely to be imposed upwards and 
less likely to be acceded to, if imposed. Only a bold or foolhardy 
subordinate lacking ties of solidarity with peers, would seek to punish 
a superior’.  
Such argument seems to support the choice of creating an 
overlapped credit-debt relation able to exploit the characteristics of an 
horizontal network instead of that in which elements of verticality are 
present. Dasgupta (2002) introduces another reflection to support such 
thesis in favour of horizontal structures. These last ones, in fact, would 
present a greater disposition to a dynamic process of evolution and ri-
negotiation of the relations. In fact if those who are members of a 
network find out the possibility of exploiting some opportunities 
external to the enclave, for example in terms of better economic 
relations, in the case of a vertical relation it can occur elements of 
resistance against changes and the opening of new channels. These 
behaviours could come from persons that have more power in the 
network especially when the change can generate a different 
distribution of power into the network. 
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 After analysing the process of formation and the structure that a 
social network can present it is possible to study the institutions that 
emerge from social networks. Each institutions are formed and 
sustained by a system of beliefs that each member of the network 
shares with the others. Institutions are in other terms a space inside 
which persons interact on the base of a system of believes and norms. 
The process of emergence of norms as well as the distinction between 
formal and informal institutions will be widely examined in the third 
chapter.         
 A system of beliefs substantiates in a system of expectations 
concerning other’s behaviour or, using Dasgupta’s words, ‘about one 
another’s characteristics and predilictions’.  
 Let us consider a group of persons, for example the group of 
microcredit, inside which an agreement is concluded. We can 
distinguish four different situations, rationales, according to which 
each interacting subject can expect that the others keep to the 
agreement. These four causal mechanisms are often overlapped and 
complementary and can generate different institutional arrangements. 
In spite of this let us consider them separately:  
(i) Mutual affection 
Each member of the group cares about one another and also they 
are conscious that everybody is interested in the other’s fortunes. 
Economists formalize this situation making use of a system 
interdependent utilities. This type of social network, where persons 
are linked by a sort of reciprocal affection is realized in the 
institution of the family for example where in fact the costs of 
monitoring are minimal and for this reason it is more difficult to 
find problems of moral hazard and adverse selection 
(ii) Pro-social disposition 
Persons can present a particular disposition to be trust worthy. 
When each member of the group  ‘is sanguine that most of others 
are honourable’ the agreement will be kept. Two possible 
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complementary explanations of this personal disposition can be 
detected: some underline how it comes from an evolutionary 
process which would have selected the subjects whose behaviour 
is based on reciprocity; others highlight how in reality the 
explanation must be found in the first years of life of each person 
and some cultural factors as for example education. Apart from 
this analysis, the system of norms interiorized and practiced 
directly or indirectly through meta-norms (for example in clan, 
neighbours, ethic or religious group), would be at the basis of this 
pro social disposition. Consequently it would become a 
mechanism of enforcement of the agreement.  
(iii) Mutual enforcement 
Even in the lack of an affective relationship and interest for others’ 
well being or a disposition to be honest, an agreement can be 
honoured if subjects are engaged in long term and repeated 
relationships. The basic idea, widely developed in economic 
literature in the so called ‘folk –theorems’, consists in the fact that 
persons can reach a cooperative equilibrium because they can 
observe those who defect from the agreement and apply some 
sanctions. To be effective, the menace of the sanction has to be 
credible and also parts must be able to observe each other’s 
behaviour.  
(iv) External enforcement 
Unlike the others this last situation implies the existence of a 
formal contract between parts that base their system of beliefs on 
formal rules that frame each person’s possible set of behaviours. 
Moreover the mechanism of enforcement is of external type and is 
practiced by a ‘third party’, an established structure of power and 
authority. The functioning of this mechanism needs two 
ingredients. First of all the third party must be recognized and 
accepted by people. A general acceptance is an equilibrium that 
emerges from the fact that when most of the subjects recognize the 
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third party it is very expensive and discouraging not to conform to 
it. This does not mean that the third party can not consider the 
system of beliefs of persons. In fact if the third party is no more 
considered trust worthy, persons can in different ways choose to 
coordinate themselves towards a different equilibrium. The second 
ingredient needed is that of ‘public verifiability’ that sometimes is 
impossible or excessively expensive, as it has been mentioned in 
the study about the raise of courts of law. For this reason these four 
mechanisms often are used in a complementary way. 
None of these mechanisms can assure the attainment of a certain 
equilibrium: the degree of conformity, as well as to which equilibrium 
it is possible to arrive, depend on the system of beliefs that is at the 
base of the interaction. If from one side the economic science permits 
to detect those systems of rational beliefs, that is those ‘that are not 
belied by the unfolding of evidence’; from an other side starting from 
Weber (1930), it has been developed a literature on the concept of 
community’s ‘culture’, as a system of values and dispositions, to 
explain economic performances and institutional arrangements. On 
this line and only on this level it is possible to meet recent 
contributions such as for example that by Putnam et alt (1993, 2000). 
They use cross-section data in order to discover correlations between 
civic culture and economic growth.  
 The concept of culture presented by Dasgupta (2002), in order 
to identify differences in the beliefs people hold about one another, is 
embedded in a coherent and organic framework that shows us how 
‘social capital, trust, culture, institutions are different objects and 
should not be conflated’ (Dasgupta 2002, p 7). Besides it is evident 
how culture configures as an endogenous variable that comes from an 
evolutionary process in which history matters. In fact it is able to 
affect the system of beliefs and the practice of norms on which the 
interactions in that particular historical moment are based. In turn 
these ‘are influenced by the products of society, such as institutions, 
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artefacts, and technologies’. Besides the models of cultural stereotypes 
and civic cooperation proposed, show how the changing of these 
systems of beliefs can realize internally in a non homogeneous way in 
the short run. In order to understand how in the long run different 
equilibrium configurations can be reached, more than focusing on the 
cultural differences as the main cause of different economic 
performances, it would be necessary to consider the interaction and 
the existing correlation between cultural and economic variables.    
 
 
 
2.1.3 Social capital: different channels towards the improvement 
of efficiency and development 
 
A possible line that could be followed in order to find some points of 
convergence among different definitions is to consider two specific 
outcomes that arise from social capital: 
(i) the first is represented by the impact of social capital on social 
exchange and specifically  what are those channels through 
which social capital improves efficiency; 
(ii) the second concerns the relation between social capital and 
development. 
In the debate previously presented, there is a wide consensus on the 
fact that social capital can affect positively, but not only, economic 
performances, although some critical points remain opened.  
In this paragraph we will try to understand how social capital 
can permit in certain cases to overcome market inefficiencies, as we 
have underlined  studying microfinance literature where the group and 
other methodologies have been considered. Moreover, concerning the 
second point more related to these studies starting from Putnam’s one 
(1993), we will pay attention to some critical issues regarding the 
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causal relation between endowment of social capital and patterns of 
development.  
  
2.1.3.1  Social capital and efficiency 
The study of the credit-debt relation is only one of the possible 
typologies of social interactions in which the existence of information 
asymmetries as well as of externalities can cause forms of 
inefficiencies. In reality such problems characterize structurally 
human society and for this reason, as Hayek (1945, 519-520) among 
the first scholars points out ‘the economic problem of society is thus 
not merely a problem of how to allocate given resources…[it is rather] 
a problem of the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in its 
totality’.  
 In social exchange inefficiencies can arise at two levels to 
which correspond two kinds of problems. The first one that we can 
call of ‘searching’ is linked to the difficulty to find those subjects to 
which interaction can be more advantageous. The second one appears 
when the interaction is occurring and it substantiates in the problem of 
‘trust’ if it is true that ‘trading is trading in promises’. In this context 
one important role that social capital can play is to improve social 
exchange ameliorating inefficiencies and facilitating the process of 
search and trust.  
This argument presupposes the existence of an initial condition 
Paretian inefficient of ‘second-best world’ on which social capital, 
under certain conditions and exploiting specific channels, can impact 
leading to a more efficient equilibrium in Paretian terms. For example 
social capital can be an instrument to solve coordination failure, to 
alter the systems of incentives among persons or finally to improve 
the technology of social exchange widening the information base and 
the space of possible interactions.  
 Although ‘social networks can guard against market failure’ 
(Arrow, 2000), social capital must not be considered the only possible 
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way of solution of inefficiencies. We can basically distinguish two 
different ways of achieving this aim: the first one is represented by the 
building of formal institutions; the second one is given by such 
informal mechanisms and interpersonal relationships that, as we have 
seen, are put together in the concept of social capital. The comparison 
of these two possibilities must take into account that we have 
situations in which one solution can be more efficient than the other 
and also that the recognition of the role played by social capital must 
not close the door to the development of formal institutions that may 
be a superior alternative (Arrow 2000; Durlauf Fafchamps 2004). 
 Again following Dasgupta’s approach, we should keep in mind  
that ‘all societies rely on a mix of impersonal markets and 
communitarian institutions’, that means, in other terms, that formal 
market institutions and communitarian institutions can complement 
each other as well as can be substitutes. The main difference is that 
while communitarian institutions emerge from systems of 
interpersonal networks and therefore ‘names matter’, on the contrary 
markets can involve ‘anonymous’ exchanges. It is recognized as this 
distinction is not sharp because ‘even in a sophisticated market 
(modern banking), reputation matters (credit rating of the borrowers)’ 
(Dasgupta 2002, 28) but it permits to underline a point: markets and 
communitarian institutions are linked together through some 
externalities. These last introduce ‘a wedge between private and social 
costs and between private and social benefits’.  
Moreover if in social capital literature it is broadly highlighted 
the virtue of personal relations into networks at the same time 
Dasgupta points out as networks can suffer from its very 
exclusiveness. Sometimes the impersonality in market institutions can 
have enormous virtues too in terms of inclusiveness and enabling a 
more efficient and productive use of resources.    
 Before entering into the analysis of those channels through 
which social capital improves efficiency, these arguments have shown 
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us as the relation between social capital and efficiency is not so 
immediate and must be critically considered.  
 In this complex scenario with different spaces of interactions 
into markets and communitarian institutions, we can find three main 
channels through which social capital can solve or reduce 
inefficiencies in an effective and less expensive way compared to 
formal market institutions (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004): 
(i) Information sharing 
Even if the objective of socialization and interaction among 
persons as well as the creation of networks is not to transfer 
information, the opening of these channels permits to share 
information and to create a common base of knowledge. An 
impressive literature about the role played by social networks in 
the process of technology diffusion, the circulation of 
information about employment and markets opportunities and 
finally on contracts (as we have seen studying peer monitoring 
and peer selection mechanisms) has been developed. It is more 
difficult to understand what are those particular conditions that 
allow to exchange accurate information as, for example, the 
existence of a sort of punishment in terms of loss of reputation 
that a person faces reporting false information (Fafchamps 2004). 
Following the same purpose it could be interesting to analyse if 
different social structures (horizontal vs vertical) can allow the 
sharing of information and can affect their credibility.   
(ii) Group identity and modification of preferences  
Being part of a network or member of a group has a direct impact 
on a person’s system of preferences and consequently his/her 
choices. The situation in which social capital alters individual 
preferences encouraging altruistic behaviour can be studied 
starting from the consideration of a standard Prison’s Dilemma 
where even moderate levels of altruism can conduct to a Pareto 
superior outcome.  Economic experiments suggest that in order 
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to induct altruistic and cooperative behaviour it is necessary to 
build a group identity in which each member can recognize 
him/herself. This is possible even if persons are strangers and 
they do not interact directly ‘face to face’ (5). Moreover the 
identification with a group can stimulate such behaviours called 
by economists ‘herding behaviour’ or deeply some processes of 
‘mimicry’ among members that require the analysis of a more 
fundamental level of interpersonal relationships. As we have 
seen considering externalities, we must remember also that 
persons can mimic the others’ ‘good’ as well as ‘bad’ 
behaviours. Finally social capital can allow persons to obtain 
certain objectives that they are not able to achieve individually 
because they face some internal obstacles: for example to be part 
of a ROSCAs protects persons from their own impulses to spend 
money. 
(iii) Explicit coordination 
In some cases, especially when in the achievement of some goals 
a certain degree of coordination is required, social capital can 
impact positively on the decision making process facilitating the 
exchange of information as well as inducting some behaviours 
(altruistic) and discouraging others (free-riding), as we have seen 
above. But in order to exploit these mechanisms in a situation of 
explicit coordination it is necessary a ‘good leadership’ that has 
the capacity to use these levers of social capital or, in other 
terms, that shows a ‘capacity building’ based on mental 
representations instead of material incentives (Durlauf, 
Fafchamps 2004). This point raises a normative issue: social 
capital not only plays a role in terms of improving efficiency but 
at the same time acting on the social structure it is possible to 
activate a process of ‘building of social capital’.  
Finally, there is the other possibility to achieve the goal of 
coordination and efficiency through formal rules. In this case a 
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‘bureaucratic’ leader that ensures the applications of the system 
of rules defined by the group is enough. 
An interesting field in which these arguments assume a particular 
sense is that one of  public goods. From one side if it is true that the 
state can tax persons to finance the provision of a public goods (via 
formal rules), at the same time in some contexts especially in poor 
countries (but not only) the inability of the state can find a solution on 
social capital. In fact as we have seen its qualities in terms of 
information sharing, encouraging behaviours and coordination can 
offer good levers to solve a typical situation of inefficiency. 
 
2.1.3.2  Social capital and development 
Perhaps, the great success of the concept of social capital comes just 
from those studies on the relation between social capital and economic 
development. In the first most famous contribution by Putnam et alt 
(1993) such relation has been considered so strong that social capital 
has been  presented as the determinant variable of different patterns of 
development of regions in the North and South of Italy.  
But, just going to the same author’s contribution (2000) on the 
United States experience since the 1950’s we can immediately 
understand that this correlation is not so direct and obvious. For 
example, if we consider, as Putnam does, as a proxy of social capital 
the club memberships, the decline registered of this variable since 
1950’s in front of the US economic performance can be interpreted in 
the following way. The improvement of a generalized trust over the 
period studied could have reduced the necessity for persons to be part 
of a club or enforce their networks. In the opposite Italian case, it can 
be argued that the absence of a developed formal institutional 
environment had given a preeminent role to small clubs (Durlauf, 
Fafchamps 2004). This argumentation suggests that we have to 
investigate the role played by networks, clubs and informal 
community-based organizations at different levels of development 
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pointing out that there is a dynamic in the structural change that can 
lead to the invention of different well functioning institutions. We will 
consider more widely this point focusing on North’s (1990, 2005) 
distinction between formal and informal institutions. 
 Drawing again from Dasgupta’s contribution (2002), we can 
take into account a critical point that must be considered when we 
want to discover ‘how network activities [at a micro-behaviour level] 
translate into the macro-performance of economies’. In other terms, 
the recognition of the existence of a relation is not enough and must 
be followed by a specification of the causal relation between social 
capital and its outcome. An effort that can be done in this direction 
and that permits to show analytically how social capital among other 
production factors can work is the following. 
Let us consider a production function:  
Y = A F(K, H) 
where the outcome Y is a single good (in order to overcome aggregate 
problems) and F is the economy’s aggregate production function.  
F presents typical characteristics and is assumed to be an increasing 
function of  K, that is the stock of physical capital, and H, that is the 
aggregate human capital. The first can be imagined as the amount of 
‘manufactured capital’ (we can ignore for our purpose natural capital). 
The second, H is equal to: Σj (hj Lj)  where hj Lj  can be considered the 
effective labour input because Lj is the labour-hours of the person j 
and hj is her/his ‘traditional human capital’, that means that it is not 
considered the network to which j belongs. 
Finally A is the scale factor of the production function called by 
economists ‘total factor productivity’ that is a combined index of 
institutional capabilities and publicly-shared knowledge.  
At this point if we suppose an increase in civic cooperation in the 
community, this will have an impact on H but also in A or in both. 
Precisely if the externalities are confined to small groups it will reflect 
on an increase of the human capital of the members of the group; on 
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the contrary if the externalities are economy wide, generalized, we 
will face an increase of the total factor productivity. In both cases we 
will observe the same directional changes in macro-performance, even 
if not the same magnitude of the improvement of Y. Starting from this 
simple formulation it is possible to compare two communities 1 and 2: 
if in community 1 civic cooperation were greater among people than 
in community 2 this means that A1 > A2 and/or h1>h2 . This means 
that ‘we have not to invoke possible increases in total factor 
productivity or human capital to explain why a cooperative culture is 
beneficial’ and also that the relation is not only from civics to 
economics but also the other way round.     
 Although it has been highlighted as the process of formation of 
social capital and so what are  ‘those institutions that would enable 
people to have a good chance of pursuing well-lived lives’ (Dasgupta 
2000, xii) are fundamental issues till now the argumentations 
presented have not focused on it. In the following paragraph we will 
try to propose some reflections on the ‘building of social capital’ in 
order to understand on these basis if microfinance institutions can be 
considered enabling institutions. 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Building social capital through enabling institutions        
 
In these last years there have been a proliferation of empirical studies 
that recognize the role of social capital, but at the same time we do not 
have convincing theories to explain how social capital is actually 
generated (Dasgupta and Serageldin 2000; Hooghe and Stolle 2003).  
In my opinion the first responsibility can be found in the fact 
that a lot of these studies have not spent the necessary efforts to build 
a coherent analytical framework up to sustain a pessimistic idea that 
social capital is a sort of legacy of long period of historical 
development (Putnam 1993). Following this line present generations 
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in countries with low level of social capital could not have some 
possibilities to enhance their inherited stock of social capital 
especially in the short run. Facing this situation, as Krishna (2000, 72) 
points out ‘the development practitioner might as well pack his or her 
bags and go home’.  
In the opposite side, some studies are promoting a more 
optimistic idea that is the design of institutions, for example for the 
provision of local public goods, as well as forms of horizontal 
organizations and government policies are all instruments capable to 
trigger a process of formation of social capital (Schneider et al 1997; 
Lam 1996; Ostrom 1994). In this terms social capital starts to be seen 
as a more malleable object that can be built up over time, also in the 
short run, through an accretionary dynamic process (Uphoff  2000).  
Moreover, some of these scholars that had sustained a more 
deterministic thesis, have begun to recognize the possibility to 
implement some strategies to improve or restore the stock of social 
capital of a certain country through a synergic interaction between 
civil society and government institutions.  
 Before considering what the possible sources of social capital 
are and on which different levels ‘enabling institutions’ can operate, it 
is important to discuss briefly what is the beneath set of assumptions 
on which the pessimistic thesis is based (Krishna 2000). Concerning 
this aspect a conceptual distinction is required: each country can 
present different levels of social capital, that is a stock variable, from 
which some benefits, a flow variable, spring out. In Putnam et al 
(1993, 1995) and Fukuyama (1995) the connection between stock and 
flows is ‘direct, proportionate and invariant’ that is, in other terms, 
there are two basic assumptions: (i) the stock of social capital cannot 
be added to in the short run and (ii) a given stock produces a single, 
invariant level of flow. Regarding this second argument, it is relevant 
to notice that, actually, the same stock of social capital can be utilized 
in more or less efficient way generating different flows of benefits. 
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 Some situations, as Krishna underlines referring to Wade’s 
work (1994), where for example very close villages (sharing a 
common history and a similar cultural matrix) show different levels of 
social capital, challenge these two assumptions that can not be 
sustained together if we want to give an explanation to these different 
process of development (7). In other terms Krishna (2000, 74) 
concludes that it has to be recognized that ‘social capital can either be 
created or its flows harnessed even within the short run’.  
This distinction allows also to go over a static notion of culture 
that is sometimes used to categorize societies in less or more trusting. 
Regardless societies, in some different forms trust and cooperation, 
the core of social capital, are always present. Starting from this point, 
building up social capital is nothing but extend ‘previously narrow 
expectations of mutual trust to produce more positive-sum outcomes 
for all’ towards forms of cooperation. 
 
 
 
2.2.1 Creating social capital: forms, dimensions and spaces of 
enablement  
 
The analysis of those institutions that enable a process of formation 
and strengthening of social capital at first must clarify what are the 
two main forms in which social capital can be conceived and 
respectively the two fundamental dimensions behind. In this way we 
could detect some possible spaces of enablement as well as some 
instructions about purposive actions and strategies in a normative 
perspective. This effort will be conducted considering in particular 
Krishna’s (2000) and Uphoff’s (2000) contributions because in my 
opinion they start from an analytical framework that is congruent with 
the above mentioned Dasgupta’s one (2000). The framework that we 
are going to develop will be later applied to microfinance institutions 
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in order to discover in which spaces and exploiting which levers these 
institutions can be considered a sort of enabling institutions. 
 As we have underlined, the consideration of the basis of 
collective actions lead us to discover that social capital can be studied 
distinguishing two different complementary forms that give reason to 
the following distinction: 
(i) Institutional capital: in this case collective action arises 
from a system of structured clear rules and procedures as 
well as the existence of well recognized roles and a 
leadership figure; 
(ii) Relational capital: it substantiates in norms and beliefs 
through which persons coordinate themselves. In this case 
we immediately recognize a cognitive and not an 
institutional basis of the collective action.  
These two forms are actually mixed and interplay in a synergic and 
strengthening way. For example if a group deals a new situation, the 
construction of a new set of rules becomes easier if the same persons 
coordinate themselves on the base of some norms of reciprocity or 
some system of beliefs and values interiorized. Vice versa, though 
persons are linked by strong feelings and their behaviour is inspired 
on trust and altruism, sometimes it is necessary to create some 
structures, it does not matter if they are very informal, and recognize 
some roles ‘to translate individual attitudes and values into 
coordinated, goal-oriented behaviour’.   
 The dichotomy introduced is useful to individuate some 
possible spaces of action and to compare different situations that can 
be faced but it is clear that both are required to sustain and develop 
social capital. In fact, if we want to compare two different contexts in 
terms of their different stocks of social capital, we can distinguish four 
different cases/spaces and for each one we can find some normative 
prescriptions. See the following scheme (figure 2.2.1). 
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Figure 2.2.1: Dimensions, forms and spaces of enablement 
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In the first case, the luckiest, the context considered is 
characterized by a high level of social capital that is in other terms 
institutions are well structured and persons are intrinsically well 
endowed in terms of pro social disposition (vice versa in the opposite 
case “weak, weak”).  
Taking apart these two ideal typical situations, it is possible to 
find among the various shades in the real world two interesting sub 
cases. Each one of them, called respectively ‘Traditional’ associations 
and ‘Strong’ organizations, is characterized by a more or less 
endowment of the two forms of social capital considered above. In 
order to understand how it is possible to build institutional capital 
(weak) on a relational capital base (strong) and in the opposite case to 
define some institutions that enable the formation of relational capital 
up to impact on a deeper dimension, we have to analyse the 
fundamental dimensions behind them. 
 The ‘institutional capital’ can be considered as the expression 
of the structural dimension of social organizations and networks. They 
are based on a system of rules, precedents, procedures and roles 
(either formal and informal) that contribute to cooperation facilitating 
the adoption of a mutually beneficial collective action. Instead the 
‘relational capital’ is better collocated in a cognitive dimension of 
persons because it derives from mental processes that are reinforced 
by culture, ideology, more specifically norms, values, attitudes and 
beliefs. These last, finding their domain in the so called civic culture, 
are capable to predispose people towards a mutually beneficial 
collective action.  
 These two dimensions, structural and cognitive, are 
intrinsically connected because the  structural dimension and therefore 
the development of an institutional capital, is directly derived from 
cognitive processes that are intrinsic and not directly observable. The 
subjective behavioural phenomena of expectations can be considered 
the vector through which the passage from one to another of these 
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dimensions in both sense is realized. System of rules and roles are 
created by expectations but at the same time they create expectations. 
Moreover ‘norms, values, attitudes and beliefs by creating 
expectations about how people should act, by implication create 
expectations about how people will act […]. Thus what are subjective 
impetuses have definitely objective consequences’ (Uphoff 2000, 
219).  
These arguments highlight that following the approach that 
thinks of social capital as a form of social network structure we must 
consider this interplay that is both the structural as well as its 
cognitive dimension of network. The consideration of these two 
dimensions and the role played permit to identify those mechanisms 
‘by which social capital is built up and accumulated, stored, modified, 
expressed and perpetuated’.  
 Bearing these mechanisms in mind, we can now consider the 
two sub cases previously mentioned and identified in the scheme as 
two different spaces/contexts characterized by different combination 
of institutional and relational capital (in the case of ‘Traditional 
associations’ respectively weak and strong; while for ‘Strong 
organizations’ strong and weak). 
 
2.2.1.1  Building institutional capital on a relational capital base  
In a context where the relational capital is strong and deeply rooted, 
typical examples are those villages where persons are linked by 
traditional norms of association, it is possible to use this stock of 
relational capital to build institutions introducing a congruent system 
of rules, procedures as well as new organizational skills.  
Just to make some examples, this strategy has been developed 
successfully in Malawi since 1960s in the so called self-help rural 
water supply program or in the so called “Six-S”, an assisted self 
reliance group that exploiting traditions of labour-sharing and 
cooperation   especially   among   the   youngest  in   the   villages   
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has  persuaded  them  to invest in productive infrastructures (both 
physical and social) and institutions.  
In fact the innovations in organizational procedures have 
helped: (i) sometimes to reinvigorate the traditional relational matrix 
but more often to create new social networks; (ii) to enhance their 
capacity and efficacy in collective action in a wider range of activities. 
Moreover, because of the interplay between the two dimensions, these 
strategies have considerably modified not only some traditional forms 
of relationships but also the relational capital that is up to the 
cognitive dimension. This last passage is very important because in 
order to sustain a new system of rules and roles (institutional capital) 
it is necessary that they are accepted or, in other terms, that they are 
recognized by persons internally if we want to obtain a modification 
in expectations. Briefly we have to consider this as a process that 
starting from a certain base of relational capital allows the possibility 
to build institutional capital that in turn will modify the first one and 
so on. See again the figure 2.2.1. 
 
2.2.1.2  Enabling institutions for relational capital 
Belonging to a cognitive dimension the objective of creating relational 
capital is more difficult to achieve than that referring formal 
institutions whose rules can be written on paper, anyway it will 
involve some costs. The precedent case suggests us the possibility to 
obtain this result in an indirect way, through the definition of 
particular kinds of institutions that can impact on subjects’ beliefs and 
attitudes up to the modification of their systems of norms and values.   
 An interesting contribution that sustain with strength this 
argumentation is that one by Hetcher (1987) that suggests a multistage 
process for building group solidarity. The context in which this thesis 
is applied is just that of microfinance as we discover reading the 
effective and synthetic analysis proposed by Krishna (2000, 84):  
‘People who need credit and insurance agree to join together in 
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groups, especially when, as in pre-market societies, credit and 
insurance are not openly available to all individuals. Having joined 
together to obtain private goods, however, members must devise 
membership criteria and monitoring and sanctioning procedures. 
These rules and procedures get institutionalized over time. 
Internalizing rules and procedures, members moderate behaviours so 
that these correspond to the expectations others have. This build up of 
social capital – of formal rules and mutual expectations – facilitates 
extending group activities to other previously unexplored areas’.    
  This contribution, anticipating the answer to the question: “Is 
microfinance an enabling institution?”, provides an idea of the 
dynamic process of enablement, that is coherent with the argument 
presented by Falk and Kilpatrick (1999). In their work, they show how 
the accumulation of social capital is the outcome of a process of 
learning interactions. In order to build social capital, therefore, it is 
necessary to stress attention on quantity and quality of these learning 
interactions that require a learning event (an actual occasion) and 
occur in a contextual dimension (the broad, socio-cultural and political 
frame of reference). The planning and implementation of community 
projects embedded in an institutional frame may be one of these 
learning interactions. It is argued by a number of practitioners that 
people’s participation rarely happens spontaneously, but rather it 
involves social-institutional preparation towards the construction of a 
learning event. This preparation is the outcome of a systematic pattern 
of action-reflection-action (Albee & Boyd, 1997).   
 Sabel’s work (1994) focuses on a quality aspect of these 
interactions that allow the creation of such mechanisms of learning. 
He proposes the concept of ‘discursive institutions’ that is of those 
institutions in which all members, committing themselves to ongoing 
negotiations based on shared understanding of common goals, become 
able to build up social capital. In fact (Sabel 1994, 138-156): ‘Discrete 
transactions among independent actors become continual, joint 
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formulations of common ends in which the participants’ identities are 
reciprocally defining…discussion is precisely the way by which 
parties come to reinterpret themselves and their relation to each other 
by elaborating a common understanding of the world…It is this 
reflexive capacity to embrace different forms of self-expression that 
defines persons as individual and creates new interpretative 
possibilities for society’. 
 As it is possible to understand from these contributions, there is 
no single answer or model for the promotion of social capital 
formation but there are frameworks and guiding principles following 
which it is possible to build enabling institutions towards the creation 
of relational capital or more generally impact on the domain of civic 
culture, using Uphoff’s expression (2000). 
 Just the consideration of two forms and respectively two 
dimensions of social capital that interact together in a mutually 
reinforcing mechanism, it has been possible to find some principles 
and normative prescriptions for the activation of an incremental 
process of social capital creation. Finally if we recognize the 
possibility of the formation of social capital (acting on stock and 
flows) at the same time we have to pay attention on the fact that social 
capital can be destroyed and probably that it can be eroded faster and 
more easily than it can be created. 
 Having sustained an optimistic thesis about social capital 
formation, in the next paragraph we are going to focus on some 
contributions that underline the possible role of civil society and 
institutions for social capital creation in a comparative perspective. 
Particularly the pregnancy of the concept of civil society, as a system 
of horizontal relations, will be taken into account.  
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2.2.2 Civil society and institutions in the process of social capital 
generation  
  
Because of the central role assumed by the concept of social capital in 
political and economic life, in recent researches we are meeting the 
first efforts which try to understand the process of social capital 
generation in order to give some answers and normative suggestions 
to political and economic actors. A useful way to look at these 
contributions is to start distinguishing two different possible 
approaches that identify respectively two levels of intervention 
(Hooghe and Stolle 2003). Moreover, this distinction enriches the 
framework proposed in the previous sub-paragraph clarifying the 
following issue: in the two spaces of enablement, identified above on 
the basis of two different dimensions and consequently forms of social 
capital, there is the possibility to introduce as we have seen some 
enabling institutions. But these last ones can be realized at two 
different levels: the first is that one of civil society and the other level 
is that of governments, public policies and political institutions.  
At this point we can introduce Hooghe and Stolle’s (2003) 
definitions: the first approach called ‘society-centred’ operates in the 
realm of civil society; instead the second one, called ‘institution-
centred’, is embedded in those political institutions that can define 
‘top – bottom’ strategies of enablement or more generally can create a 
favourable environment for social capital formation. Both approaches 
are aimed by the recognized necessity of increasing the level of social 
capital in a given context particularly acting on that dimension that we 
have called ‘cognitive’ or that can be defined ‘attitudinal’ (following 
Stolle 2003). 
 In the ‘society-centred’ approach a preeminent role is 
recognized to social networks, for example voluntary associations, as 
spaces of social interactions from which in certain cases relational 
capital can arise. After testing this thesis the problem is to understand 
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which types of social interactions, associations and networks, are 
capable to develop civic attitudes and skills and how they operate 
creating the congruent conditions of enablement.  In the same way the 
‘institution-centred’ approach requires the investigation of a series of 
issues such as for example: (i) the possible correlations between 
governmental local experiences and patterns and levels of social 
capital; (ii) how some characteristics of political institutions especially 
their credibility can affect generalized trust and forms of cooperation; 
(iii) how some political choices such as for example the 
neighbourhood composition (especially in multiethnic societies) or 
forms of tax amnesty can impact on expectations and social capital.  
 Although both approaches open interesting and often 
interrelated questions, the purpose of this brief analysis is to underline 
the existence of these two levels and then to concentrate on some 
aspects of the ‘society-centred’ approach into the frame of civil 
society. The reason is that, in order to study microfinance institutions, 
we have to take more carefully into account those conditions that 
allow the creation of social capital starting from social networks.  
In the collection edited by Hooghe and Stolle (2003) there are 
interesting analysis of the relationships between specific aspects of 
participation, as for example the number and the length of 
memberships or the intensity of participation, and the development of 
‘civic attitudes’ and norms. Some results recognize that important 
factors are: (i) the presence of regular social horizontal interactions 
where persons are linked by face to face relation; (ii) the length and 
quality of time that members spend together; (iii) the concentration of 
selected attitudes within a group implying that only those associations 
in which democratic patterns predominate are possible sources of 
social capital (Hooghe 2003). This recalls some aspects introduced 
with the concept of discursive institutions (Sabel 1994) or with the 
idea of groups as learning spaces of interactions (Falk and Kilpatrick 
1999) as we have seen above. But these results are not unambiguous 
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because for example others (Wollebaek and Per Selle 2003) point out 
as the promotion of civic attitudes can arise both from active and 
passive memberships and also that time intensity of participation is 
less important than for example the multiplicity of memberships for 
each person.   
 Concluding this review, we can notice that if all these 
contributions sustain the idea of a relation between voluntary 
associations and attitudinal aspects of social capital, at the same time 
they find that this relation is very complex and not so direct and linear 
and therefore that it must be studied more applying a mix of 
theoretical and empirical approaches as well as exploiting 
multidisciplinary contributions in a fertilizing perspective.  
 A following critical issue is to understand if and in which way 
the process of creation of relational capital can be extended outside 
the group or association allowing the solution of collective action 
problems outside the group towards, in other terms, developing a 
generalized trust. As the authors recognize: ‘The problem is that there 
is no causal mechanisms that successfully explains the transfer of trust 
for people one knows personally, such as the members of one’s 
association, to people outside the associational experience. How are 
group experiences generalized?’ (Hooghe and Stolle 2003, 234).  
 An initial possible suggestion in order to analyse this issue 
comes from a common conclusion of these contributions that find as 
‘multiple or overlapping memberships’ are important aspects of group 
life and consequently they impact on the development of civic 
attitudes.  
At this point it is relevant to introduce a theoretical distinction 
used in social capital studies between ‘bridging’ relations and 
‘bonding’ relations. The first one unites actors across social cleavages 
while the second one allows the creation of bonds within 
homogeneous subcultures. As it is underlined (Mayer 2003; Wolebaek 
and Selle 2003) the fact that many people belong to more than one 
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association for example a religious group, a non profit association, a 
trade union or a political movement demonstrates that each subject has 
found his/her own form of bridging social capital. In this way also 
persons ‘are exposed to various cross pressures, even if all of these 
organizations, considered independently are homogeneous’. Moreover 
they have the opportunity to face different contexts and persons on the 
base of different interests, personal characteristics or identities from 
which the memberships derive. In other terms persons engaged in 
various types of associations will introduce in their system of social 
networks some elements of diversity and variety. Regarding to this, 
social capital theory ‘suggests that the membership contact with 
citizens that represent a broad sampling of the population might be 
more conducive for generalizing trust to people outside of the 
association than contact with people like oneself’ (Hoooghe and Stolle 
2003, 234). In these terms it is possible to find some sources of a 
generalized trust and relational capital studying not only the dynamics 
into groups but also in which way the subjective system of social 
networks (and so all the memberships owned by a person) can be an 
instrument to spread and generalized systems of civic attitudes and 
norms. This effort runs again into the same limit that we have 
underlined trying to define the concept of social capital that is the 
absence of a developed theoretical framework.   
 An interesting starting point in this direction, can be the 
analysis of different models of civil society especially that one of 
‘open proximity’, in which the role of horizontal and overlapped 
systems of relations is studied (Porta and Scazzieri 1997; Scazzieri 
1999).  
 The concept of civil society stems from the classical 
philosophical reflections on the idea of ‘sociability’ that has been 
developed by Aristotle and Cicero up to the Scottish contributions in 
the XVIII century (mainly by Adam Smith), leading to different 
models of interpersonal interaction. The common object substantiates 
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in the analysis of those characteristics that human’s sociability 
acquires when we start to consider interpersonal relationships and 
social structures outside the context of the original family group.  
 The general conditions of social living together are considered 
in Aristotle on the base of an evolutionary criteria that leads to the 
recognition of the ‘political association’ in the polis as the 
fundamental structure of sociability. From this idea comes the 
‘political’ model of civil society in which a strong connection between 
sociability and citizenship implies a close relational structure 
characterized by exclusiveness.  
 In De Officis Cicero refuses an evolutionary scheme and 
suggests an idea of sociability as an attitude that steams at first from 
the common exercise of ‘fundamental human capabilities as reason 
and language […] that link human beings in a sort of universal 
fraternity’ (De Officiis, I, xvi, 50). From this conception derives an 
idea of a system of open social structures characterized by different 
‘degrees of proximity and distance’ in which each person is inspired 
in his/her behaviour by a rational allocation process of benevolence. 
Just this ‘economic’ principle of sociability open the door to a 
multiplicity of spaces of interaction that can coexist without the 
recourse to a general order structure that implies a general hierarchic 
criteria of sociability. In fact in Cicero’s frame ‘linkages between 
relational spheres are lateral more than vertical  reflecting a situation 
of reciprocal congruence instead of hierarchic subordination’ 
(Scazzieri 1999, 366 personal translation).  
This framework is coherent with the argumentation presented 
above (Hooghe and Stolle 2003) because it implies that each person 
can belong to multiple and overlapped networks (friends, commercial 
relations, associations, etc) excluding the situation of closure. This 
system of networks are characterized also by forms of horizontal 
coordination among persons and by mechanisms of inclusion and 
 123 
openness that opens the possibility to two other models of civil 
society.  
Although both of them, the model of ‘commercial society’ on 
the base of the Scottish reflection and that one of ‘open proximity’, 
provide for the development of open relational schemes able ‘to 
transform the strangers in friends’ (through the principle of ‘catallaxy’ 
proposed in Friedrich von Hayek) briefly we will focus on the second 
one because it can be applied in different contexts introducing ‘the 
paradigm of lateral connections and multiple memberships’ in a 
context of maximum variety. In fact ‘civil sociability can do without a 
reduction of variety and permits the simultaneous memberships of the 
same subject to a multiplicity of distinct groups that are not organized 
in conformity with a hierarchic criteria’ (Scazzieri 1999, 373 personal 
translation). 
 Forms of coordination among subjects can be achieved 
implementing ‘lateral process of exploration’ through which different 
persons (or social groups) can find the existence of complementary 
among their secondary own characteristics. The discovery of such 
similarity and shared characteristics, outside the fundamental identity, 
can open spaces for the formation of horizontal patterns of interactions 
and cooperation. In this sense in this model of civil society it is not 
required a reduction of variety or the coordination on some 
behavioural standards as in the commercial society. The fundamental 
intuition at the base of this model is an elastic concept of distance 
among persons: in fact even very different persons can find among 
their characteristics an element of proximity. Moreover a generic 
binary relation among persons on the base of a certain character is 
opened to all persons that own the same character. The following 
generation of possible spaces of congruence among persons, with 
different degrees of extension and density, can facilitate the 
enlargement of the informative base and so the reduction of 
 124 
transactions costs, the formation of a common knowledge and more 
generally the creation of a common base of norms of interactions. 
 In this sense the concept of civil society as ‘a cluster of 
relations and needs continuously changing’ (Poni 1997, personal 
translation) and in particular the hypothesis of open proximity can be 
a good analytical framework in order to understand the formation of 
social capital and the diffusion of these attitudinal habits and systems 
of norms that are the deep intangible dimension of social capital.   
 
  
 
2.3 Is Microfinance an “enabling institution”?                        
 
As we have seen studying some aspects of the debate around the 
‘social collateral’ argumentation, the notion of social capital has been 
widely used in microfinance literature. Very often in the last years 
from different sides, microfinance institutions have been presented as 
good practices for the mobilisation of social capital in order to reduce 
poverty just where both the market and the state have failed. Although 
we do not have so much and convincing contributions to sustain the 
thesis that microfinance institutions are good tools in order to enable 
the process of formation of social capital, recalling some features of 
these institutions presented in the previous chapter, we can try to 
insert them in the analytical framework developed here.  
Most of the argumentations that we are going to discuss require 
a systematic empirical research in order to test their basic hypothesis. 
If they were verified, we would have important normative suggestions 
for the definition of development policies. 
 A first observation is that microfinance institutions can operate 
as enabling institutions in both the spaces of intervention that we have 
individuated. In fact these institutions can allow the construction of a 
congruent system of rules, procedures as well as new organizational 
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skills (not only related to the credit-debt relation as the ‘Sixteen 
decisions’ in Grameen Bank model suggests) that in turn can impact 
both on the institutional and relational faces/forms of social capital. 
Some examples have been presented before referring not only to 
microfinance experiences but also to other development programmes 
in which a certain degree of coordination among persons is required. 
This point is particularly relevant if we consider as poor countries 
suffer very often a condition of ‘institutional poverty’ often 
accompanied by a lack of systems of social horizontal networks.  
 It has been highlighted as the group mechanism based on an 
horizontal social structure can allow the formation of social capital. 
For example Rutherford (2000, 41) observes how ‘perfect strangers 
coming together with the limited aim of running a ROSCA, can 
sometimes construct and practice trust more easily than people with 
histories of complex relationships with each other’. Moreover the 
regular interactions in group meetings can represent those ‘learning 
events’  (Falk and Kilpatrick 1999) in which members practice some 
horizontal-democratic rules of interactions as well as ‘discursive’ 
interactions (Sabel 1994) that can be all instruments for the creation of 
a new system of norms and beliefs.  
This argument has been explicitly sustained referring to group 
lending in Hetcher (1987) and it finds some supports in these 
contributions in which the relation among horizontality, trust, forms of 
cooperation and civic attitudes is stressed. 
 Some studies (see Dowla 2006) present interesting results 
regarding the effects that the introduction of the Grameen Bank 
system has had on the rural Bangladesh where communities are 
particularly divided because of clan and caste tensions, village 
superstitions and scarce resources. As it is widely demonstrated in 
development economic studies, women are more disadvantaged by 
this situation of poverty especially for what concerns the possibility 
for them to create some ‘social channels’ towards a social network 
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system outside the family group. Because of Islamic purdah norms, 
women’s relationships are in fact primarily cultivated among those 
with whom they share kinship ties. The Grameen group represents for 
women their first opportunity to convene with a new group based on 
horizontal relationships, permitting the achievement of some goals 
such as:  
(i) individual recognition (women are called into the Center 
using their first name instead of that one of their husband or 
family); 
(ii) shared identity ( through the weekly group meetings); 
(iii) building new networks and increased mobility (in each 
Center women can meet other 40 women so that, not only 
they can strengthen their old direct relationships but also 
develop new indirect relationships; for example in the 
Soburon’s ‘rice water network’);  
(iv) information sharing; 
(v) exchange of scarce resources and forms of cooperation (it is 
registered an increase in borrowing material networks). 
The recognition of these results comes also from A.Sen (1999) who 
praises the role of Grameen Bank and other MFIs in Bangladesh 
which have ‘done al lot not merely to raise the deal received by 
women, but also - through the greater agency of women – to bring 
about other major changes in the society’.  
 The same author in an other book Reason before identity (1999) 
or look also at Identity and violence (2006), speaking about the 
difficult dialogue between these fundamental dimensions of human 
being, recognizes how the worst situation is that in which a person 
‘thinks that is not possible to think’, in other terms that there is no 
space for putting things under the eye of rationality. Following this 
line, it is possible to argument that the introduction of a particular 
methodology that encourage interactions among peers on new bases 
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and procedures can be considered an instrument to put into discussion 
some rooted elements of cultural identity. 
 As we have seen, in microfinance institutions, other two kinds 
of relations, the overlapped one in which microfinance institutions and 
the group are linked and the triangular one in the case of individual 
loan, are present. Some scholars have raised the idea that it is possible 
to recognize a form of social capital also in the vertical relation 
‘lender-borrower’ sustaining that microfinance operators and 
borrowers develop special relationships (Ito 2003; Van Bastelaer 
1999). This point comes from  many observers’ reports from both 
developed and developing countries as for example in the Grameen 
Bank model or in many experiences of Mentor programme in Ireland, 
UK etc and it is declared also in some World Bank documents (7 april 
2003) as we can read: ‘the formation and maintenance of social capital 
between staff and borrowers is crucial to: identify and train borrowers; 
select and approve loan proposals; negotiate solutions when problems 
emerge; and fend off criticism – even hostility – from sceptics, 
moneylenders, and some religious leader’. Moreover for example in 
Bangladesh villages, Grameen Bank workers have become not only 
recognized money managers but also some sorts of counsellors, 
conflict mediators, teachers and institutional references (Ito 1999). 
This phenomenon happens especially when microfinance institutions 
are inspired by an integrated approach that open the possibility to 
various occasions of ‘learning interactions’. But as Montgomery 
(1996, see chapter one) has widely showed in group lending 
programmes, the vertical relation between operators and borrowers 
could shift in certain cases from a ‘bhai (brother) culture to a sir 
culture’, in other terms reproducing a ‘patron – client’ relation in 
which elements of hierarchy, pressure and unequal distribution of 
power could represent obstacles to the development of a base of social 
capital. In spite of the possible existence of these degenerations some 
scholars have pointed out how the ‘vertical social capital’ has become 
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increasingly the best guarantee of good repayments and therefore that 
microfinance institutions have to invest more and more on this 
relation.  
 A possible way to introduce in the borrower – lender relation a 
third part that recreate a more horizontal base is to resort to figures as 
guarantors that are placed between the two actors in the credit-debt 
relation and also are recognized by both of them. This is the case of 
the so called ‘triangular’ scheme.  
 Although the application of different methodologies imply the 
creation of different systems of interactions providing various 
instruments of enablement, a common strategy that can be applied to 
make microfinance an enabling institution is to embed the credit – 
debt relation into a system of overlapped and interweaving relations. 
In fact this system could strengthen not only the credit-debt relation as 
we have underlined in the first chapter, but it can introduce some new 
system of social networks in which economic, social and relational 
reasons find a congruent composition reciprocally reinforcing.  
The fact that microfinance institutions are able to impact in all 
these contexts, providing persons the opportunity to develop their 
capabilities in the production field but also in the relational and 
institutional one becoming a sort of fabric of social networks, suggests 
the idea that they can be looked at as enabling institutions.  
 If we recognize that microfinance institutions enable the 
creation of social capital into groups and other sets of relations the 
problem that remains open is to understand and empirically discover if 
they are also capable to extend these results in a broad context.  
 In a recent study in the East Europe (Mosley et al 2004) where 
social capital has been literally destroyed in years of dictatorship, 
some scholars have tried to understand which effects the introduction 
of microfinance institutions had generated. Although not in all 
countries examined there is a correlation between microfinance and 
higher levels of formal associational membership, they find some 
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evidence that links microfinance institutions to the development of 
informal associations, and thence trust, and thence political 
participation. They also underlines how these results must be taken 
with caution because for example ‘prior linkages bonded in the hard 
experience of perestroika tended to survive and induce more trust  
than more recent and more ad hoc associations’ (Mosley et al 2004, 
424).  
 In other terms, as we have highlighted above, the causal 
relation between microfinance institutions and social capital needs to 
be more investigated, both in the intra and inter institutional  
dimensions, in order to understand how the potentialities that these 
enabling institutions seem to show can be exploited in a normative 
perspective. 
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Notes chapter 2 
 
(1) See Dasgupta (2000), Durlauf (2000), Solow (2000), Arrow 
(2000), Portes (1998). 
 
(2) This last approach anticipates some considerations that we will 
widely develop considering Douglass North’s (1990 and 2005) 
distinction between formal and informal institutions as well as the role 
of the institutional dimension of interaction.   
 
(3) See for example the Fukujama’s contribution (1995) in which  
a comparative analysis is conducted simply considering the 
differences between high trust societies and low trust societies. There 
are also others more refined studies such as that one by Knack and 
Keefer (1997) or Paxton (1999) in which various proxies of social 
capital are adopted. Finally we can mention Burt’s work (1997). Here 
social capital is measured in terms of network constrain that depends 
on: size, density and hierarchy of a particular network 
 
 
(4) Consider Arrow (1972: 357) who wrote: ‘Virtually every 
commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly 
any transaction conducted over a period of time. It can be plausibly 
argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be 
explained by the lack of mutual confidence’. The relevance of the 
concept of trust is also stressed in Coleman (1990: 304): ‘.. social 
capital ... is embodied in the relations among persons...a group whose 
members manifest trustworthiness and place extensive trust in one 
another will be able to accomplish much more than a comparable 
group lacking that trustworthiness and trust’. 
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(5) We will come back to this point in the third chapter considering 
the role of group identity speaking about team thinking and 
Bacharach’s last contribution (2006). For the second aspect, that is in 
which way a certain behaviour can impact on person’s identity see 
Akerlof and Kranton 2000; Muldrew 1998. 
(7) This prognosis is challenged by a number of recent empirical 
studies (Schneider et al, 1997). For example, it has been shown that 
changing the structure and composition of school boards can enhance 
significantly the level of parental involvement in school-related 
activities and in turn help build social capital. Others present similar 
conclusions about the design of irrigation projects (Ostrom, 1994 and 
Lam, 1996).  
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Chapter 3   
 
The economics of  social interactions: 
 an analytical framework    
 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce an analytical framework for the 
study of economic and social interactions in view of assessing the 
phenomenon of microfinance and the working of enabling institutions 
(see chapters one and two). In this direction, the distinction between 
formal and informal institutions, the dynamics of interactions and 
reciprocation and the role of trust will be further analysed.   
First of all, I suggest a methodological approach in which the 
study of economic and social interactions is carried out by 
distinguishing between different levels and dimensions of interaction. 
This will allow the identification of a fundamental level of interaction. 
For this reason we may start from the analysis of the space (domain) 
of interaction in which the interplay between objective and 
institutional features takes place. An interesting perspective in this 
direction is the one provided by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen in his 
analysis of peasant communities, not only because the interplay of 
these two dimensions is clearly considered, but also because his 
analytical effort lends itself to a high degree of generalization. 
Although this economist seems to be distant from the ‘microfinance 
revolution’, we have to remember that he has been recognized by 
M.Yunus (1997, p71-72),  as his ‘better teacher [who] opens up 
unsuspected horizons before [him]’(1). I shall suggest that there are 
various connections between the two economists and that it is possible 
to identify a clear intellectual influence of the teacher upon his pupil. 
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 After introducing this structural frame, we will make another 
step taking into account social interactions and particularly the 
interpersonal dimension in economics (paragraph 3.2 and 3.3). At this 
level it is possible to analyse the possible explanations of non-selfish 
economic behaviour provided in the economic literature. In this 
section we will consider both economic theories of altruism and 
reciprocity and those more radical proposals, such as team reasoning, 
towards the reintroduction of relationality into economics.  
A particular emphasis will be placed on the analysis of the role 
of trust and its property of responsiveness that will be modelled 
following Pelligra’s work (2005). The existence of emerging practices 
of trust as well as the role played in the credit debt relation will be 
considered specifically.  
The last step will introduce a more fundamental level of 
interaction between human beings. At this point, concepts such as that 
one of ‘fellow feeling’ and ‘sympathy’ introduced in the eighteenth 
century by Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) 
show an impressive deepness and ‘modernity’. These last features are 
immediately evident if we consider, as we have done in the last 
paragraph, the revolutionary discoveries in neurosciences made in the 
last ten years by Giacomo Rizzolatti and his associates at the 
University of Parma. This fascinating encounter between economic 
theory and the biological and neural foundations of human beings 
leads to the identification of a fundamental relational structure within 
human beings, which is based on mirror neurons and from which the 
first basic pattern of interaction arises. 
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3.1    Economic structures: objective and institutional features 
 
3.1.1 Introduction to economic structure 
In the field of structural economic analysis, the economic system is 
described starting from the consideration of each event as an element 
of a particular structure. Moreover, the consideration of the economic 
structure as the ‘most fundamental set of relationships among 
economic units providing the basic framework for economic life’ 
(Baranzini, Scazzieri 1990, 6) allows to consider these events both as 
the result and the cause of the underlying structure. 
As suggested in Baranzini and Scazzieri’s (1990) analytical 
perspective on economic structure, the concept of ‘structure’ 
presented in literature leads to a fundamental distinction. As a matter 
of fact, structure can be conceived ‘as the network of interpersonal 
relationships on which the economic fabric of society is founded’ or 
‘as a set of relationships among economic magnitudes such as sectoral 
outputs population and technology’ (Baranzini and Scazzieri 1990, 1). 
In the first case the concept of structure refers to the system of social 
rules, interpersonal obligations and mutually compatible beliefs and 
thus to the formal and informal institutions that define the framework 
of economic actions; in the second case we describe the economic 
system in quantitative terms dealing with relationships among 
magnitudes such as wealth, revenue, population and capital stock. 
Clearly the relationships of the latter type ‘describe in the first 
instance the outcome not the motivations of agents’ aggregate 
behaviour’ (Baranzini and Scazzieri 1990, 1). 
A very clear example of the use of the concept of structure ‘as 
the fabric of economic society’ is provided by institutional economic 
analysis. The concept of ‘economic society’ arises as the result of a 
process that starting from the emergence of market laws slowly arrives 
to the definition of a sophisticated and institutionalized system of rules 
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of behaviour that becomes the ‘natural space’ for economic 
interactions (2).  
 In parallel the concept of structure, as the set of relationships 
among economic magnitudes, was developed by the so called 
“political arithmetic” up to Leontief’s work (1941) in which the 
“Structure of the American economy” is represented in terms of a 
flow of inter-industry relationships. In this second approach as it is 
highlighted in Scazzieri (1993, 85) ‘the object of investigation is 
represented by a network of relationships that can be identified in an 
objective sense (they are flows of produced and traded commodities, 
or of services delivered by particular productive funds). The 
behavioural assumptions, in this case, are important in so far as the 
dynamics of the system are concerned, but do not affect the identity of 
the economic system as such’. 
The existence of these two structural dimensions has sometimes 
led some scholars to a structural specification based on assumptions 
on the institutional set up of the economic society. In other cases 
economists such as J.M.Keynes, Piero Sraffa and Luigi Pasinetti have 
tried to understand the impact of particular institutional aspects on a 
given outcome. In particular Pasinetti’s contribution (1964) is an 
attempt to identify a fundamental level of structural analysis which is 
independent of the institutional set up. However, as soon as we want 
to consider more specific features of economic systems, the analysis 
of the institutional framework is recognized to be essential.  
 Although it is useful to distinguish between these two 
fundamental notions of structure at the same time it is important to 
examine their possible patterns of interaction. As a matter of fact 
‘[the] institutional set-up is itself related to the objective features of 
economic structure, and thus with the dynamic behavioural principles 
at the basis of the actual motion of the economic system through 
historical time’ (Baranzini, Scazzieri 1990, xi). This mutual 
dependence between objective and institutional features of economic 
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structure emerges also as central in determining paths of structural 
economic change.  
 
 
3.1.2  The interplay between objective and institutional features 
As we have just seen introducing the alternative uses done of the 
notion of structure, the description of economic systems permits the 
identification of two distinct but interrelated structural dimensions: the 
objective and the institutional one. 
 The first dimension, substantiating in the ‘objective network of 
the flows of produced commodities and services and of the stock of 
real assets existing at any given point of time’ (Baranzini and 
Scazzieri 1990, 243) has been represented following two different 
approaches. In the horizontal one, mutually dependent economic 
activities generate a circular flow, while, in the vertical approach, the 
relationship between certain key magnitudes and the respectively 
requirements for their production or utilization is a ‘one way’ 
relationship. In other terms the integration of economic activities can 
take the form of a circular interdependence between consumption and 
production leading to the idea of ‘productive consumption’ or in the 
opposite case the form of a unilateral relation between consumption 
and production, leading to the consideration of the concept of 
‘productive allocation’. Although the reconstruction of the intellectual 
traditions from which different patterns of integration of economic 
activities, the horizontal and the vertical one, is not the focus of this 
section, it is worth stressing that this structural specification played a 
very important role in the analysis of the dynamic of the economic 
system and its quantitative changes.  
Our goal, here, is to underline how the specification of this 
structural dimension that belongs to the level of the ‘natural’ economy 
analysis, must be conducted taking into account the existing  interplay 
with the institutional arrangements behind the objective network of 
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flows and stocks. For example, as it is stressed, in Sraffa’s original 
corn-iron model in which a structural matrix of the economic system 
is defined, ‘institutions come into play as soon as the system generates 
a positive net product [...] In particular the assumption is made that the 
net product is distributed among industries according to the criterion 
of a uniform rate of profit reflecting the requirements of a capitalistic 
competitive economic system’ (Baranzini and Scazzieri 1990, 234). 
In this direction we have to recognize how ‘institutions, which 
may be defined as ‘prevalent habits of thought with respect to 
particular relations and particular functions of the individual and of 
the community’ (Veblen 1953, 132) are at the basis of the specific 
forms taken by economic activity in relation to the processes of 
production, consumption and accumulation. [This type of structural 
specification] permits a careful identification of the distinguishing 
features that characterize any given form of economic activity” 
(Baranzini and Scazzieri 1990, 243-244).  
The existence of such interplay substantiates in the fact that if 
the social and institutional structure behind the economic system has 
an impact in the determination of its productive structure, at the same 
time the way in which production and accumulation are arranged 
could be reflected in the social structure and in the institutional set up. 
For this reason it is important not only to obtain a certain degree of 
congruence between economic units in both dimensions, objective and 
institutional, considered alone, but also it is important that their 
interacting dimension finds a congruent composition.  
Baranzini and Scazzieri (1990) highlight that the recognition of 
interaction between ‘objective’ and ‘institutional’ dimensions may be 
linked to the idea of Georgescu – Roegen (1976, 235; 1st edn 1965) 
that ‘economic growth involves not only quantitative changes but also 
qualitative transformations’. This argument arises from the 
observation of  differences between the productive organization in 
agriculture and industry. Any form of productive organization can be 
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considered as a ‘cluster of technological, institutional and physical 
features of the production process [that] gives identity to the economic 
structure at any given point of time’ (1990, 245). This consideration 
leads to concentrate our attention on the institutional dimension at the 
base of qualitative transformations of an economic system. 
 As we have mentioned in the introduction, some scholars 
among them Luigi Pasinetti in his formulation of a theory of economic 
structure and structural change (1964-5), have tried to analyse the 
interplay between objective and institutional aspects of economic 
system starting from the definition of a set of relationships that may be 
defined independently of the institutional arrangements, relationships 
that ‘may be stated in natural terms’. The ‘natural’ and the 
‘institutional’ systems of relations are considered in two different 
types of causal frameworks: in the former ‘a precise direction of 
causality may be established between fundamental explanatory 
variables and their relative impact upon structural interdependencies’; 
while the field of institutional relationships is associated with a 
‘mutually causality (Hicks 1979) among all the variables that reflect 
the simultaneous working of a given institutional mechanism’ (3). 
 If following this line it seems to emerge the possible relative 
autonomy of a ‘natural’ and an institutional analysis at the same time 
other complementary approaches have been proposed such as that one 
of ‘local models’ by Morishima (1984). In his contribution the effort 
goes to the direction of finding those characterizing assumptions for 
each particular economic system that allows to distinguish essential 
and non essential features of an economic model. 
 At this point it is worth to underline as ‘the relationship 
between economic history and economic theorizing appears to be one 
in which history provides the economist with a number of alternative 
institutional frameworks, thus emphasizing those ‘characterizing 
assumption’ that give shape to the type pf historically specific 
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economic theories relevant for the analysis of any given economic 
situation’ (Baranzini and Scazzieri 1990, 252). 
 In the next paragraph we are going to focus on the Georgescu-
Roegen’s analytical framework (1965) based on the analysis of 
peasant communities and its implications in the study of the interplay 
between the ‘objective’ features of an economic system and the 
corresponding institutional set-up.  
 
 
3.1.3 The ‘analytical map’ of interpersonal relationships 
It is important to restate that ‘the concept of economic structure 
emerges as the outcome of a complex inter-relationship between the 
analytical representation of the objective stock-flow network of any 
given economic system and the theoretical formulation of some 
general features of economic behaviour as may be associated with the 
existence of relatively persistent institutional arrangements’ 
(Baranzini and Scazzieri 1990, 227). 
Georgescu-Roegen’s contribution on peasant communities 
(1965 first edition) represents a first important attempt at finding a 
framework suitable to the consideration of these two dimensions and 
their interaction.  
In his work we can find a conceptual scheme based on the idea 
that it is possible to identify an analytical map of interpersonal 
relationships. In fact it is possible to identify in principle all 
institutional relations Rk that may relate to a pair of individuals Ai and 
Aj , distinguishing between those relations that are potentially existing 
and those ones that hold in practice. This leads to the emergence of a 
dominant set of ‘true relations’ from which a specific institutional 
arrangement derives. Individuals will be related through a plurality of 
different interpersonal relations however: ‘the analytical map of true 
relations Ai Rk Aj will immediately separate the whole structure into 
several distinct nuclei [...]. The analytical separation results from the 
 141 
fact that the number of relations true for any pair Ai and Aj of the same 
nucleus exceeds by a significant magnitude the number of relations 
applicable to internuclear pairs” (Georgescu-Roegen 1976, 205-6; 1st 
edn 1965).  
In other terms, using the example of peasant communities we 
will face a situation in which the number of ‘true relations’ connecting 
the members of the same village overcomes that one existing among 
members of different villages.    
At this point the emergence of a dominant set of interpersonal 
relations comes to be related to the processes of production, 
consumption and accumulation through the organization of the 
productive activity that represents a keystone for the consideration of 
the relationships between the material and the institutional aspects of a 
given economic system. As it is stressed using the same example ‘the 
economic activity of the village forms a unit of production as close 
knit as a simple workshop. A peasant household can perform 
practically no economic activity independently of those of others. On 
the contrary [...] all must move in step, whether it is for cultivating the 
fields, mowing the meadows, cutting wood from the forest, or 
depasturizing the animals’. Such organization of production implies 
that ‘in all economic respects, not only in respect to production, the 
village is not a granular mass of households, much less of individuals, 
loosely connected through anonymous markets, factories, banks, or 
other similar urban institutions. Above all, it is not a civil society. On 
the contrary, it is an indivisible social and economic whole [...] 
cemented by multiple integrative forces’ (Georgescu-Roegen 1976, 
206; 1st edn 1965).  
In this sense, it may be argued that the concept of productive 
organization emerges as a critical factor of institutional arrangements 
because it is ‘the factor determining the way in which any given 
material basis comes into relation with the institutional set-up’ 
(Baranzini and Scazzieri 1990, 258). Moreover, the degree of 
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specificity of productive organization is strictly related to the degree 
of determinacy that links the institutional set up with the material 
basis. This last one refers to the matrix of objective conditions that 
substantiates in the natural and environmental resources available as 
well as the technological set-up defined in terms of technological 
skills and capabilities. 
 The existence of the interplay between material bases and 
institutional set-up, analysed on the base of the organization of 
productive activity, can be detected considering other types of 
societies such as for example the commercial society where 
productive units are connected by exchange based institutions 
(commercial and financial markets) or the industrial society. If in the 
peasant economy we face a situation of ‘simple cooperation’ in the 
other two cases the concept of ‘complex cooperation’ can explain the 
dynamic of the economic system.  
Apart from the different types of economic societies that we are 
facing, the important outcome of this contribution as it is stressed, is 
the ‘identification of a characteristic feature of the objective stock-
flow network of economic activity; namely that the field of structural 
economic analysis cannot be restricted to the material bases of any 
given economic system. As a matter of fact, in any economic system 
associated with a sufficiently sophisticated material basis the role of 
the institutional set-up becomes crucial, the reason being that in this 
case production processes cannot be carried out without the existence 
of an articulated network of institutional arrangements, such as 
property rights and associated patterns of wealth accumulation; the 
interpersonal distribution of resources and opportunities of exchange; 
the distribution of currently produced output; family size and 
structure; cultural traditions and inherited skills. In addition the 
political dimension of social institutions (such as the mechanisms of 
formation of collective choices) may also be considered’ (Baranzini 
and Scazzieri 1990, 263). 
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The institutional features mentioned above are widely 
considered in Georgescu-Roegen’s contribution to the analysis of 
peasant communities. His attention to these institutional contexts 
presents a particular inspiring root, among others, that substantiates in 
the reflections made by scholars such as Herzen, Chuprov and 
Chaianov that studied the condition of Russian peasants of the early 
years of the nineteenth century. They were members of the political 
and cultural movement called populism (narodnicestvo, from narod 
that means common) that tried to find solutions to the critical situation 
of Russia in the nineteenth century, a situation that will lead to the 
October Revolution in 1917. Both the two schools of this movement, 
the Slavophiles and the Narodniki, sustained the idea that the 
traditional village communities, called ‘obscina’, organized through 
the so called ‘mir’, had to be studied deeper because they would be the 
Russian own institutional model of development.  
Georgescu-Roegen’s reflections were inspired just by these 
villages considered as ‘social entity...a perfectly natural, atomic, social 
unit” (1976, 205; 1st edn 1965), the resiliency and power of their 
traditions and especially their productive organizations from which the 
interplay between material basis and institutional arrangements clearly 
emerges. 
The study of this relationship and particularly the institutional 
dimension finds a useful framework in Georgescu-Roegen’s (1976; 1st 
edn 1965) definition of an ‘institutional matrix’, that is the relatively 
invariant patterns of relationships among distinct technological, 
organizational and behavioural features of a given economic system. 
Starting from the consideration of the institutional matrix from which 
a plurality of distinct institutional arrangements can emerge it is 
possible to organize in a coherent frame the above mentioned 
institutional features, discovering ‘a comprehensive range of 
theoretically possible clusters of such different features’.  
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The ‘institutional matrix’ allows not only to study 
systematically the institutional dimension but also becomes a powerful 
tool in the analysis of the dynamic and the qualitative transformations 
occurring in some institutional features of an economic system.   
It is worth remembering as the structural change is deeply 
rooted in the interplay between the objective stock-flow network and 
the institutional dimension (the ‘social fabric’ of a community) of an 
economic system. As it is clearly explained: ‘once a certain degree of 
sophistication in productive organization is attained, the material 
basis, which is expressed by means of an objective stock-flow 
network, takes shape according to the possibilities implied by the 
existing institutional set-up. An important consequence is that changes 
in the material bases of the economic system may require 
corresponding changes of the institutional set-up; on the other hand 
modifications of the institutional set-up may sometimes be impossible 
unless a corresponding change of the material bases takes place’ 
(Baranzini and Scazzieri 1990, 265). 
These reflections lead these scholars to introduce an idea of 
structural change as a morphogenesis, a concept that implies the 
consideration of the transformation both of the objective stock-flow 
network and the institutional set-up.  
In this direction it is also stressed how it is possible to consider 
two different types of institutional transformation of any given 
economic system distinguishing ‘whether such a system is moving 
within the boundaries of a given institutional matrix or whether it 
switches to a different matrix” (Baranzini and Scazzieri 1990, 263). In 
other terms we can define two situations: in the first one remaining 
into the same institutional matrix the transformation leads to the 
formation of new clusters of institutional features, that is a different 
combination of the existing institutional features; in the second one 
transformation is a more radical process through which the 
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institutional matrix is changed: some features of the traditional 
institutional set-up disappear while others emerge.      
Each institutional matrix, as Georgescu-Roegen pointed out, 
shows a certain degree of resiliency that is particularly strong in the 
case of peasant communities. As soon as the pressure impressed by 
some dynamic factors such as population increase, the change in the 
demand (for example with the income distribution) or supply side of 
the economy becomes not sustainable by the institutional matrix, this 
incongruence comes to be solved in terms of a morphogenesis of the 
institutional matrix (the second case considered).  
The gradual emergence of this potential change of economic 
nature is often accompanied by a necessary action of political 
institutions. In other terms ‘new institutions may emerge from a 
previous institutional framework, either as an outcome of endogenous 
determination or as an outcome of deliberate actions taking into 
account existing structures and their implicit potential for change’ 
(Baranzini and Scazzieri 1990, 265).    
Into this frame the idea of enabling institutions finds a 
conceptual scheme of reference. In fact, the study of the institutional 
matrix of a given economic system and so the interplay existing with 
the objective stock-flow network seem in my opinion to be the 
‘pillars’ for the building of that space of enablement, as we called it in 
the previous chapter, in which microfinance institutions can play an 
important role. 
It is not a case that the approach that we have presented comes 
from the complex legacy of a heterodox economist, Georgescu-
Roegen, who ‘always considered economics to be a social science, a 
science which does not deal only with observable quantity but also 
with man, the study of which necessitates an empathetic 
interpretation’ (De Gleria 1999). 
Like Marshall, he sustained the idea that economists must find 
their home in biology and not in physics looking for a synthesis in 
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which ‘the economic process appears as a continuation of biological 
evolution, in fact a transcendental extension of this evolution. This 
synthesis explains not only the eternally evolutionary character of the 
economic process, but also political social aspects related to 
inequalities among social classes or among nations...’ (Dragan and 
Demetrescu 1986). 
Following some reflections presented by De Gleria (1999) and 
on the base of M.Yunus’s reconstruction of his relation with 
Georgescu-Roegen, it is interesting to individuate some elements of 
congruence between the refined reflection by the Romanian economist 
and the complex figure of ‘the banker of the poor’.  
Quoting Yunus (1997, 71-72): ‘Georgescu was a real tyrant, 
difficult and implacable, but there is no doubt that I have never had a 
better teacher [...] He opened up unsuspected horizons before me. 
Thanks to him, I understood that there was no need for formulae, and 
that the essential thing was to understand the concept [...] Burdened 
with work under his direction, I learnt to respect precise models which 
showed me that certain concrete plans could help us to understand and 
to build the future’. When Yunus arrived at Vanderbilt University, it 
was the period of gestation of ‘Entropy Law and Economic Process’ 
(1971) while the collection ‘Energy and Economic Myths’ had just 
been printed (1965 first edition). 
Briefly, it is possible to find at least three points of similarity in 
which it seems clear the influence of the teacher on his pupil.  
At first, as we have stressed before, Georgescu-Roegen 
suggested the need to study the phenomenon of economic growth both 
in terms of ‘quantitative changes’ and ‘qualitative transformations’ 
(see before). Although Yunus will become a professor of econometry 
he remained persuaded that the ‘economics of poverty’ cannot get 
along without a qualitative analysis recognizing how ‘prices, profits, 
interest rates and famine are the results of a complex and powerful 
social process’ (Fuglesang and Chandler 1995). 
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Moreover, Georgescu Roegen had observed that persons, 
especially considering rural communities (with particular objective 
and institutional features) are not well represented in terms of self 
interested agents. Yunus will speak referring to human motivation 
neglecting the idea that the main one is ‘greed’.  
Finally, as we have remembered in the first chapter, Yunus 
applied a particular approach to the economic problem he was facing, 
that is to assume the ‘worm’s-eye perspective’ rather than ‘the bird’s-
eye overview’. This assertion is especially significant if we remember 
how microfinance institutions have been development policies 
inspired by a perspective ‘from the bottom’. This preference for a 
micro-level perspective, especially in a normative context, in such a 
way was also present in Georgescu-Roegen’s thought. As De Gleria 
(1999, 469) remembers: ‘this distinction was made by GR in 1968 
under the heading of Utility with regard to the theory of consumer 
choice. There is no doubt that GR often expressed a sceptical view of 
macro-economic questions (not least, I presume, because he had had 
first-hand experience of the practical difficulty of tackling such 
questions seriously during his Romanian exile, when he held 
important official positions, including posts of responsibility within 
the National Institute of Statistics)’. 
Taking into account these reflections, our goal is now to make 
another step towards a deeper understanding of the role of institutions 
both in their formal and informal dimension.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
3.1.3 Formal and informal institutions 
In the last decade it has been recognized more and more that 
institutions in their specific diversity and complexity matter if we 
want to understand relevant economic phenomena such as, for 
example, the explanation of the diverse economic performances of 
different economies. This recognition has been having huge 
implications in terms of the relevance assumed by the institutional 
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economic analysis opening also new points of view on phenomena 
such as that one of poverty that comes to be rethought as a situation, 
among others, of ‘institutional poverty’. 
 In this paragraph the definition of what institutions are and how 
they are formed is done following Aoki’s Game - Theoretic 
perspective (2001) in which  three different (although interrelated) 
views of institutions are presented. After that we will focus more on 
one of these conceptualizations, that is that one by Douglas North 
(1990), specifically in his identification of two kinds of constraints, 
formal and informal, through which institutions emerge and can be 
defined. This conceptual scheme finds a significantly advancement in 
North’s last contribution (2005) in which his conception of the nature 
of institutions is the result of new reflections coming from the field of 
the philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences. 
 Starting from the analogy of the economic process as a game, 
as already Adam Smith (1759) had done with the image of the ‘great 
chessboard of human society’, Aoki highlights how economists have 
regarded an ‘institution comparable to either players of the game, the 
rules of the game, or equilibrium strategies of the players in the game’ 
(2001, 5).  
Some economists, as in part we have done speaking about 
microfinance, identify institutions as organizational establishments, 
and so players such as industry associations, technical societies, 
universities, courts, legislatures etc (see Aoki, 2001). But at the same 
time, speaking about microfinance institutions, our attention has been 
placed on their internal systems of rules from which spaces of 
interactions among agents derive.  
 This view has been strongly proposed by Douglas North that 
opens his seminal book with this definition: ‘Institutions are the rules 
of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interactions [structuring] incentives in 
human exchange, whether political, social or economic’ (North 1990, 
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3).   These constraints, defining the framework within which human 
interaction takes place, allow a reduction of uncertainty and a more 
stable ‘structure to everyday life’ in which for each economic actor a 
set of choices is defined.  
The degree of uncertainty that characterize the space of 
interaction is the result of both ‘the complexity of the problems to be 
solved and the problem-solving software (to use a computer analogy) 
possessed by the individual’ (North 1990, 25). The first cause of 
complexity arises from the incomplete information characterizing 
human interactions while the computational limitation are intrinsic to 
the capacity of the human mind ‘to process, organize and utilize 
information’, as Herbert Simon had firstly pointed out.    
 At this point North (1990) suggests an analytical framework 
based on the idea that if we want to understand why institutions exist 
and their role in the functioning of societies we have to combine a 
theory of human behaviour with a theory of the costs of transacting. 
These last ones ‘consist of the costs of measuring the valuable 
attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights 
and policing and enforcing agreement. These measurement and 
enforcement costs are the sources of social, political and economic 
institutions’ (1990, 27).  
The subsequent step is to introduce a theory of production that 
allows to explain the role of institutions in economic performances, 
recognizing how the costs of production are the sum of the 
transformation and transaction costs. This approach immediately 
shows itself to be impressive not only for the implications in the 
neoclassical paradigm but also because it underlines the role of 
institutions in the solution of problems of interaction and coordination, 
exchange and production. 
For our purposes in this framework a distinction is particularly 
relevant. ‘As in a competitive team sport’, quoting North (2005), the 
interaction among agents is regulated by a system of both formal and 
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informal rules. The formal ones are those written rules consciously 
designed that substantiate in political rules (constitutions, regulations 
etc), economic rules (property rights on resources and their derived 
utility) and contracts (agreements on the use or exchange of goods). 
These formal rules are accompanied by a bundle of informal ones 
such as social norms, moral codes and conventions that very often 
play a very important role in human interactions.  
 In the analysis of the emergence and evolution of these systems 
of rules, according to North a sharp distinction between organizations 
and institutions must be considered. In fact if institutions (formal and 
informal) ‘define the way the game is played’, at the same time there 
are some players of the game that are ‘groups of individuals bound by 
some common purpose to achieve objectives’ (North 1990, 5) that he 
calls organizations.  
Just in the interaction between these two subjects, institutions 
and organizations, it is recognized the possibility of an institutional 
change: ‘Both what organizations come into existence and how they 
evolve are fundamentally influenced by the institutional framework. 
In turn they influence how the institutional framework evolves. […] 
Organizations are created with purposive intent in consequence of the 
opportunity set resulting from the existing set of constraints 
(institutional ones as well as the traditional ones of economic theory) 
and in the course of attempts to accomplish their objectives are a 
major agent of institutional change’. This institutional change realizes 
in an incrementally rather than in a discontinuous path in particular 
because of the existence of informal institutions embedded in customs 
and traditions that have a higher degree of resilience, as Georgescu-
Roegen (1965) had noticed,  than the formal one.  
 Although it is more difficult to define and describe the informal 
mechanisms through which human beings have structured their space 
of interaction, we have to make this kind of effort taking them into 
great consideration.  
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As a matter of fact, several contributions demonstrate how in 
primitive societies in the absence of the state and other formal 
institutions the existence of a ‘dense social network leads to the 
development of informal structures with substantial stability [in 
which] people have an intimate understanding of each other and the 
threat of violence is a continuous force for preserving order. […] 
Deviant behaviour cannot be tolerated in such a situation, because it is 
a fundamental threat to the stability and insurance features of the tribal 
group’ (North 1990, 38-39). Even in most developed economy, 
informal institutions, that is the informal system of rules, are 
important in themselves often also in the explanation of the 
effectiveness of formal institutions’ performances and the 
enforcement of agreements.  
 Following North, we have to underline how these informal 
constraints, with their pervasiveness in the coordination of repeated 
human interaction, can manifest themselves: 
(i) as extensions, elaborations and modification of formal 
rules 
(ii) as socially sanctioned norms of behaviour 
(iii) as internally enforced standards of conduct 
The same kind of specification is also suggested in Aoki where, into 
the framework of prisoner’s dilemma, it is recognized how starting 
from an ‘external enforced’ system of norms, as for example trader’s 
norms and club norms, we can arrive to an ‘internal mechanism’ based 
on moral obligations that were described by Kenneth Arrow (1969, 
79; quoted in Aoki, 2001) as the ‘carrying out of implicit agreements’ 
in which ‘internalized feelings of guilt and right are essentially 
unconscious equivalents of agreement that represent social decision’. 
The historical analysis that we have conducted in the first chapter on 
the evolution of merchant’s community and financial markets can be 
reread just using these lens.  
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As we have seen, as we move from less to more complex 
societies characterized by an increasing specialization and division of 
labour, we face the emergence of a system of formal rules and legal 
systems that ‘may lower information, monitoring and enforcement 
costs and hence make informal constrains possible solutions to more 
complex exchange. Formal rules also may be enacted to modify, 
revise, or replace informal constraints’ (North 1990, 47). This last 
point suggests the idea that we must take into account the interplay 
between these two mechanisms, formal and informal, internal to the 
institutional dimension if we want  to explain in a coherent framework 
economic and social interactions. 
After having focused on the central distinction proposed by 
North between formal and informal constraints, it is worth to consider 
some aspects of the last approach, called in Aoki (2001) the 
equilibrium-of-the-game view of an institution (4).  
 This last conceptualization has been developed on the base of 
two different equilibrium  notions: the evolutionary game approach 
and the repeated game approach.  
In the first line of research an important contribution is that one 
by Robert Sugden (1986). As it is well stressed by Aoki (2001, 7) here 
‘a convention of behaviour establishes itself without third-party 
enforcement or conscious design. As a convention evolves, agents 
tend to develop particular traits (perceptions of environment, 
preferences, skills, etc) under the pressure of evolutionary selection. 
Thus a convention and associated individual traits may co-evolve’. 
Only in this direction conventionalized rules of conduct may become 
formal, underlining the idea that ‘the law may reflect codes of 
behaviour that most of individuals impose on themselves’ (Sugden 
1986, 5). One relevant difference in this approach to that one followed 
by North is that institutions originate from a spontaneous order or a 
self organizing system. 
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The other line developed, mainly by Greif’s various 
contributions (1998), is based on sophisticated concepts of 
equilibrium where the expectations (or system of beliefs) in a context 
of repeated game play a central role. This approach leads to a 
conception of institutions as the result of ‘two interrelated elements: 
cultural beliefs and organizations’ that ‘whenever applicable, have to 
be an equilibrium’.   
Moving in this direction Aoki (2001, 10-12) arrives to identify 
institutions with a ‘self-sustaining system of shared beliefs about a 
salient way in which the game is repeatedly played’.  
This becomes the system of rules of the game that are created 
endogenously through agents’ interactions and held in their mind. 
Specifically ‘the content of the shared beliefs is a summary 
representation (compressed information) of an equilibrium of the 
game. Namely, a salient feature of an equilibrium may be tacitly 
recognized by the agents, or have corresponding symbolic 
representations outside the minds of the agents and coordinate their 
beliefs […] Agents strategic choices made on the basis of shared 
beliefs jointly reproduce the equilibrium state, which in turns 
reconfirms its summary representation’. On the base of this 
mechanism, briefly described, an institution endogenously created 
becomes objectified and self-sustaining unless some events comes to 
modify the shared system of  beliefs. 
In this very brief overview on different theoretical frameworks 
into which the concept of institution can be developed, we have to 
underline the relevance of North’s recent contribution Understanding 
the process of economic change (2005). For the purposes of our 
research,  the first more methodological section of the book seems 
particularly relevant.  
In the tradition of his seminal work (1990), North restates the 
idea that human institutions are mainly motivated by the need of a 
reduction of uncertainty (in Frank Knight’s 1921 sense; as quoted in 
 154 
Aoki 2001) on the face of an intrinsic limit of human mind whose 
nature is such that our knowledge is necessarily partial and 
incomplete. This human condition is complicated by the fact that the 
structure of the human domain is ‘non-ergodic’. This means that it 
shifts in unintended ways as humans try to modify or control it. 
Moreover, as we alter it, it changes  how we represent the costs and 
choices we face, which in turn changes how we attempt to further alter 
our institutional environment and so on.  
 Facing this scenario, North mainly innovative effort is to 
recognize that ‘we must necessarily focus on the way in which the 
mind works and makes sense of our external environment’ (2005, 21). 
In other terms we cannot understand the society’s structure of 
interaction independently of the ‘mental models’ or systems of beliefs 
that help to constitute that structure. 
According to North a first attempt in this direction is to 
rediscover F.A.Hayek’s contribution The Sensory Order (1952) about 
the process of learning and formation of beliefs, that has ‘an 
amazingly modern resonance in recent work in cognitive science’ 
(North 2005, 33).  
North highlights how human beings think and act within the 
context of a system of categories and assumptions that provides a 
necessarily incomplete model of the world in which not all the range 
of possible actions is represented. Our estimation of our alternatives 
depends on how we represent them which in turn depends on our 
underlying system of beliefs (5). 
Drawing on the work of Andy Clark (1997), Ed Hutchins 
(1995), and Merlin Donald (1991, 2001), North commits himself to 
the view that cognition is not simply something that takes place 
‘inside the head’, but which is done in interaction with a structured 
external human environment. In this way we could show how ‘human 
cognition is not just influenced by culture and society, but that it is in 
a very fundamental sense a cultural and social process’ (Hutchins 
 155 
1995, xiv; quoted in North 2005, 34). The recognition of this 
endogenous feature is stressed referring to such works in which 
cultural and historical variables show to be relevant in the explanation 
of the general experimental game of responding to incentives.  
This last contribution stressed again the importance of an 
understanding of the cultural background of economic interaction and 
so of the formal and informal institutional arrangements especially ‘if 
we are to account for the wide and still-widening gap between rich 
and poor countries’ (North 2005, 47).  
 Although North’s last contribution would deserve more 
attention for his interesting and in such a way ‘revolutionary’ for 
economic theory thesis introduced, the goal of this section was to 
underline the co-existence into the institutional dimension of a system 
of formal and informal constraints. In the next paragraph we are going 
to analyse another dimension of interaction that call in cause directly 
the interpersonal dimension. 
 
 
 
3.2 Economics and social interactions: towards the 
explanation of non- selfish economic behaviour 
 
 
3.2.1 Social interactions and the interpersonal dimension of 
economics    
At the beginning of the twentieth century the ‘new’ economic science 
introduced a theoretical revolution that is systematically described in 
many recent contributions  (see Bruni 2005; Gui, 2000; Zamagni 
2005). In this process it is recognized how, in contrast with the 
founders of the classical political economy, Pareto’s reformulation of 
the theory of choice implied the first sacrifice of the interpersonal 
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dimension and the development of a methodological individualistic 
base of analysis.  
 Before considering the reasons that make necessary the 
adoption of new theoretical lenses and the efforts made in this 
direction in economic literature, briefly we are going to put attention 
on the principle stages in the economic reflections that have had a so 
important impact in the contemporary economic science.  
As Bruni (2005, 213) underlines in his reconstruction of the 
new Pareto’s approach based on the ‘naked fact’ of choice: ‘[…] no 
room is left for non-instrumental relations among human beings: 
economics becomes the science of the individual and is characterized 
by a system of preferences, rather than by an identity or personality 
[reaching] the point of stating: ‘The individual can disappear, 
provided he leaves us this photograph of his tastes (Pareto sect. 57 as 
quoted in Bruni 2005)’.  
This process of eradication of the interpersonal dimension in 
economic analysis found the subsequent fundamental step in 
Wicksteed’s idea that ‘the specific characteristic of an economic 
relation is not its egoism but its non-tuism’ (Wicksteed 1933, 180; as 
quoted in Zamagni, 2005). In his approach, economics can be 
compatible with any motive and so even altruism, but the thing that 
can not be tolerated is ‘that the other becomes a you’. As Zamagni 
(2005, 311) maintains ‘Non- tuism is the true barrier that prevents the 
treatment of economic relations between agents that, on the one hand, 
know each other (so that the interactions are not anonymous), and, on 
the other hand, possess an identity (so that the interaction cannot be 
impersonal)’. Using the well known metaphor, the combination of 
instrumental rationality and non-tuism, as two sides of the same coin, 
condemned Robinson to an unhappy life alone without Friday which 
was turned out from the island of economic theory. 
 As a result of this path in the economic thought, conventional 
economic theory represents ‘the behaviour of rational agents, 
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characterized only by, and motivated only by, their preferences and 
beliefs; in consequence, it recognizes only the cognitive dimensions of 
interactions between its agents. This methodological strategy, one 
might say, treats all interactions as impersonal’ (Sugden Gui, 2005, 
13). Just in that strand of literature that puts into discussion the 
rational choice model, new contributions on the relevance of 
sentiments and communication of dispositions are arising. In the last 
section of this chapter we will take into account those recent 
contributions in which the mutual perception of sentiments in the 
interpersonal dimension is considered rediscovering Adam Smith’s 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (Sugden 2002, 2005; Scazzieri 2005).  
 In the modern economic science, sociality, at least in the sense 
of not assuming self interest has been reintroduced in order to give an 
explanation to those phenomena such as the provision of public goods, 
the bequest motive, or the existence of social dilemmas as well as 
experimental data and results raised in game theory that are in contrast 
with the selfish maximization.   
In some of these earlier contributions, for example if we 
consider theories of altruism, generally there is no departure from an 
individualistic and instrumental horizon  in which ‘modification are 
restricted to an expansion of the set of arguments in the individual’s 
utility function’ (Bardsley and Sugden 2006, 18). In this way 
individuals may be altruistic or inequality – averse but ‘the others’ are 
considered only as instruments or obstacles for their own preferences 
even if their objectives include the welfare of just those others. In 
more recent works, for example theories of reciprocity (Rabin 1993), 
the idea that individuals in their interactions may be motivated to 
return kind behaviour for kind behaviour and viceversa, opens the 
door to causal links between motivations (Kolm, 2005).  
Another way followed to explain non-selfish behaviour has 
been to consider the possibility that economic agents can be motivated 
(endogenously) by their need to meet other people’s expectations 
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about them. In other terms, in these theories of normative expectations 
‘one person’s motivation depends on another person’s belief’ (Sugden 
and Gui 2005, 15). Moreover, just on the idea that a person with his 
behaviour can communicate his expectation on other’s behaviour, the 
mechanism of trust responsiveness is based. Finally if we recognize 
that persons are affected by the consideration, admiration and esteem 
of others, also in a deeper way in terms of the recognition of 
themselves and their identity, we have found other endogenous 
sources of motivation that can have a very important explaining power 
(6). 
We will spend more time in the next subparagraphs considering 
some of these contributions and more radical proposals, such as that 
one of team reasoning, towards the explanations of non selfish 
economic behaviour and the provision of useful instruments to face 
the microfinance phenomena. 
Before that, it is worth to identify some important causal links 
that connect interpersonal relations with the economic sphere in order 
to underline the relevance and necessity of a more complex scheme of 
interpretation of economic phenomena. In fact, if in the previous 
paragraph we have underlined the importance of the institutional 
framework in its formal and  informal expression for economic 
performance, here the goal is to consider specifically the interpersonal 
dimension and its relevance in the economic field. 
As suggested in the recent contribution by Robert Sugden and 
Benedetto Gui (2005) we may argue that: 
 
(i) Interpersonal relations inside the economic sphere can 
affect the economic performance and well being 
This statement implies that the existence of good interpersonal 
relations among economic actors may allow not only a reduction 
of the transaction costs and mutually beneficial interaction towards 
cooperation and collective actions; but at the same time it means 
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that positive interpersonal relations may provide intrinsic benefits 
for the persons involved. 
(ii) Interpersonal relations outside the economic sphere can 
affect economic performance and well being 
As we have seen the existence of norms of cooperation, dense 
social network and mutual familiarity, in a word of social capital, 
can bring instrumental benefits towards the improvement of 
efficiency and development and at the same time may bring 
intrinsic benefits 
 
(iii) Economic choices can affect interpersonal relations inside 
and outside the economic sphere 
A particular arrangements for example in terms of intra e inter 
organizational practices can affect the interpersonal dimension of 
the actors involved (examples can be some different settings 
analyzed in microfinance literature based on incentives and 
monitoring mechanisms or other development projects applied in 
rural communities). Outside the economic sphere personal 
relationships and social cohesiveness can be facilitated (or not) by 
individual and collective economic choices. In this sense we have 
suggested the concept of enabling institutions, as a possible tool 
through which it is possible to implement economic policies. 
 
Each of these links have been inspiring an increasing number of 
theoretical and empirical contributions, underling also the necessity of 
an interdisciplinary approach in which different disciplines encounter 
themselves with a fertilizing attitude.  
 The first conceptual scheme that we are going to analyse is that 
one in which just the recognition of the relevance of the interpersonal 
dimension, and so the consideration of the so called relational goods, 
leads to a different idea of economic interaction that comes to be 
reviewed as an encounter.  
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3.2.2 Economic interactions as encounters: ‘relational’ goods  
A possible root that can be taken in order to consider the interpersonal 
dimension of economic reality, or in other terms the 
‘communicative/affective side of economic interactions’ (Gui 2005, 
28), is to identify some conceptual entities that may contain relational 
phenomena into a coherent framework and then analyse agents’ 
preferences and motivations concerning such entities.  
The first attempt in this direction could be to apply in this field 
the concept of externality, that is, to individuate some forms of 
‘interpersonal’ or ‘social’ externalities that operate ‘through 
interpersonal communication (both verbal and visual) or emotional 
links’ (Gui 2005, 29). But this concept is more useful if we want to 
refer to a situation where the effects on other agents of one’s 
behaviour are unintentional, that is, a by-product of actions based on 
the persecution of other goals.   
Other efforts could be done considering a wide spectrum of 
goods’ characteristics or extending the exchange paradigm 
introducing concepts like social exchange in which the expression 
exchange substantiates in a ‘non-contractual combination of reciprocal 
contributions’.  
Leaving apart some limits that these solutions present we will 
concentrate on the promising root taken by some scholars (Gui 1988, 
2000; Uhlaner 1989; Zamagni 1999) particularly considering 
Benedetto Gui’s recent contribution (2005). This choice is motivated 
by two reasons.  
The first is that in Gui’s contribution, starting from Mark 
Casson’s  statement (1991, 25) that ‘the concept of a trade [must be] 
replaced with the concept of an encounter, which can also include 
team-work, public assembly, chance meetings, and so on’, the scholar 
proposes an analytical framework in which relational goods are 
considered as the result of a productive process called ‘encounter’.  
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The second one is that his concept of relational capital is the 
manifestation at a micro-level, as it is suggested by Turner (in 
Dasgupta and Serageldin’s collection essays 2000), of the same 
concept of social capital that we have presented in the second chapter 
at a different level. 
 After proposing examples of encounters such as ‘an estate 
agent and a customer engaged in a deal; a foreman explaining a new 
task to a worker’ or others based on different ‘productive 
technologies’ (Sugden 2005), all characterized by the fact that they 
substantiate in face-to-face interactions, Gui suggested to decompose 
an encounter (considered as a productive process) into its components. 
The aim of this operation is to identify at first the inputs and the so- 
called affecting factors of the productive process and then the 
resulting outcomes or outputs of encounter. 
In transactions the following inputs (I) are employed: 
(I1) ordinary goods and services 
(I2) interactants’ human inputs (they refer to such flows of 
services of interactants’ stocks of human capital) 
These elements must be considered in the face of two affecting factors 
(A): 
(A1) the external environment (both the objective and 
institutional structure of a society) 
(A2) interactants’ attitudes and moods (interactants’ 
reciprocal “state of feelings”) 
In order to understand the communicative/affective side of an 
encounter to the traditional outcomes (O) considered, that are: 
(O1) transfers of property rights  
(O2) the provision of a service 
(O3) the performance of a task within an organization 
we have to add other two outcome-entities that are: 
(O4) changes in interactants’ human capital, in particular its 
relation-specific component 
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(O5) ‘relational’ goods ‘consumed’ in the course of 
interaction 
Just the introduction of these two outcomes (O4 and O5 as Gui defines 
them in his scheme) that we are going to analyse separately, opens to 
the identification of those entities we had spoken about at the 
beginning.   
 
Relation-specific human capital or ‘relational capital’ (O4) 
In nearly all encounters, the human capital of the agents involved is 
modified by the fact that there is a passage of information owned. As a 
matter of fact, in the encounter a face to face interaction generate new 
information that become available for future individual activities and 
choices. But, in the case in which ‘a piece of information obtained 
during an encounter affects only the ability to derive outputs of 
various types from future encounters with the same interactant, it 
constitutes ‘relation-specific human capital’ (or, more simply, 
‘relational capital’)” (Gui 2005, 35 cursive added).  
This new capital, substantiating in an improvement of 
information, may be local. This means that one part univocally 
possesses information about the other, or common knowledge for 
those specific agents involved, but not for others. The creation of 
relational capital substantiates also in the modification of the ‘state of 
feelings’ of interactants that can affect an encounter’s outcome. 
 On the base of the degree of specificity of human capital from a 
two-person relationship (dyadic) through small groups up to full 
generality, we can recognize in this entity the concept respectively of 
relational capital at a micro level and social capital at a meso and 
macro level. As it is well clarified by Gui (2005, 36): ‘Enlarging the 
number of the group causes the notion of relational capital to overlap 
with the notion of ‘social capital’, which – in its prevalent ‘meso-
economic’ usage – refers to a collection of intangible durable 
resources that are specific to a community: the respect of norms of 
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cooperation (which requires, first of all, knowledge of the norm, and, 
secondly, a convergence of beliefs that it will be followed); mutual 
familiarity and trust among members of networks along which 
information flows easily (so research costs are contained); and so on. 
Indeed, social capital and what I call relational capital are made of 
roughly the same substance’. 
 We quote this last statement because it is clearly coherent with 
the framework proposed in Dasgupta (2000; 2002) and for this reason 
in the fourth chapter we will overlap these contributions towards a 
comprehensive framework of analysis. 
 
Relational goods (O5)  
To introduce this concept we have a wide range of examples. One of 
them is proposed by Hansmann (1980, 890; quoted in Gui 2000; 2005) 
who suggests how the success and continuation of participatory 
organizations such as associations, cooperatives, non profit 
organizations can be explained referring to those benefits that persons 
involved obtain just for being interacting parts of these realities, 
independently of other possible outcomes achievable (O1, O2, O3, 
O4).  
Those benefits, identified by Gui (2005, 37) as ‘relational 
consumption goods’ are those outcomes of social interaction that do 
‘not reside in what this can be instrumental to (advantageous 
transactions, or the accumulation of human capital of any sort) but in 
what is enjoyed (or suffered, if the communicative and affective side 
of the interaction is unpleasant) during the interaction itself – a 
peculiar form of consumption’.  
In this sense Kenneth Arrow (2000, 3 cursive added) asserts 
that “much of the reward from social interaction is intrinsic”. 
 Relational goods, as Carole Uhlaner (1989) had observed, can 
be considered local public goods. This implies they are subject to 
market failure with two exceptions: the first is that complete free 
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riding is not possible; the second is that they are exposed to the 
tragedy of commons: non-contractibility. In other terms just their 
intrinsic dimension cannot be accompanied with monetary incentives. 
If we put briefly attention on the process of creation of these particular 
kinds of goods two reflections can be done.  
 The first is that the distinction just proposed between relational 
capital and relational goods permits to recognize the role that 
relational capital (and in a wider sense social capital) can play in an 
encounter not only in terms of a reduction of transaction costs  but 
also in the achievement of intrinsic benefits from interactions, that 
means the creation of relational goods.  
 The second is that (Gui 2005, 50) although ‘spontaneity is a 
crucial condition for high-quality relational interaction, while the 
outcomes of public intervention are, almost by definition, artificial, 
[here] ample room [remains] for indirect public intervention: 
promoting actions that favour the accumulation of relational capital 
goods, and discouraging other actions that lead to their depletation’.  
In this conclusive statement the concept of enabling institutions 
reappears suggesting its pregnancy: it is possible to implement 
policies that introduce those enabling institutions through which at 
different levels activate a process of creation of relational and social 
capital towards also the ‘production’ of relational goods.   
 
 
3.2.3 Economic theories of altruism and reciprocity       
Since the last quarter of the twentieth century, economic science has 
tried to reintroduce ‘sociality’ following different routes. In this 
paragraph we will analyse the most relevant theoretical efforts in this 
direction while, in the next one, we will concentrate on those theories 
at the frontier of economic science such as those of team reasoning 
and group identity (Sugden 2003; Sugden and Gold 2006; Bacharach 
2006).  
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 As a matter of fact, the economic theory of altruism has been 
for long time the most followed route and articulated attempt in order 
to overcome the intrinsic limitations implied by the assumption of 
self-interested behaviour.  
 At this point, it seems interesting to remember that the word 
‘altruism’ was originally coined by Auguste Comte (1875) in order to 
define a ‘selfless motivation to act in others’ interest as opposed to a 
motivation to act in others’ interests for an ulterior selfish reason.  
[This conception of altruism] does not rule out that people can act in 
others’ interests independently of their own preferences’ (Bardsley, 
Sugden 2006, 19). But this is not the conception on which models of 
rational choice altruism have been based. In fact, these theories, as we 
are going to see, are more related to that apparently similar conception 
that persons can obtain utility from others’ well being. This idea was 
introduced in Edgerworth’s utilitarian approach and Bentham’s 
classification of ‘the pleasure of benevolence’,  
Following a useful distinction proposed by many scholars 
(Zamagni 2005 refers to Khalil’s 2001 distinction; Bardsley and 
Sugden 2006) we can identify three main approaches to altruistic 
behaviour:  egocentric, egoistic and altercentric. This distinction 
allows to detect some different conceptual frameworks in a 
comparative perspective. After that, we will put attention on two 
different notions of reciprocity. 
 
Egocentric approach and Rational choice altruism 
This first approach finds its original root in Becker’s contribution 
(1974) according to which pro social behaviours can be introduced 
into neoclassical economic theory once it is allowed to individual 
utilities to be positively interconnected. In other terms, following 
Edgerworth’s intuition, an altruistic behaviour can be modelled simply 
recognizing at first that the others’ utility becomes an argument of my 
individual utility function. Secondly we have to recognize that this 
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argument, as a mere consumer good, has a positive impact on my 
utility. 
In formal terms, let i denote an altruist (with his vector of consumer 
goods xi )  and j the generic other person: 
 
Ui = Ui (xi ; Uj) 
 
The altruistic assumption is that:  ∂ Ui /∂ Uj > 0 
 
In this approach (7), the relationship between economic agents is 
instrumentally defined so that an individual will behave altruistically 
only to the extent that the marginal utility, that he derives from the 
others’s utility, equals the marginal cost to be altruistic. As Zamagni 
(2005, 307) underlines ‘to reduce an altruistic behaviour to a questions 
of tastes or preferences means betraying the meaning of the term itself 
[…] introduced by Auguste Comte to denote a disinterested 
motivation to act in the interest of others’. Moreover this approach, 
based on the altruistic interdependence of utilities, often leads to 
paradoxically results and predictions for example in the field of the 
contribution to public goods or more generally in the analysis of 
interpersonal relations (Bardsley and Sugden 2006; Gui 2000) .  
 
Egoistic approach and ‘warm glow’ 
With this expression Khalil (2001) identifies two main influential 
lines of research.  
The first one is related to Axelrod’s pioneering contribution in 
the explanation of cooperative behaviour in the context of repeated 
social interaction. Here the typical prisoner’s dilemma can be 
overcome assessing a role to agents’ reputation. In this field the idea 
of a ‘calculating altruism’ emerges as the result of an instrumental 
strategic behaviour. As a matter of fact, an agent may be motivated to 
build a reputational asset if interactions with others are repeated on 
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time. But it is relevant to underline how, at the base of the altruistic 
behaviour, there is again an egoistic motivation that leaves 
unexplained ‘true altruism’ (Zamagni 2005). 
The second approach has been proposed by James Andreoni’s 
(1990) idea of ‘warm glow’. In his theory of voluntary contribution to 
public goods, the scholar assumes that an agent can derive utility 
‘directly from an act of unselfish behaviour, independently of any 
consequences it gives rise to’ (Bardsley and Sugden 2006, 21). The 
idea is that an agent acting unselfishly will experience internally 
‘warm glow’ and so that he will act in pursuit this feeling. In the 
voluntarily provision of a public goods, warm glow is a sort of 
‘private by-product’ that increases the supply of public goods.  
In the model the utility function will be:  
 
Ui = Ui (xi ; wi ; z) 
 
where w is the contribution to a public goods and z the total amount of 
public good financed by voluntarily individual contributions. The 
internal satisfaction derived from contributing to public goods implies 
that:   
∂ Ui /∂ wi > 0 
Although this theory seems to explain the strong empirical 
evidence in the provision of public goods of crowding-in, ‘warm 
glow’ cannot be considered the first cause of an altruistic behaviour. 
In fact, as it has been stressed, ‘there are grounds for claming that 
warm glow presupposes the rationality of the behaviour it is supposed 
to explain’ (Bardsley and Sugden 2006, 21). This means that the fact 
that rational agents experience ‘warm glow’ requires a priori belief 
according to which to contribute is a good thing that implies a good 
feeling. In the absence of this a priori element, rational agents will not 
feel ‘warm glow’ and we will meet again a situation of crowding out.  
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Altercentric approach and ‘inequality aversion’ 
In this third approach, linked to the work of Etzioni (1986) and others, 
at the base of an altruistic behaviour there is ultimately a moral 
imperative, that is the interiorization of a system of moral ideals. But, 
in this case, ‘the ethical altruist is not interested in others as such. He 
is only concerned in abiding by a particular ethical principle that 
operates in the same way as the Kantian categorical imperative’ 
(Zamagni 2005, 309).  
This first feature leads immediately to the consideration of one 
of its limit that is of an altruism without ‘the other’, or more precisely, 
in which the other is a generic other. The second one is that this 
ethical code may be not chosen by the agent but it may come from 
some macro entity (the community, the social class, the group etc) that 
imposes a particular system of values on agents.  
 Recently some models introduce in the explanation of agent’s 
behaviour a sort of inequality aversion that can be interpreted both as 
an ethical code and an aversion that produces a bad feeling related to 
inequality, as in the case of warm glow. These theories have arisen 
from the experimental results obtained in the so called ‘ultimatum’ or 
‘dictator’ games. But as the previous attempts, it shows a weakness 
that is more fundamental.  
At this point, it is clear how the basic limit of these theories is 
that they remain embedded in an individualistic framework. In other 
terms, just the denial of the social (or better relational) nature of 
person is the higher limitation of standard economic theory.   
Here, as Zamagni (2005) suggests, we must take care of a 
critical distinction/connection between the relationality and the 
sociality of individuals. From the well known Aristotle’s assertion that 
man is a social animal, we know that human beings present a 
disposition to interact systematically in society. But, in this sense, 
sociality is essentially ‘a principle of self-organization’ that is not 
exclusive to human beings. Recent studies recognize how in the 
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animal realm various examples of social behaviour can be observed, 
especially in terms of mutual assistance. But ‘what is typical of the 
person is the relationality which postulates that the others become a 
you and not merely an alter ego […] Relationality ultimately hinges 
on the conception of the self: oneself is constituted by the recognition 
the other bestows upon her. In standard economics, the other only has 
instrumental significance. In turn this implies that relations among 
agents are treated as relations “at arm’s length” and not as “face to 
face” interpersonal relations (Gui 2003). This excludes all process of 
relatioanlity from theoretical examination’ (Zamagni 2005, 315).  
This distinction can be understood at the light of two recent 
developments in the economic theory of human behaviour based 
respectively on the idea of expressive rationality and collective 
rationality. Briefly, since we will concentrate on Sugden’s theory of 
team reasoning in the next paragraph, here it seems worth to introduce 
the fundamental idea behind the concept of expressive rationality (8).  
In opposition to rational choice theory, it seems to me that this 
conceptual tool comes to be particularly relevant, also in the study of 
the credit-debt relation. This seems true especially when it is 
combined with a theory of the social determination of appropriate 
expressive actions. In the standard economic theory of choice 
instrumental rationality implies that the agents choose an action only 
as a mean to some end. The expressive rationality approach is based 
on the idea well explained by Benn (1978, 3) that: ‘An action can be 
rational for a person regardless of its payoff if it expresses attitudes 
and principles that it would be inconsistent of him not to express 
under appropriate conditions, given the character which he is 
generally content to acknowledge as his own. This is what is called 
being true to oneself’.  
In other terms this approach allows to consider an agent that is 
not simply interested to the consequences of actions but also in the 
significance that these actions have with respect to their identity of 
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persons. The meanings or connotations of an action depend critically 
‘on the existence of a shared rule, standard or norm [that governs] the 
appropriateness of acts as expressions of particular meanings […]. 
That is to say that, there are constraints and opportunities imposed not 
through interaction with specific others but by the prevalent attitudes 
and beliefs of members of a community” (Bardsley and Sugden 2006, 
27). 
As it is possible to understand reading Muldrew’s (1998) The 
Economy of Obligation about the credit culture in early modern 
England, a deeper understanding of the credit debt relations requires 
the consideration of the particular ‘meaning’ of the act of not paying 
respect to borrower’s identity. As a matter of fact, the stability and 
mechanisms of solution of disputes among the members of a particular 
credit network cannot be understood only on the base of the 
reputational factor and in terms of repeated interactions. The impact of 
an action on person’s identity should be introduced in the analysis of 
these mechanisms of enforcement of agreements. 
 In the following part of this paragraph we are going to analyse 
another important line of inquiry based on the principle of reciprocity.  
 
Notions of reciprocity and its emergence 
A comprehensive analysis of the huge literature around the principle 
of reciprocity would require more than a section. Here we will 
introduce only some efforts in this field and later we will concentrate 
more on Kolm’s (1994) formulation of reciprocity that appears 
particularly interesting in a relational perspective. Some of these 
theories are also closely related to those ones on altruism. We will 
come again on the principle of reciprocity studying the role of trust in 
social interactions. In fact, these two concepts are theoretically and 
empirically so tightly intertwined to the point that in some 
contributions trust is considered as an expectation of reciprocal 
behaviour (9). 
 171 
 It is widely recognized that reciprocity overcomes both the idea 
of reciprocating altruism and direct reciprocity developed by some 
scholars (better known as the ‘tit-for-tat strategy’).  
Many studies, such as the famous Rabin’s theory of reciprocity 
(1993), have defined a game theoretic model that leads to the use of 
psychological game theory. Others have tried to explain the 
evolutionary process through which preferences of reciprocity in 
agents can emerge and stabilize in a specific social context. Finally, in 
many empirical studies the application of various theories of 
reciprocity have shown a clear evidence of the validity of this concept 
in the explanation of agents’ pro-social behaviour (Frey and Meier 
2002). As a result, iterated laboratory experiments of the prisoner’s 
dilemma have put into discussion just the basis of traditional game 
theory.  
In this specific field, it is possible to identify in the vast 
literature two main notions of reciprocity. The first one arises from an 
internal aversion to unfair distribution that leads to a reciprocating 
behaviour (this seems very closely related to those theories of 
inequality aversion analysed). In the second conceptualization, as Falk 
and Fischbacher (2001) underline, reciprocity is a behavioural 
response to a ‘perceived courtesy’. Here, the term courtesy implies 
both a sense of distributive equity and a specific good intention of the 
agent. In this direction it is possible to take into account the intention 
behind a certain action and the adoption of signalling actions finalized 
to teach to the other interacting players a coordinative strategy at the 
cost of a ‘sacrifice’ in the short run. 
 But, both these theories present the same limit of an 
individualistic framework that has been stressed in the previous 
sections. The only difference between them arises from a ‘different 
specification of the interdependence of individual preferences, but the 
conceptual structure behind it is the same: the attribution of weights to 
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the pay-offs of others persists, weights that enter, in some way, one’s 
own preference function’ (Zamagni 2005, 318). 
 In a more relational perspective, Kolm’s (1994) definition of 
reciprocity ‘as a series of bi-directional transfers, independent of each 
other and at the same time interconnected’ appears particularly 
interesting (Zamagni 2005, 320). In fact this definition implies that 
reciprocity is characterized by three relevant properties: 
 
(i) each transfer is voluntary in itself 
Unlike the principle of the exchange of the equivalent, the 
fact that each transfer is realized independently implies a 
wide degree of freedom and voluntary of the action. In other 
terms each transfer is not the prerequisite of the other; while 
in the exchange of equivalents the transfer in one direction 
makes obligatory the opposite one.  
 
(ii) transfers are bi-directional 
The bi-directionality is a critical element that allows to 
distinguish philanthropy and pure altruism from a 
reciprocating relation. In fact, if in the former the relation 
realizes in an one-direction form (from the giver to the 
receiver) and so it is not properly a relation, in the case of 
reciprocity both actors are essential active pillars of the 
relation. In this sense, as we have shown speaking about 
altercentric approach, some relations appear to be relations 
without the other, to say without a specific other with a 
peculiar identity. 
 
(iii) transitivity 
A reciprocating attitude may reveal itself not necessarily 
when it is directed towards the person who ‘triggered’ the 
reciprocity relation. The fact that a third external party may 
be the recipient of a reciprocating action opens the door to 
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the fact that reciprocity is a triadic structure. This seems 
particularly interesting if we try to apply this kind of 
concept in relational structures based on a credit-debt 
relation. We will consider more deeply this aspect in the 
fourth chapter where the analysis of social network 
structure will lead to the central consideration of triads.  
To quote Zamagni (2005, 320): ‘the relation of reciprocity requires 
some form of balancing between what one gives and what one expects 
to obtain, or expects to be given to some third party; a balancing [that] 
may vary according to the intensity with which moral sentiments such 
as sympathy, benevolence, the feeling of solidarity are put into 
practice by the agents involved in the relation’.  
This principle of reciprocity, in Kolm’s sense, also does not 
exclude, as we have seen above, the existence of a strategic 
dimension. In other terms, agents involved in a system of social 
interactions can choose to reciprocate or not, to signal or not a 
particular attitude and so to establish/continue or not a relation. What 
makes this concept richer in a relational perspective is that as Zamagni 
(2005, 321) well explains ‘the other person assumes a special value, 
since s/he gives us back the relational sense of ourselves. By 
comprising an essentially communicative aspect, reciprocity builds 
social relations and sense of identity’. 
 A relevant dynamic aspect of reciprocity is also related to the 
idea that the practice of reciprocity in a given social context allows 
both to induce in its interacting agents a sort of pro-social disposition 
and to modify endogenously their preference structure. In this 
direction, on the base of the literature on social evolution, it is possible 
to think reciprocity as a social norm that can emerge endogenously as 
the result of various processes of cultural transmission and of social 
selection. In this evolutionary process, the institutional framework, 
especially in its informal dimension, plays a central role impacting on 
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the system of preferences, values, norms, identity and cultural traits of 
individuals (Bowles 1998).  
 This last reflection remembers once again the possibility just in 
a dynamic perspective of the role that enabling institutions can play. 
For example if we follow Putnam’s characterization of social capital 
as a context of generalized reciprocity, we have to ask ourselves in 
which way particular kind of institutions can enable the process of 
formation of these practices of reciprocity and so of social capital. 
 In the next paragraph we will abandon the more traditional 
approach to sociality in economic theory to face more radical 
proposals at the frontier of economic research. 
  
 
3.2.4 Team reasoning and group identity       
The theory of economic decision is based on the assumption that 
agency is invested in individuals. Their actions are the result of their 
own system of preferences and beliefs. As we have seen, this does not 
exclude that persons’ preferences may be altruistic or other-oriented. 
This means that they may take account of the impact of their own 
actions on other people. But ‘still, these are her [of the person] 
preferences, and she [the person] chooses what she most prefers’ 
(Sugden,Gold 2006, 8).  
In the last years some contributions (Sugden 1993) Bacharach 
1999, 2006; Hollis 1998; Sugden and Gold 2006) have introduced an 
alternative approach that allows groups of individuals, ‘teams’, to 
count as agents. In this case each group member acts as a part of the 
whole and not simply in the interest of the whole. This idea suggests 
that individuals, in front of a particular context of interaction in which 
the individual strategies offer ‘a scope for common gain’ (to use 
Bacharach’s 1999 expression) or the possibility of a Pareto 
improvement, will base their action on a team reasoning.  
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In other words, we are considering the hypothesis that a person 
may face a problem asking not “What should I do?” but “What should 
we do?” (10). 
 Such a sort of decision theory, based on the idea of team 
reasoning, seems to provide a framework to understand those results 
in experimental economics and evidence in real life in which persons 
act in contrast with the prediction of the orthodox decision theory.  
At this point it seems interesting to introduce two puzzles of 
cooperation: the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Hi-Lo Paradox, from 
which the idea that in standard theory there is something 
fundamentally wrong emerges clearly (Bacharach 2006; Gold and 
Sugden 2006). After that we will concentrate on team reasoning as a 
mode of reasoning that may be explicitly represented through schema 
of practical reasoning. Finally we will focus on Bacharach’s last 
contribution in which persons’ identification with a particular group is 
a matter of ‘framing’. In other terms we will make two steps.  
The first is to face these puzzles through team reasoning 
identifying it as ‘a mode of reasoning’. Then, given the existence of an 
isomorphism between individual and team agency, the second step is 
to introduce two possible explanations of ‘how the unit of agency is in 
fact determined’ (Bardsley and Sugden 2006).  
The former contribution is related just to Bacharach’s 
uncompleted work on ‘frame’ (1999, 2006) while the latter to 
Sugden’s (2002) rediscovery of the Smithian concept of fellow feeling 
(developed in the paragraph 3,4). 
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma 
As well known, conventional game theory predicts that the two 
prisoners will choose the strategy defect (defect, defect is the only 
Nash equilibrium) although there is scope for common gain when both 
choose the strategy cooperate.  
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Table 3.2.1:  The Prisoner’s dilemma 
Prisoner’s dilemma  Player 2 
  cooperate Defect 
cooperate 2 , 2 0 , 3  
Player 1 defect 3 , 0  1 , 1 
 
 
At the same time we have an experimental evidence that suggests how 
many people (around the 40-50 per cent) facing this kind of game 
have a strong intuition that cooperate is the rational choice. The 
following puzzle is more interesting. 
 
 
The Hi-Lo Paradox 
  As in a pure coordination game, players choosing both the 
same labels (high, high) or (low, low) will obtain a positive payoff 
(the same for both, therefore it is defined a ‘common interest game’) 
while in the opposite case (0 , 0). The interesting difference is that 
here there is the label ‘high’ that associates to coordination a strictly 
higher payoff for both players. As in the Prisoner’s dilemma there is a 
scope for common gain but here there are two pure-strategy Nash 
equilibria (high, high) and (low, low). So a coordination problem 
arises. 
 
Table 3.2.2:  The Hi-Lo Paradox 
Hi - Lo  Player 2 
 labels high low 
high 2 , 2 0 , 0  
Player 1 low 0 , 0  1 , 1 
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Although the common sense suggests that players will 
coordinate on the equilibrium (high, high) that they both prefer, in the 
formal theory ‘there is no sequence of steps of valid reasoning by 
which perfectly rational players can arrive at the conclusion that they 
ought to choose high. […] from the assumption of  rationality, all  we 
can infer is that each player chooses the strategy that maximises her 
expected payoff, given her beliefs about what the other player will do’ 
(Gold and Sugden, 2006). 
 In team reasoning approach a solution to these puzzles is the 
result of a different ‘mode of reasoning’. As a member of a team a 
person may ask to herself ‘What should we do?’ and the answer is to 
perform that action that, combined with other’s team players, would 
best promote the team’s objective. Following Bacharach (2000), 
Sugden and Gold (2006) propose to represent team reasoning  through 
schema of practical reasoning which include premises about agency. 
 Given a set S of individuals, a set of alternative actions for each 
player and for each profile of actions, that the individuals may choose, 
an outcome (better known as game form), we define a payoff function 
to represent what some specific agent wants to achieve. Finally, given 
any individual i we will say that i identifies with a set of individuals G 
if i conceives of G as a unit of agency, acting as a single entity in 
pursuit of some single objective. Here there is also a situation of 
common knowledge in the usual sense. 
 Letting A stand for any profile and U for any payoff function, 
the simple team reasoning may be represented (from a group 
viewpoint) as follows: 
(1) We are members of S 
(2) Each of us identifies with S 
(3) Each of us wants the value of U to be maximised 
(4) A uniquely maximizes U 
_____________________________________________ 
Each of us should choose her component of A 
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This schema can be applied both to individual reasoning assuming that 
S is reduced to ‘myself’ or as a mode of reasoning of a group. A 
critical condition in this schema is that (2) is satisfied. This means that 
all the members of S identify (in the sense before expressed) with this 
group.  
 After having intuitively shown what these authors mean for 
schema of reasoning, we have to make the second step. In fact ‘the 
pure theory of team reasoning […] presupposes that there can be 
group agency; but it is not reliant on any particular theory of how 
group agency comes about or of what the group agent should take as 
its goal’ (Sugden, Gold 2006, 17).  
The literature, as I have anticipated, has conducted various 
attempts in this direction. Here we want to introduce briefly 
Bacharach’s last contributions (1999, 2006) in which the idea of team 
agency as the result of framing is at the base of the concept of ‘group 
identity’.  
 In a lecture in 2001, Bacharach defines a ‘frame’ as ‘the set of 
concepts or predicates an agent uses in thinking about the world’. And 
adds: ‘If I see the marks 
 
О  ∆  Χ 
 
as a circle, a triangle and a cross, my frame includes three shape 
concepts; if as an omicron, a delta and a xi, three letter concepts. I can 
also see them as both. But not at the same time. One does not just see, 
but one sees as’(Bacharach 2006, 10).  
Behind this statement there is a clear distinction between 
objects of choice and act-descriptions. According to the frame used by 
the decision-maker, the same set of objects may be perceived in 
different ways leading to alternative decision problems. The 
‘perception’ or ‘framing’ and consequently the description of a given 
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set of objects depends on ‘contextual factors which bring to mind, or 
prime, particular sets of ideas’ (Sugden, Gold in Bacharach 2006). 
Just the absence of distinction between objects and act-description in 
conventional decision theory does not allow the possibility of 
‘variable frames’.  
 So assessing that the identification of a person with a group is a 
matter of framing means that in order to reason as a ‘team’ it is 
necessary that in person’s frame the concept of ‘we’ is present. In this 
way it is possible to recognize that the perspectives of ‘I’ and ‘we’ are 
the results of different frames.  
 At this point Bacharach suggests that the ‘we’ frame may be 
induced by the payoff structure of a game which presents a property 
that he calls strong interdependence. Referring to our examples such 
as that of Prisoner’s dilemma, we can approximately say that a game 
shows strong interdependence when “it has a Nash equilibrium that is 
Pareto dominated by the outcome of some feasible strategy profile” 
(Gold, Sugden 2006, 20). The identification of this property does not 
imply that in its presence a game invariably prime the ‘we’ frame and 
so a form of team thinking.  
To conclude, what seems particularly important to stress is 
Bacharach’s recognition that other contextual factors can play a 
critical role in the process of decision making just through the process 
of framing. This intuition and the construction of Bacharach’s variable 
frame theory has remain uncompleted but leaves an important legacy 
in the development and comprehension of coordination problems. 
Moreover in my opinion it is evident how this theoretical effort will 
conduct to a more comprehensive theory of choice capable to dialogue 
with just those other dimensions of interactions that we are detecting 
in this chapter. 
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3.3 The interpersonal dimension: the role of Trust 
                           
 
3.3.1 Emerging practices of trust: rationality and relationality 
In the previous chapters, both in the analysis of the credit-debt 
relation and in the study of the concept of social capital we have often 
referred to a general idea of trust. After having introduced the 
interpersonal dimension, at this level of interaction, it seems 
particularly relevant to deepen the study of this concept.  
The aim of this paragraph is just  to present different theories of 
trust in which scholars try to explain the kinds of reasoning that 
persons use when they engage in practices of trust. The huge literature 
in economics and philosophy on this field is strictly related to those 
theories of social capital in which the focus is on those institutions 
able to induce and reproduce practices of trust and its emergence in 
terms of habits, dispositions or modes of reasoning. This subject has 
been treated in the second chapter. There, in front of those theories in 
which the economic underdevelopment of some regions is explained 
through the idea of scarce social capital and the absence of trust-
inducing institutions (Putnam 1993), we have tried to recognize more 
optimistically the possibility of enabling institutions.  
As it has been suggested (Bruni and Sugden 2000), these 
arguments should be approached not simply on the base of the 
instrumental conception of rationality and the individualistic approach 
which dominate modern economics and game theory. Instead, it could 
be useful to refer also to classical authors such as Smith, Hume (the 
leading figures of the Scottish Enlightenment) or Genovesi (in the 
Neapolitan  Enlightenment) towards a more ‘fluid’ approach that 
allows to detect the real nature of trust.  
In this section we will present the three main definitions of trust 
emerged in modern economic theories referred respectively to the 
concept of reputation, disposition and reciprocity. In doing that, we 
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will make a backward step to one of these ‘father thinkers’ to provide 
intuitions that help us to collocate trust in a relational perspective.  
In the next section we will discuss the recent approach that 
introduce the idea of trust as a responsive behaviour. Finally in the last 
subparagraph we will present a recent contribution by Pelligra (2005) 
in which just this concept in a trust game framework is applied 
specifically to Grameen Bank methodology. It will be suggested also 
the opportunity to explain the fiduciary interactions in microcredit 
programs not only in the vertical credit debt relation (borrower - 
lender) but also in the overlapped relation, as it has been defined in the 
first chapter. 
Modern theories of trust are immediately characterized for their 
intrinsic intention to be  both descriptive and normative. Descriptive 
of the practices of trust observed in social contexts but also normative 
‘in that they characterize trust as rational: under appropriate 
conditions, trust can be recommended to rational persons’ (Bruni and 
Sugden 1999, 3). 
The first line of research, that we are going to introduce, has 
defined the concept of trust mainly in terms of reputation. Starting 
from a decomposition of economic and social interactions into 
discrete games, scholars admit the possibility that players can choose 
to be cooperative that is, to repay trust or not. Although each player 
benefits if everyone is cooperative, each has a self interested incentive 
to be uncooperative. When in this framework we introduce the 
possibility of repeated interactions and that persons can dispose of the 
‘history’ of players’ behaviour, it is possible for them to adopt 
conditional strategies. To cooperate with and only with those who 
have been cooperative can lead under certain specific conditions to a 
certain Nash equilibrium (see the literature on Folk Theorems). What 
seems particularly interesting in these models (Dasgupta 1988) is the 
fact that ‘trust can be sustained by rational self interest, by virtue of 
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the private value of a reputation for trustworthiness’ (Bruni and 
Sugden 1999, 4).  
As it is observed also in Pelligra (2002), specifically in 
Dasgupta’s (1988) model we remain into a neoclassical frame in 
which players act only on the base of their own self interest while 
trust, comes to be considered as ‘nothing but the expectation that the 
subjects involved in the relationships build in relation to the other 
subject’s behaviour and to the various possible states of nature’ (see 
chapter two). In other terms this approach contemplates the possibility 
of a ‘long run self interest’ through which it is possible to explain how 
and when a rational agent may renounce to immediate gains in order 
to make a reputational investment. 
But, although it is clear that the repetition of interactions in 
human relations plays a critical role, this approach seems to lose its 
explaining power when we observe trust for example in a one-off 
interaction. As Pelligra (2002) suggests there is a risk of a reductive 
comprehension of trust taking apart other motivations that are 
primarily the result of the fact that trust implies relationality. Quoting 
the title of Pelligra’s work, trust is a matter of “r(el)ationality”. 
Another important limit of this approach can be detected 
referring to those mechanisms, suggested in social capital theory, 
according to which people who have experimented the value of trust 
in one socio-economic context of interaction, are better able to make 
use of trust in other ones.  
At this regard many scholars (Granovetter 1985; Putnam 1993) 
have highlighted how the existence of dense networks of civil 
engagements incentivate to make an investment in reputation for 
trustworthiness. Specifically, just the direct and indirect experience of 
trust (through its transitivity) in various contexts of interaction, and so 
the emergence in the network of a generalized system of trust, are the 
main arguments at the base of the concept of social capital. To this 
respect however ‘the mechanism by which trust is supposed to spread 
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from one domain to another is not altogether clear. We suspect that 
these arguments depend on an implicit assumption that trustworthiness 
is something more than a reputation, built and maintain for 
instrumental reason’ (Bruni and Sugden 1999, 5).  
An interesting perspective that provides a possible explanation 
of this phenomenon is related to those theories that refers to 
trustworthiness as a disposition (see Bruni and Sugden 1999) that 
inspires a wide range of human acts. Although we remain as before in 
an instrumental perspective, here as it has been pointed out the 
rationality is assessed ‘over the whole class of situations in which it 
gives guidance, rather than case by case. In any particular case, an 
action is judged to be rational if it proceeds from a rational 
disposition, irrespective of the instrumental value of the action itself’ 
(Bruni and Sugden 1999, 6). But this theory depends critically on the 
assumption that each person’s dispositions are known by others.  
 The last theory that we want to introduce, as it has been 
anticipated (see paragraph 3,2), identify the concept of trust as a 
relationship of reciprocity. The starting point of this approach is 
related to Martin Hollis’s (1998) criticism to the philosophical egoism 
on which the previous (and others) approaches are based.  
This kind of ‘a-relational’ perspective arrives to define the 
rationality and emergence of trust only in terms of those benefits and 
incentives deriving from trust, to the point that society comes to be 
represented as a network of egoistic individuals inspired only by a 
calculus of the ‘convenience’ of their behaviour. From his work we 
can read: ‘we need a more social conception of what persons are and a 
role-related account of the obligations which make the world go round 
and express our humanity’ (Hollis 1998, 104). 
 The perspective suggested by Hollis is mainly a change in 
agents’ perception of the problem, not simply the emergence of a 
cooperative attitude in the pursuit of everyone self-interest. His 
attempt, in this direction, is to define a theory that can consider 
 184 
rational to repay trust even when this is in contrast to our self interest. 
To be trust rational, according to Hollis, it is necessary that the 
persons involved inspired their behaviour on a principle of reciprocity. 
A situation of this kind, as we have seen before, occurs when  there is 
an ‘expectation that the practice of trust will be generally followed, 
and that this practice will tend to work to everyone’s advantage’ 
(Bruni and Sugden 1999, 7). 
 This last step towards ‘the first person plural’ is realized only if 
each person arrives to think as member of a team or, in other terms, 
she becomes aware that her action is part of an action by us which has 
good consequences for us. As we have seen in the previous paragraph 
this approach requires the existence of a group identity and a mutual 
awareness of that identity. This process arises from a network of civic 
engagements where the ‘community consciousness to be a we’ may 
emerge leading to the rationality of trust. In this framework ‘social 
institutions do not merely set the parameters within which rational 
choice are made; they influence the content of rationality itself’ (Bruni 
and Sugden 1999, 8).   
 But, although the idea that trust is based on an expectation of 
reciprocal behaviour has been capable to explain many interactive 
situations and so have found many advocates, as Pelligra (2002) 
stresses, there are situations where the absence of this kind of 
expectations does not exclude the emergence of trust. For this reason 
we need a more general explaining principle that is capable to catch 
the true nature of trust. As we will see, starting from the philosophical 
contribution by Philip Pettit (1995; 2002), some scholars, especially 
Pelligra (2002; 2005) are going to suggest that this general principle is 
that of responsive behaviour.   
 Before that, although it could be interesting to analyse Hume 
and Smith’s ideas on trust and social capital (some aspects of their 
philosophical approach to human nature will be the subject of the next 
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paragraph), in this last part we will introduce briefly some aspects of 
Antonio Genovesi’s concept of fede pubblica (public trust).  
This choice is motivated by his strong ‘relational’ approach that 
arrives to the point to consider the enjoyment of social relationships as 
the chief advantage of society (while for Hume it is an increasing 
provision of material goods). This thesis, of a human nature 
immediately relational, is expressed by Genovesi saying that we are 
‘created in such a way as to be touched necessarily, by a musical 
sympathy, by pleasure and internal satisfaction, as soon as we meet 
another man; no human being, not even the most cruel and hardened, 
can enjoy pleasures in which no one else participates’ (Diceosina, 
Book I, Chapter 1, §XVII, p. 42; as quoted in Bruni and Sugden 
1999). 
 Just Genovesi’s assumption on human nature and the 
recognition of human desire for social relations allow him to think 
trust as rational. Trust is a precondition of social relations as well as 
friendship (that we should identify with reciprocal assistance in a non 
instrumental sense) and in this way, escaping from any form of 
instrumental reason, trust is rational per se.  
 Moving in the same direction of the classics in the last years, 
the rediscovery that trust is basically a matter of interpersonal 
relationships has conducted to a responsive conception of trust. 
At this point, as Pelligra well clarifies we must recognize that 
‘[an] act of trust takes place within an (often personalized) 
relationship between two subjects. It is extremely unlikely that a 
theory that considers the reasons to behave trustfully and trustworthy 
as external to that relationship will be able to give a satisfactory 
account of what trust is. Nevertheless, at least theories based on 
(enlightened) self-interest, altruism, inequity aversion and team 
thinking consider the reason to be trustworthy as exogenous. This 
means that, at a given node of interaction, whether or not alter decides 
to behave trustworthily does not depend on ego’s preferences and 
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choices. In the trust responsiveness hypothesis, a trusting move 
induces trustworthiness trough an endogenous modification of ego’s 
preference structure [providing] additional reasons to behave 
trustworthily”  (Pelligra 2005, 113). With this critical specification in 
mind, now we can understand the theory of trust responsiveness and 
the possible application of this concept in the credit-debt relation. 
 
3.3.2 Trust responsiveness 
The basic idea just intuitively expressed in Pelligra’s useful quotation 
can be more sistematically formalized in the following way.  
 
Given two subjects A and B: 
If A behaves trustfully  
→ A is signalling his expectations about B’s behaviour  
According to the trust responsiveness mechanism:   
Given A’s manifestation of his expectations   
→ B is inducted to fulfil A’s expectations 
 
In this sense it has been studied in behavioural economics if trust 
presents a self-fulfilling quality (see for example Bacharach, Guerra 
and Zizzo 2001).  
Just in order to find a theoretical explanation to the self-
fulfilling nature of trust, Philip Pettit (1995), among the first, 
suggested explicitly the possibility of this kind of process. In his 
contribution, starting from a very general idea of the word trust, as a 
reliance on people’s behavioural disposition, the philosopher focuses 
his attention on interactive reliance.  
Taking again the stylized situation of two subjects, we will be 
in the presence of trusting reliance when A thinks that his manifest 
reliance on B “will strengthen or reinforce [B’s] existing reasons to do 
that which [A] relies on him to do. [This because] the utility [B] gets 
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(from fulfil trustor’s expectations) increases with the recognition that 
[doing so] will serve [trustor’s] purposes” (Pettit 1995, 206).  
Although an explanation to this process may be found (as Pettit 
does for example referring to Greif study of medieval traders 
presented also in Aoki, 2001) through the combined mechanisms of 
loyalty, virtue and prudence, the endogenous process that emerges, 
appears to be more relevant (Pelligra, 2005). In fact, behind the 
scheme presented above there is a process of belief formation: 
 
The fact that A rely on B expresses A’s belief that B is 
trustworthy 
→ only if B confirms A’s good opinion may enjoy a special 
good, that is ‘A’s good opinion’ 
  
In this explanation, Pettit is suggesting the fact that persons’ 
desire to be well regarded by his/her peer may induct trust 
responsiveness. But according to Pelligra (2005, 115) ‘although 
crucial this motive should not be considered  the ultimate source of 
motivation. [...] this is because there is a wide range of motives, going 
from vanity to the genuine desire of being praiseworthy’ that we must 
try to take into account in their varieties to full understand the 
rationale at the base of this mechanism. 
 In order to find a more comprehensive descriptions of human 
motivations behind trust responsiveness, Pelligra (2002; 2005) refers 
to the evolution of the concept of self love broadly conceived as 
‘desire for the good opinion of others’ up to the introduction of the 
Smithian concept of impartial spectator. Although we will concentrate 
widely on this subject in the paragraph 3.4, here it is necessary to 
anticipate some conceptual instruments that allows to identify three 
sources of motivation for being trustworthy.   
 As a matter of fact, although both in Dasgupta’s (1988) and 
Rabin’s (1993) models the idea that one’s trustfully behaviour 
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generates on us a sort of obligation to which is very difficult to betray 
is suggested, these scholars do not introduce this intuition in their 
models. Here, the attempt is just to introduce into the model a more 
complex representation of human motivations that may give reason 
for a responsive behaviour.   
 The first motivation has been already introduced in Pettit 
where, the good opinion of others, constitutes an ‘external 
psychological reason’ to act as trustworthy persons.  
Using again Pelligra’s expression we can identify also an 
‘internal psychological reason’ at the base of the trustee responsive 
behaviour just going back to Smith’s reflections in the Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (1759). Here, as we will see later (see sub-
paragraphs 3.4.2 and 3.4.3), Smith recognizes how one of the first 
motive for social action is the desire to be loved by fellows and 
approved. But, at this point Smith clarifies the distinction, already 
proposed in Hume (1739) between the desire to be appreciated and the 
desire to be worthy of appreciation. This distinction, based on the 
‘reverberating’ or ‘reflective’ nature of sympathy, is at the base of the 
introduction of an internal motivation.  
A critical property that Smith associates to sympathy is, in fact, 
to allow persons to become capable of self reflection. Precisely, 
through sympathy (fellow feeling) man arrives to the construction of a 
‘man within’, a sort of impartial spectator from which man’s ability 
for self-approbation and disapprobation depend. 
In this direction Smith argues that ‘Man naturally desires, not 
only to be loved, but to be lovely; or to be that thing which is the 
natural and proper object of love...He desires, not only praise, but 
praiseworthiness’ (TMS III, 2, 1). This assertion seems to provide a 
potential justification to the existence of that internal psychological 
motivation for being trustworthy that ‘[derives] from the mere fact of 
having been made an object of trust’ (Pelligra 2005, 118). 
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These reflections have been stylized in models and also 
empirically applied in behavioural economics experiments (Pelligra 
2002) for example recurring to the so-called Trust Game.  
In the next paragraph we will consider a game of this kind 
applied to the credit debt relation. What is relevant here is that we 
have arrived to define three orders of motives at the base of human 
behaviour: 
 
(i) material reasons 
(ii) external psychological reasons 
(iii) internal psychological reasons 
 
To explain better this order of motives, recalling again our individuals 
A and B, let assume that:  
 
A has two strategies: to be trustful or prudently distrustful  
→ opts for the trustful strategy 
According to the traditional assumption:  
B is materially self interested: 
→ B will behave opportunistically 
 
But under the assumptions that:   
(i)  man has a natural desire for the good opinion of others 
(ii) man has a desire to deserve praise and so to self esteem  
→ B knows that he must confirm A’s expectations if he wants 
that A maintains the good opinion on B that A has manifested 
with his trustful behaviour 
→ B is influenced by the idea that his internal impartial 
spectator will form on him if B decides to be opportunistic 
 
So “B is in relation with two subjects” and from the balance 
between material gain and psychological losses the theory of 
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trust responsiveness suggests that the trustee will be 
trustworthy resisting the temptation to be opportunistic. 
 
To conclude with Pelligra (2005, 120) trust responsiveness is 
based on: ‘two sources of motivation [that] account for the difference 
that exists between having a desire for conformity to others’ 
expectations because of the fear of others’ reactions and having the 
same desire because of intrinsic reasons related to one’s own sense of 
worth. [...] And this composite nature is able to explain why, for 
instance, we often observe trustworthiness even in anonymous 
interactions”. 
 Just this idea of a trust mechanism based on the self reflection 
that in turn is the result of the relation with others (interpreted as 
“mirror of the self”), suggests the recognition of the relational nature 
of trust. 
 
 
3.3.3 Models of fiduciary interaction: vertical and horizontal 
relational structures  
After having widely discussed the mechanism of trust as a responsive 
behaviour in this last section we want briefly to introduce some 
aspects of Pelligra’s model of fiduciary credit-debt relation. 
 Here the scholar has shown how the trust responsiveness 
mechanism may account to the surprising results obtained by 
Grameen Bank in terms of a high rate of repayment (see chapter one). 
This attempt has been conducted presenting the structural informative 
problem of the credit debt relation in the form of a ‘Simple Trust 
Game’. This presentation allows to reconsider briefly some of the 
explanations suggested both in literature on microfinance and in the 
literature on social and economic interactions. Later we will introduce 
in the scenario the trust responsiveness mechanism. 
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 Given the informative problem at the base of the credit-debt 
relation, the  lender may decide to give (G) or not to give (NG) the 
loan. If the borrower receives the loan he/she may decide to repay the 
debt and keep the profits of his/her investment x (strategy R) or to 
keep the loan (f) and the profit e = x + f (strategy K). To solve 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selections the traditional 
response is to require a collateral (S). In this case the Simple Trust 
Game becomes a Banking Game as we can see in the following 
representations (source Pelligra 2005b, 6-7): 
 
Figure 3.3.1: The Simple Trust Game     Figure 3.3.2: The Banking Game  
            
 
As we have seen (chapter one) in microfinance literature 
various explanations have been provided to the functioning of those 
methodologies that are not based on collaterals. For example, if we 
consider the role of repeated interactions and the consequent value of 
reputation (Dasgupta 1988) that summarizes the effect of dynamic 
incentives and the role played by forms of social collaterals, we arrive 
to a more complex configuration of the game.  
Here W represents the objective value of social approbation 
and disapprobation (in monetary terms) that is weighted for a 
parameter of sensitivity (α to disapprobation and β to approbation). 
The loss of future interaction related to a loss of reputation can be 
logically interpreted as a sort of sanction equal to collateral (S). 
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Figure 3.3.3: the Simple Trust Game with reputation and social pressure 
 
 
Source: Pelligra 2005, 10 
 
 
Just two intuitions proposed by Yunus (1997) as the basis of his 
methodology: 
(i) ‘If we want succeed we must rely on trust’(1997, 197); 
(ii) ‘the poor have their self-love’ (1997, 34). 
have encouraged Pelligra to apply the trust responsiveness mechanism 
towards a ‘relational’ explanation of  Grameen Bank and other 
microfinance institutions’ methodologies. 
Using psychological game theory Pelligra suggests a variant 
version of the Simple Trust Game in which it is possible to identify 
B’s hierarchy of beliefs. That is, given p the probability that B plays 
R, the lender’s belief about p is q and finally r is B’s belief about L’s 
belief on B’s choice.  
In this scenario according to the mechanism of trust 
responsiveness B will balance material and psychological payoffs. 
These last ones may take account of the sense of guilt that B will feel 
in the case of an opportunistic behaviour. This guilt G is multiplied to 
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A’s belief (r) on B’s behaviour to consider the impact of A’s trustfully 
behaviour. 
 
Figure 3.3.4: the Simple Trust Game with sentiments 
 
 
 
Source: Pelligra 2005b, 17 
 
 
Rather than to focus on the multiple equilibria of the game, for our 
purposes, here it seems more relevant to stress the three main 
fiduciary dynamics detected by Pelligra. 
 The first is certainly that one of trust responsiveness that is 
‘based on the perception of the idea the others have of us and on its 
direct and indirect influence on our self esteem. Such a perception 
strengths in relation to others’ actions, and particularly in relation to 
our interpretation of such actions. Such interpretation, in turn, is 
strongly affected by the context and the framework within which 
actions take place’ (Pelligra 2005b, 19). This recognition of the 
existence of the so-called framing effect is particularly critical. The 
fact that ‘the same action may provoke different reactions depending 
on the context where it happens’  (Pelligra 2005b, 19) suggests to 
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reconsider again the preminent role played by the relational and 
institutional structures.  
As a matter of fact, if it has been recognised how in the 
experimental context the framing of the situation is critical for the 
results of the game and the emergence of equilibria, all the more so in 
the real world the institutional and relational matrix must be taken into 
a more important account. 
 A declaration such as the following underlines clearly how 
Grameen Bank would signal to the borrowers that believes them to be 
trustworthy: ‘Banks tend to suspect every clients to want take the 
money and run. So they bind her with every kind of clauses especially 
designed by specialised lawyers. In the bank system there is only 
diffidence (…) for Grameen, on the contrary, the starting point is that 
debtors are honest. Since our first day we decided that our system will 
not had relied on police and courts (…) nowadays to recover our 
credits we never use lawyers (…) Following the same logic we do not 
use formal contracts between clients and the bank. We establish 
relationships with people not with documents’ (Yunus,1997:106-108). 
This statement also suggests the second dynamic called by Frey 
(1997) motivational crowding-out. According to this theory material 
incentive in certain cases may transform itself in a disincentive. In 
other terms, transforming my motivation from intrinsic to extrinsic up 
to assign it a price, material incentives may reduce my willingness to 
perform a given action (for example to repay my loan). Moreover this 
effect depends critically on the subject’s perception of the 
incentivator’s intention to control or to support the other’s action.  
In the first case we can face a strengthening of internal subject 
motivations (and so crowding-in) while in the second a negative 
impact on self esteem (and so crowding-out). Finally, it is recalled 
how the new program in cognitive psychology suggests the impact on 
human behaviour of the so called ‘Feeling of Freedom-Effect’, that is, 
the importance of the perception of freedom in doing an action. 
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All these mechanisms, according to Pelligra, are congruent with 
the institutional design of the Grameen Bank and have allowed the 
construction of a relation borrower-lender highly cooperative. 
Moreover the scholar concludes his work supporting our thesis of 
microfinance institutions as enabling institutions (see chapter two) 
recognizing that: ‘The case of Grameen constitutes, in this sense, a 
paradigmatic example showing how is possible to encourage agents to 
behave according to their fiduciary duties, not by means of pecuniary 
sanctions or incentives, but by both trusting them and attributing to the 
environment the distinctive traits of a cooperative relationship, that is 
freedom, responsibility, commitment; favouring this way the 
development of trustworthy behaviours’ (Pelligra 2005b, 24, cursive 
added by the author). 
 On the base of the analysis conducted in the first chapter, it 
seems to us that the mechanism of trust responsiveness could be also a 
reasonable explanation for the horizontal relation that is established 
inside the ‘group of five’. In other terms, we are suggesting the 
introduction of a model in which the mechanism of trust 
responsiveness allows to justify why the various forms of joint 
liability may be sustained. We must remember, in fact, that just in the 
Grameen Bank methodology the five members of the group are linked 
by a sequential mechanism of loan provision that makes the third, the 
fourth and fifth exposed to the un-cooperative behaviour of the first 
two who receive the loan immediately. 
 This attempt is particularly interesting especially on the light of 
microfinance literature in which the dynamics inside the group in its 
various forms, from the group of three, five to more in ROSCAs, have 
been explained not so much in a relational perspective.  
As a matter of fact, many models have considered the role of 
reputation and the role of dynamics incentives as well as social 
ostracism and peer pressure as good factors for solving the 
informative problem of the credit-debt relation and to reduce the need 
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of a material collateral. But very few have modelled the credit-debt 
relation from a different perspective on human nature and motivations, 
in the sense for example suggested by Smith’s fellow feeling.  
In the fourth chapter we will stress again the need to a more 
complex framework of analysis for microfinance methodologies that 
joined the variables until now considered to others towards a more 
relational approach. 
 
 
 
3.4 Towards the fundamental level: fellow feeling and 
mirroring 
 
 
3.4.1 Human nature and the social bond in classical thought: 
Hobbes, Hume and Rousseau 
The aim of previous chapters was to show that the study of the 
economics of social interactions requires the identification of different 
dimensions and levels of interactions. Our starting point was the 
recognition of the existence of an interplay between objective and 
institutional features of economic structure. After that, we consider the 
institutional dimension and a set of contributions in which the 
exploration of economic behaviour is found primarly in the 
interpersonal dimension. We then examine the interpersonal 
dimension focusing on the possible dynamics behind a non selfish 
economic behaviour as well as on the role played by trust.  
In this paragraph we reach the fundamental level of 
investigation in which the analysis of interactions lends itself to the 
consideration of fundamental assumptions concerning human nature. 
It is interesting in this first section to briefly consider some 
contributions from classical philosophers such as Hobbes, Hume and 
Rousseau especially in order to provide a background to the analysis 
of Smith’s conception of fellow feeling. This concept is essential in 
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order to critically assess the assumptions on human nature in 
economic theory. It may be argued that there are similarities with new 
findings in neuroscience that show the existence of neural 
fundamental structures of interactions: the mirror neurons. 
The idea that social relations may be explained without 
assuming a certain degree of ‘sociality’ in human nature has been a 
guiding principle in economics since the time of Adam Smith. His 
well known statement, or better the interpretation that has been given 
of it (Sen 1999),  according to which it is not from the benevolence of 
the butcher, the brewer of the baker that we expect our dinner, but 
from their regard to their own interest, has irremediably constrained 
the ‘interpretation’ of human beings in economic theory. As a matter 
of fact, following this line of reasoning, it has been argued that 
economic relations are realized among individuals motivated by 
rational self interest and that the working of the economic system 
needs only a system of property rights and markets (called by Smith 
‘natural liberty’). But as soon as we want to explain why economic 
agents should respect one another’s property rights we are bound to 
make some assumptions about sociality (Sen 1999, Bardsley and 
Sugden 2006). 
Economic theory requires a richer model of human motivation 
than the one associated with the idea of homo economicus, going 
beyond the assumption of self interest, have remained anchored to an 
individualistic framework (see paragraph 3,2). 
Recognizing that sociality is part of human nature and that 
human beings ‘naturally’ live in structured groups has far reviling  
implications. In particular, we are bound to acknowledge that ‘we 
human beings are genetically endowed with emotions, dispositions 
and ways of reasoning that equip us to live in groups. [And so that] 
some kind of sociality – by which we mean some primitive desire or 
tendency to participate in society without ulterior motive, or some 
positive orientation towards other human beings – must be part of 
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human nature’ (Bardsley and Sugden, 2006, 3). In other terms, it is not 
sufficient to say that the human being is a social animal to derive 
some assumptions concerning the sociality of his nature. 
The following short introduction to some relevant aspects of 
Hobbes’s, Hume’s and Rousseau’s philosophical reflections provide a 
background to the consideration of Smith’s Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759). This reconstruction will be based on concepts such 
as ‘self-love’ (Pelligra 2003) and following the interpretation 
suggested by Bardsley and Sugden (2006), will consider the four 
ingredients from which the ‘social bond’, or ‘cement’ of society 
arises. Here we will combine some features associated with both these 
contributions. 
As a preliminary to that, it is worth noting that the concept of 
philautia (literally “self-love”) takes central relevance in Aristotle’s 
thinking about social relations, in particular about friendship. As a 
matter of fact, recognizing that “Friendly relations with one’s 
neighbours, seem to have proceeded from a man’s relation to himself” 
(Nicomachean Ethics, 1166a 4-5), Aristotle puts at the basis of philia 
(friendship) the idea of philautia. In turn, philia is the necessary 
condition for eudaimonia (happiness), to be understood as “human 
flourishing” (Nussbaum, 1986). Finally an important effect of philia 
noticed by Aristotle is its property of fostering one’s own self-
knowledge and self-consciousness. At the base of this process we find 
the idea of the ‘other as a mirror’ of ourselves. This means that human 
beings can acquire an objective self-knowledge only through friendly 
relations.  
 
Hobbes’s  reflection on human nature 
In the following centuries, the idea of self love and of the 
natural sociality of human beings ‘will be in various forms subjected 
to a form of moral degradation’ (Pelligra 2003, 8), reaching the lowest 
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point in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (1962), where self love becomes 
equivalent to egoism and the natural sense of sociality disappears.  
According to Hobbes, in a state of nature human beings cannot 
find pleasure in one another’s company as they perceive one another 
as potential enemies. The main sentiment that human beings feel in 
their relational dimension is fear of the other. In his mechanical 
representation of human behaviour, Hobbes highlights that human 
beings are motivated by desires of self preservation, delectation, 
security and glory. If the first three motivations are associated with 
self interest the fourth one leads to the satisfaction of others. These 
natural desires condemn human beings to the condition of bellum 
omnia contra omnes from which it is possible to escape only through 
reason: “Social order – in the form of a common power to keep 
everyone in awe [the Leviathan, created, through a voluntary renounce 
of a share of individual’s freedom] – is the product of reason, not of 
natural sociality” (Bardsley and Sugden 2006, 7). The adherence to 
the ‘laws of nature’ at the foundation of the Leviathan is, in fact, a 
result of human ‘rational’ self-interest. Following this interpretation, 
contractarian thinkers will consider social institutions as agreements 
reached among rational individuals. 
 
Hume and the emergence of conventions  
In Hume’s “new science of man” (1739, 1751) it is particularly 
relevant  to highlight the introduction of two concepts that are 
explicitly in contrast with Hobbes’ cynicism. 
The first is that one of conventions, a sort of tacit agreements, 
that emerge as unintended consequences of repeated interactions 
between rational individuals. They ‘arise gradually , and acquires 
force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the 
inconveniences of trasgressing it’ (Treatise of Human Nature,1978, 
490). In other terms according to Hume, individuals will be motivated 
to conform with a convention not through an explicitly agreement but 
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through the experience of the other’s compliance in similar previous 
situations and therefore the creation of an expectation on others’ 
behaviour. In this conceptualization, he also offers two interesting 
explanations of the way in which conventions emerge in human 
society. The first, anticipating Schelling’s (1960) analysis of ‘focal 
point’, refers to an idea of salience (expressed in terms of associations 
of ideas) of some patterns of coordination that allows, in the absence 
of experience, to expect some kind of behaviour in other people. The 
second, also associated with the concept of salience, suggests that 
conventions may emerge from a sort of contamination from a context 
(for example the family) to another one (small groups up to societies). 
Finally, although according to Hume social order arises from the 
interaction of rational self interested individuals, as in Hobbes (not 
requiring necessarily socially oriented motivations), it is necessary a 
certain kind of ‘common understanding among individuals sufficient 
to produce the common conceptions of salience and common 
associations of ideas [...] Conventions are therefore possible only 
among people who have some habits of thought in common’ 
(Bardsley and Sugden 2006, 11). 
The second relevant aspect in Hume’s reflection is more 
directly related to human nature, in which he recognizes the 
coexistence of both self-interest and benevolence. Contrary Hobbes, 
here human beings are acknowledged to have sympathetic affections, 
especially for those whose happiness or misery is “brought near to 
[us] and represented in lively colours (THN 1978, 481).  
As Pelligra clearly shows, in Hume ‘social relations are 
governed by the very powerful principle of sympathy, that enable us, 
through imagination, to experience others’ feelings and sentiments, 
pleasures and pains. Such a system of reciprocal sympathy is, 
according to Hume, the basis of society’s moral order. It is through 
sympathy, in fact, that we can originally assess whether our actions 
are ‘useful’ or ‘pernicious’ for the others’ (Pelligra 2003, 12).  In 
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some way here we find some elements of similarity with Smith’s 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (see next paragraph). 
 
Rousseau and the ‘identification with a greater whole’ 
We cannot present here a comprehensive assessment of the 
intellectual tradition associated with Jean Jacques Rousseau (see 
Gauthier 2006). But, it is useful to stress how Rousseau, writing at the 
same time as Hume and Smith, has influenced their views, especially 
with his ‘treatment of the self’, reintroducing in the philosophical 
debate the central idea of self love at the root of human nature. In 
particular, Rousseau points out that ‘the desire for approbation (amour 
propre) is the most powerful motif of social life’ (Pelligra 2003, 15) 
from which every virtue, but also every vice, are originated. 
 The other interconnected relevant contribution is represented 
by his reconstruction of the history of human beings and the original 
source of inequality. Starting from the picture of an original  innocent 
state of nature in which human beings interact very little, he arrives to 
describe ‘the truth youth of the world’. In the happiest epoch of 
history, human beings develop language, intelligence and social 
organization based on simple social structures in which persons 
supported each others. The ‘loss of innocence’, according to 
Rousseau, has been a result of social interactions, by the gradually 
growing desire for public esteem. Finally the development of a system 
of  property rights and  the division of labour have conducted to the 
arising of inequality. 
 In this reconstruction, in order to escape from a Hobbesian 
destiny, Rousseau introduces in ‘The Social Contract’ (1762) the idea 
of a form of democracy in which the participation of all members of 
society allows the determination of a ‘general will’. To obtain this 
result a ‘remarkable change in man’ is required. This ‘change’ seems 
to involve ‘some radical shift in each person’s perceptions and modes 
of reasoning such that, when he acts in the role of citizens, he 
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identifies with the political unit of which he is a part’ (Bardsley and 
Sugden 2006, 14). In this direction Martin Hollis (1998) has found an 
interesting linkage with Rousseau’s reflection and the modern theory 
of ‘team thinking’ (see paragraph 3,2). 
 
 
3.4.2 Smith’s perspective: the congruence continuum and fellow 
feeling as the highest stage of social interaction 
As we have seen looking at some of the most important contributions 
in the eighteenth century, if we want  to understand the complex 
mechanism at the base of social interactions we cannot escape from a 
deeper analysis of human nature. In other terms, to understand the 
way in which human beings establish and sustain interpersonal 
relations, we must combine the analysis conducted until now with a 
deeper comprehension of the fundamental structures of interactions 
with ‘others’ in a given situation. For this reason we have introduced 
this section speaking about a fundamental level.  
In order to face the complexity of this subject recent 
contributions (Sugden 2002, 2006;  Scazzieri 2006) have proposed a 
reconstruction of Adam Smith’s legacy in his Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759). This attempt has been conducted stressing the 
centrality of concepts such as that one of ‘fellow feeling’, which we 
are going to consider. How these concepts have found important 
elements of congruence and confirmation at the light of modern 
discoveries in neuroscience will be the subject of the next paragraph. 
 A possible way of addressing the concept of fellow feeling, 
following Scazzieri (2006), is to start from the consideration of the 
sophisticated Smithian theory of rational choice in which, human 
behaviour and the rationality of the actors result from a complex 
interplay of understanding, knowledge acquisition and deliberation 
under social constraints. As Scazzieri points out: ‘Smith associates 
rationality (and rational deliberation) with the ability to identify a 
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congruent setting, in which mutually acceptable reasons may be 
identified. Once such a congruent setting is identified, ‘Smithian’ 
rationality presupposes the ability to attune decisions to the structure 
of expectations prevailing within such an environment. This makes 
rationality itself to be context-dependent’. (Scazzieri 2005, 1). This 
means that context may significantly impact on the mental 
representation of  problem spaces and on the identification of agents’ 
rational standards. As soon as we accept the idea that rationality is 
itself context dependent, we may observe that ‘rationality appears to 
be relative to the relational context in which human deliberation takes 
place. The same choices could be reasonable under some rational 
configurations and unreasonable under others’ (Scazzieri 2005, 1). 
 In such a framework it is the consideration of the way in which 
social constraints are ‘mediated through reflection and imagination 
within the agent’s mind’ (Scazzieri 2005, 3) that allows us to 
appreciate the critical relevance of a relational perspective and the 
fundamental concept of fellow feeling. 
In the Smithian perspective, the analysis of the interpersonal 
dimension may be conducted mainly by considering the combined 
influence of imagination and sympathy on human behaviour. As a 
matter of fact, we must recognize at first that each human being faces 
a situation, that is, ‘the complete state of the universe at an instant of 
time (MacCarthy and Hayes, 1969, online version, p. 18), starting 
with a ‘bounded social knowledge’ and a system of behavioural 
beliefs emerging as the outcome of situational knowledge. But, at the 
same time, human beings through imagination, that is, through ‘the 
ability to consider a counterfactual set–up’ (Scazzieri 2005, 4), may 
extend their knowledge ‘beyond [their] own person’ (TMS I.i.1.2) by 
imagining another individual’s situation and feelings (sensations) and 
‘by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation’ 
(Smith, 1976a [1st edn 1759], TMS I.i.1.2).  
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On this basis ‘impartial spectator’ is allowed  to create his own 
judgment and to express her/his own emotions.  
In other terms, ‘[i]magination allows individuals to complete 
their own descriptions of states of the universe and to introduce 
workable patterns of social interactions’ (Scazzieri 2005, 8). This 
possibility for human beings, through imagination, to consider, or 
better to ‘imagine’ conterfactual-set-ups (a property that presupposes a 
certain degree of distance and diversity, see Scazzieri 2005; Porta and 
Scazzieri 2001) permits to identify a ‘continuum of congruence 
criteria based upon different stages of counterfactual reasoning 
(sympathy)’ (Scazzieri 2005, 6).  
As a matter of fact, conterfactual reasoning mechanism allows 
the identification of three different stages of sympathy (11): 
(i) semiotic sympathy 
It is the result of an almost instinctive use of imagination 
vis à vis a particular situation, and leads to an  
immediate correspondence of feelings. In Smith (TMS 
I.i.1.6) we read: ‘Upon some occasions sympathy may 
seem to arise merely from the view of a certain emotion 
in another person. The passions, upon some occasions, 
may seem to be transfused from one man to another, 
instantaneously, and antecedent to any knowledge of 
what excited them in the person principally concerned. 
Grief and joy, for example, strongly expressed in the 
look and gestures of any one, at once affect the spectator 
with some degree of a like painful or agreeable 
emotion’. 
(ii) subsidiary sympathy 
In this case, sympathy arises from an inversion of 
feelings: the spectator, facing the other’s situation, 
identifies a social distance that allows his feelings to be 
different from those ones of the other. Again quoting 
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Smith: ‘[w]e blush for the impudence and rudeness of 
another, though he himself appears to have no sense of 
the impropriety of his own behaviour; because we 
cannot help feeling with what confusion we ourselves 
should be covered, had we behaved in so absurd a 
manner’ (TMS I.i.1.10). 
(iii) mutual sympathy (or fellow feeling)    
It is the highest stage of fundamental interaction as it 
implies a ‘double correspondence’ of feelings between 
persons. According to Smith ‘nothing pleasures us more 
than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the 
emotions of our own breast; nor are we ever so much 
shocked as by the appearance of the contrary’ (TMS 
I.i.2.1). 
Using the categories just introduced, we may analyse the 
dynamics of fellow feeling, which in terms of modern psychology 
appears as ‘a mechanism which connects individuals’ affective states’ 
(Sugden 2005, 15). At this point, it is essential to understand how 
fellow feeling is not simply resolved in the fact that, given two 
persons A and B, individual A can imagine the good or bad situation 
of individual B and that also B recognizes A’s attitude. In other terms, 
B will not feel “the pleasure of mutual sympathy” simply from the 
recognition of a semiotic sympathy. As a matter of fact this kind of 
sympathy would only obtain the result that B and A’s  feelings (good 
or bad) find a sort of congruence. Smith’s hypothesis, at the base of 
fellow feeling, is “not a simple reflection of pleasure and pain” 
(Sugden 2005, 16). It means that the simple congruence of feelings is 
not the real source of pleasure of mutual feelings.  
The process is interpreted in Scazzieri (2005, 6) as follows: 
“[...] B’s mind-set derives not so much from semiotic congruence 
(between the original joy or grief and A’s fellow-feeling), as from the 
perception that A’s fellow-feeling corresponds exactly to how he (or 
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she) would react, were she (he) in the same position as A. 
Correspondence of feelings becomes an essential element of social 
interaction, and is itself at the origin of a new ‘layer’ of sentiments: in 
general, human beings are pleased when ‘able to sympathize’ with the 
feelings of another human being, and distressed ‘when [they are] 
unable to do so’ (TMSI.i.2.6)”. 
 In Scazzieri’s contribution, Smith’s theory of fellow feeling is 
presented into a more complex framework in which, the existence of 
such a continuum of methods of congruence, has a critical impact on 
the formulation of a theory of choice in terms of conceptual structure.  
Another important aspect highlighted in Sugden (2002) is that, 
as soon as we accept the idea that the correspondence of sentiments is 
a source of pleasure for human being, we can admit the existence of 
natural desire to create interpersonal contexts of internal congruence. 
Smith proposes the example of two persons that read a book together, 
but we can imagine various other examples such as the big difference 
between eating together or eating alone. Some of these examples, 
recalling some aspects of the theory of relational goods, suggest how 
“the mere fact of doing something together with another person rather 
than alone can be a source of pleasure [identifies] an element of 
sociality in human nature” (Bardsley and Sugden 2006, 17). 
The topicality of Smith’s insights about fellow feeling and 
‘emotional contagion’, according to Sugden (2005), is shown in the 
wide theoretical and empirical work conducted in biology, psychology 
and neuroscience.  
 
3.4.3 Neuroeconomics and mirror neurons  
In the last years we are facing the emergence of a new approach, 
popularly known as neuroeconomics, in which different disciplines 
mainly psychology, neuroscience and economics are trying to 
integrate their contributions towards more accurate models of choice 
and decision of human beings. Although some scholars have 
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expressed a strong scepticism, it is more and more evident how 
neuroeconomics is able to draw upon the complementary strengths of 
its contributing disciplines towards new potentially fruitful research 
directions. As it as been pointed out ‘neuroscience can, and already 
has, benefited from economics’ unitary perspective […] while 
economics can, and has begun to, be enriched by taking account of 
cooperation and competition between multiple specialized neural 
systems’ (Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure and Cohen 2006, 108). This 
last statement allows us to introduce, perhaps, the most relevant 
contribution from neuroscience to the analysis of interpersonal 
relations. 
As a matter of fact there is a wide psychological literature, 
supported by recent neuroscience discoveries, that suggests to 
represent human behaviour as the result of a multiple process that 
reflects the fundamental interaction of different specialised 
subsystems. As it has been explained: ‘Although most of the time 
these systems interact synergistically to determine behaviour, at times 
they compete, producing different dispositions towards the same 
information. A major cause of these observed idiosyncrasies of 
behaviour that have been used to challenge the standard economic 
model might be that these decisions do not emerge from a unitary 
process, but rather from interactions between distinguishable sets of 
processes’ (Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure and Cohen 2006, 111). 
At this point the central distinction between systems supporting 
emotion and those supporting deliberation, which closely parallels the 
distinction between automatic and controlled processes, emerges. 
Neuroimaging studies have stressed how emotional and controlled 
processes, activate some closely interrelated neural mechanisms but at 
the same time these processes involve distinguishable neural 
components. This distinction ‘could help shed light on many of the 
most basic patterns uncovered by behavioural economics […] as well 
as several other behaviours that challenge the standard economic 
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model, including many that involve market and non-market 
interactions between individuals’ (Sanfey, Loewenstein, McClure and 
Cohen 2006, 113).  
According to Robert Sugden (2002, 2005), the existence of a 
linkage between Adam Smith’s concept of fellow feeling and various 
forms of ‘emotional contagion’ may be derived from  recent 
contributions (see also Decety and Chaminade 2003). The emotional 
contagion has been described as a process that realizes below the level 
of conscious control and implies the transfer of emotional states 
between individuals. This mechanisms seems to be present not only in 
humans but also in other social mammals and seems to be positively 
correlated to the degree of proximity and homogeneity of the 
individuals involved (their familiarity, their similarity in experience 
and the salience of the signal expressed). In this field the modernity of 
Adam Smith’s conceptualization, according to Sugden, can be better 
understood by taking into account the discovery of mirror neurons by 
Giacomo Rizzolatti and others, in the 1990s (Rizzolatti and Gallese 
2002; Rizzolatti and Senigaglia 2006).  
If we want to catch the intuition at the base of the linkage 
between the modern representation of the brain, as a system made up 
of a dense network of interconnections in which mirror neurons play a 
central role and the Smithian mechanism of fellow feeling, we have to 
make a backward step. 
Quoting Sugden (in Sugden Gui 2005, 57) who refers to some 
experiments conducted in order to discover the basic mechanism of 
representation of an action and its imitation  ‘[…] it is now known that 
in both monkey and human subjects, seeing the hand of another 
monkey or human grasping an object with apparent purposefulness 
does not merely activate in the subject’s brain a visual representation 
of that act, as seen from outside. It also activates a motor 
representation of the performance of the act, as performed by the 
subject. In other words, the subject’s consciousness of anther’s 
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individual’s act of grasping has much of the neural content of actually 
grasping. There is some evidence that affective states are subject to 
similar mirroring. For example when sad stories are read to human 
subjects, neural structures that are known to be involved in emotional 
processing are activated’.  
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2006) reconstruct the emergence of 
the concept of mirror neurons that arises just from the study of  simple 
acts (such as grasping an object). For a long time, the simple 
representation of the motor system as mechanical implementation of 
an act (perception  cognition  act), had left no space for the 
consideration of these kinds of neural structures.  
The revolutionary discovery in this field has been represented 
by the identification of neurons that activate in relation to finalized 
motor act. Quoting from Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2006, 2 my 
translation) ‘these neurons appears to be able to distinguish and select 
sensorial information, detecting the different possible set of acts 
implied, independently from the actual or not realization of it’. Just 
the possibility of an abstract representation in human brain and 
therefore the distinction between simple movements (‘meri 
movimenti’) and acts (‘atti’), allows human beings to acquire 
knowledge and to give a precise meaning to things. In this framework, 
in which a unified process of perception-cognition-action is suggested, 
we find the discovery of mirror neurones. 
The mirror neurons, are so called, because they make able our 
brain to recognize the meaning of a movement observed in another 
subject correlating it to our movement. This process immediately 
recalls the image of a mirroring. This means that the recognition of the 
others, of their movements and actions and also of their intentions, 
may be realized immediately  by our brain exclusively thanks to our 
motor asset and skills. Obviously it does not exclude the possibility 
for a human being to interpret the other on the base of a cognitive 
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process based on the analysis of other possible intentions, expectations 
and motivations. 
 The relational nature of these neural structures, through which 
processes of imitation, communication and learning are realized 
among human beings, clearly assigns to mirror neurons a central role 
in the field of interpersonal and social interactions. Moreover, recent 
researches are showing how these mirror properties are present also in 
the field of the communication of emotions or ‘emotional contagion’. 
Intuitively the same neural mechanism at the base of the recognition 
of a movement seems at the base of our capacity to recognize others’ 
feelings. A first experiment that has been conducted to understand the 
mirror properties in the emotional field is related to the sensation of 
pain and disgust. These experiments demonstrate how there is a 
mechanism that leads to emotional sharing (or ‘correspondence’): the 
direct experience of a pain and the indirect perception of a pain in 
another person, for example, seems to activate the same neural base. 
Quoting Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2006, 181 my translation): ‘[…] 
our perception of others’ acts and emotive reactions seems to be based 
on the same mirror mechanism that allows our brain to recognize 
those things that we look at, feel and imagine to be done by others. 
This is because these things activate the same neural structures 
responsible for our actions and emotions. […] The immediate 
comprehension of others’ emotions allowed by the mechanism of 
mirroring, is the necessary prerequisite for the empathic behaviour 
that is at the root of most of our interpersonal relations’.  
To conclude, it is clear that the neural mechanism of mirroring 
recalls the process of fellow feeling discussed above. The main 
overlap is that human behaviour can only be explained in relational 
terms and the acknowledgment that ‘it is bizzarre to conceive an I 
without a we” (Rizzolati and Sinigaglia 2006, 4). It is only through 
interaction with the others, ‘the outside’, that each human being 
attains the construction of ‘the inside’.  
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Notes chapter 3 
 
 
(1)  In the middle of the 1960 Yunus thanks to a fullbright 
scholarship left the Bangladesh (Chittagong) for Vanderbilt University 
in Nashville, Tennessee. There he became an esteemed pupil of 
Georgescu Roegen. 
 
(2) This view of economic structure can be met first in Adam 
Smith’s notion of civil society and later in contributions of other 
classical authors as John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx up to John 
Maynard Keynes. 
 
(3) Pasinetti’s distinction of these two fundamental levels of 
analysis is also present in Lowe (1935), as it is stressed in Baranzini 
and Scazzieri (1990, 245-248). 
 
 
(4) This approach seems to be particularly interesting at the light of 
the development proposed in the fourth chapter where the problems of 
asymmetric information (moral hazard and adverse selection) are 
presented in a game theoretic framework combined with other 
conceptual schemes. 
 
(5)  North is particularly fascinated, as in recent seminars he has 
stressed, by the hypothesis that religious belief plays a central 
psychological role in human belief systems.  
 
 
(6) All these conceptual efforts towards the consideration of the 
interpersonal dimension and therefore a deeper analysis of human 
sentiments, dispositions and motivations represents the recognition of 
the high degree of complexity in the domain of economic and social 
interactions, or in other terms, quoting Barkley Rosser (2003) that ‘we 
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live in a world that reflects the enormous variety and diversity of 
humanity in their knowledge, attitudes, and behaviours, interacting 
with each other in an enormous range of institutional frameworks’.  
 
(7) Alternatively, one can start with a mapping from the utility 
individuals gain from commodities to inclusive utilities. 
That is, Ui = Ui(ui(xi), uj (xj)), where Ui is the utility function which 
represents i’s overall preferences, ui is a function which represents i’s 
tastes with respect to his own consumption of goods, and altruism is 
represented by the assumption ∂Ui/∂uj > 0. 
 
(8)  This finds its original root in Max Weber’s concept of 
wertrational (‘value – rational’). 
 
(9)  See Pelligra 2006 who clarifies the relation between the 
concepts of trust and reciprocity. 
 
(10) To view some of the issues involved in analyzing team 
reasoning, it is useful to outline Sugden’s (1984) ‘reciprocity theory’. 
Comparing this theory with that one by Rabin (1993) it is possible to 
notice that the fact that reciprocity is defined in terms of participation 
in the collective action of groups, makes this model one of team 
reasoning. 
 
(11) This distinction is proposed in Scazzieri (2006) from which 
these passages of the Theory of Moral Sentiments are taken.. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Understanding the credit debt relation: 
overlapping literatures towards a relational 
approach 
  
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse microfinance institutions through 
the economic literatures developed in the last two chapters. In the 
second chapter we have focused on the concept of social capital 
embracing the idea of social capital as a form of social network 
(Dasgupta 2002). This approach requires a deeper analysis of the 
economics of social networks that can be a useful frame in which to 
consider some of the main relevant aspects of the credit-debt relation, 
especially when it is established using a group methodology as it has 
been done in microfinance institutions. In this sense we will try to 
develop the analysis of those graphs, club and network, anticipated in 
the second chapter towards a better definition of the system of social 
network (paragraph 4.1). This work will lead to the recourse, in 
addition to payoff matrix, to adjacency matrix whose elements provide 
some information about the relations existing among actors. At the 
same time, on the base of the literature developed in the third chapter, 
we will focus on the internal dynamics of a network studying the 
‘economic and relational’ worthiness of the system of ties among 
actors involved. Here the concepts of objective, institutional and 
economic-social interactions and therefore the main theoretical efforts 
done in order to consider sociality and relationality into economics 
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will help us to understand the possible dynamic process into a network 
system.  
 Following this line, in the paragraph 4.2, we will try to 
reconsider the two structural problems that the credit-debt relation 
presents. These are the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
These problems have been presented in some simplified models in the 
first chapter drawing on microfinance literature.  
Here the same kind of analysis will be conducted through a 
different analytical framework. The first step will be to introduce in 
the explanation of the dynamics inside the group of three (as a basic 
starting point) the use of payoff matrix that allows to look at 
informative problems in a compact and more interactive way.  
 The payoff matrices could be studied on the base of the theory 
of game trying to identify the possible equilibria of the game and  
some of the possible scenario suggested in the first chapter (for 
example collusive groups, different levels of interest rate).  
As a matter of fact, this analytical framework appears to be not 
yet sufficient if we want to consider these economic and social 
interactions by a more ‘relational’ approach. In other terms we are 
looking for a framework that allows to study these information 
problems encompassing the relational dimension and the role played 
by those relevant variables and dynamics presented in the third 
chapter towards different possible solutions and therefore explanations 
of some methodologies developed in microfinance institutions.  
A proposal in this direction could be, just starting from these 
payoff matrix, to consider different payoff matrix in relation to 
different relational structures behind the space of interactions. As it 
has been in various occasions suggested in the previous chapters, the 
relational and institutional matrix that define the space of interaction 
could impact on agents interaction both in terms of agents’ perception 
of the situation both in terms of motivations, and so choices. 
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4.2 The economics of social networks: a starting base of 
understanding 
 
Social network analysis has emerged as a set of methods for the 
analysis of social structures, groups and institutions in order to 
investigate the relational aspects of these structures shifting the focus 
from the individual or group to the relationship between individuals or 
groups. The starting theoretical point is the recognition of the 
importance of relationships among interacting, individuals or groups 
that are connected to one another through social and economic 
‘meaningful relationships’ (Wellman & Berkowitz, 1988). Examples 
of such meaningful relationships include family, friends, and more 
generally relations based on trust, such as giving advice, or sharing 
information. The study of this multifaceted dimension leads to the 
consideration of the patterns that emerge among individuals, groups, 
or organizations in terms of the quality of the relationships and the 
positions of actors within the network, in order to understand how 
both aspects affect the way information and resources flow (Wellman 
& Gulia, 1999). 
 The relevance of this approach is widely recognized in 
Granovetter’s legacy, especially in three main propositions that are of 
interest to economists (Gazier, Saint Jean 2005, in Gui and Sugden 
2005).  Starting from the recognition of the intrinsic limit of an 
‘undersocialized conception of man’, Granovetter proposes a vision of 
economic actions as social actions in order to expand the set of 
motivations that belong not only to the economic order but must also 
include search for recognition, identity, status, etc. From this point of 
view he/she suggests that the preferences as well as the identity of the 
economic agent may evolve as a result of the interactions in which he 
is engaged. This point leads immediately to the second proposition 
concerning ‘embeddedness’, according to which individuals are not 
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‘monads’ but are ‘embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social 
relations’ (1) (Granovetter 1985, 487). Stressing ‘the role of concrete 
personal relations and structures (or ‘networks’) of such relations’, the 
concept of network is introduced in a wide sense including all regular 
sets of contacts and relations among individuals. Just from their 
dimension of interaction, that is from the structure of the social 
network, choices and behaviours derive ‘generating trust and 
discouraging malfeasance’ (1985, 490). The concept of network plays 
such a central role in this analysis that Granovetter (1990, 1992) 
comes to define institutions as ‘congealed social networks’ 
underlining the existence of a process of creation of institutions and 
the possibility of a dependence in their formation. 
 In order to systematically study in which way microcredit 
groups may be conceived as ‘network systems’ (paragraph 4.2), we 
have to take into account the basic concepts of social network analysis 
and the different possible ways of representing such networks.  
 A social network may be defined as a finite set of actors 
connected to one another through relations. Each actor (individual, 
group or  organization), whose actions are interdependent, has to be 
seen as a node of the network. Relational ties (linkages) between 
actors are channels for the transfer or ‘flow’ of resources (either 
material or nonmaterial). These ties can be reciprocated, or 
unreciprocated, and they can be directed or undirected. A relation is a 
specific type of tie between actors in a network. There are many 
different kinds of relations: communication or social interaction, 
friendship, reciprocity, trust, diplomacy, advice, and so forth. Since 
the network environment provides opportunities for, or constraints 
upon individual action, it is clear that it may affect substantive 
outcomes and be related with emergent effects.  
 For this reason, the fundamental unit in network analysis is not 
the individual, but a collection of individuals and the linkages among 
them. In particular, attention is focused on dyads (two actors and their 
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ties), triads (three actors and their ties), or larger systems (subgroups 
of individuals), or upon entire networks.  
 From a methodological point, this approach has developed 
different techniques for data collection, statistical analysis, visual 
representation, etc., providing both a visual and a mathematical 
analysis of complex human systems. If as we have seen, a social 
network can be represented by having recourse to the theory of graphs 
(2); at the same time it is possible to combine this analytical tool with 
the adjacency matrix.  
 In adjacency matrix nxn , the system of relations of each actor is 
expressed exploiting a binary codification. Precisely if between two 
actors (nodes) i and j there is a relational tie (or connection) the 
generic element  aij=1 (viceversa aij=0). For this reason starting with a 
matrix of adjacency it is possible to define a graph G(p, q) such that p 
is the number of nodes in the network and q is the total number of 
relational ties between any two nodes in the graph. In formal terms, 
each graph represents a function in which each relational tie q is 
associated with a couple of nodes. In this sense it is possible to derive 
a graph from a matrix of adjacency.  
 The study of network structure may be developed considering 
more information regarding relational data in terms of their value and 
direction. In other terms, we can not only say if there is or is not a 
relation (binary system), but we can also identify the intensity of the 
relational tie between any two nodes. In many cases, it is difficult to 
distinguish the direction of relational ties while basically it is 
generally much easier to detect if there is or not a  relational tie and of 
which kind that tie is.  
 Finally it is possible to consider ‘indirect’ ties and the so called 
‘path’ through which nodes that are not directly connected can be 
indirectly related to one another. I shall examine below examples that 
are related to those presented in the chapters I and II. 
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Figure 4.1.1: Adjacency matrix and alternative graph diagrams 
 
 
  
  
  
Source: Scott ( 1991) 
  
 
Figure 4.2.2: A directed graph 
 
 
  
  
Source: Scott ( 1991) 
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Focusing first on the network as a whole, one might be 
interested in the number of actors, the number of connections that 
are possible, and the number of connections that are actually present. 
The number and kinds of ties that actors have are keys to determine 
how much their embeddedness in a network constrains their 
behaviour, and the range of opportunities, influence, and power that 
they have. Differences in how connected the actors in a population 
are, as well as the impact of the size of the network, may be 
indicator keys of the solidarity, ‘moral density’, and ‘complexity’ of 
the social organization of a population (Hanneman, Riddle 2005).  
Moreover, it is possible that a network is not completely 
connected, which raises the question of ‘reachability’. In fact, if it is 
not possible for all actors to ‘reach’ all other actors, then our 
population consists of more than one disconnected groups. As a 
result, it is possible to define for each network a different degree of 
inclusiveness (considering the difference between the connected 
nodes and the isolated nodes). 
 Another useful way to look at networks and at the way 
individuals are embedded in them, is to examine the so-called local 
structures. The most common approaches have been to look at dyads 
(i.e. sets of two actors) and triads (i.e. sets of three actors), as we can 
see in the following graphs (see next page figure 4.2.3).  
The relevance of a triangular relation has been stressed also in 
chapter I when considering particular situations in which the 
‘guarantors’ are added in the vertical relation between the borrower 
and the lender. 
 With directed data, there are four possible dyadic relationships: 
A and B are not connected, A sends to B, B sends to A, or A and B send 
to each other (with undirected data, there are only two possible 
relationships - no tie or tie). It may be useful to look at each actor in 
terms of the kinds of dyadic relationships in which they are involved. 
An actor that sends, but does not receive, ties may be quite different 
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from one who both sends and receives. A common interest in looking 
at dyadic relationships is the extent to which ties are reciprocated (3). 
 
 
Figure 4.2.3: Local structures: dyads and triads 
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Of course, one can examine the entire network, as well as 
individual differences. In one sense, a network that has a 
predominance of null or reciprocated ties over asymmetric 
connections may be a more ‘equal’ or ‘stable’ network than one with a 
predominance of asymmetric connections. 
 Although dyadic relations permit to analyse the degree of 
reciprocation in the relation, small group theorists argue that many of 
the most interesting and basic questions of social structure arise with 
regard to triads. Triads allow for a much wider range of possible sets 
of relations (for example with directed data, there are actually 64 
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possible types of relations among 3 actors) including relationships that 
exhibit hierarchy, equality, and the formation of exclusive groups (for 
example where two actors connect, and exclude the third). Thus small 
group researchers suggest that all of the really fundamental forms of 
social relationships can be observed in triads. Because of this interest, 
we may wish to conduct a ‘triad census’ for each actor, and for the 
network as a whole. In particular, we may be interested in the 
proportion of triads that are ‘transitive’ (that is, display a type of 
balance where, if A directs a tie to B, and B directs a tie to C, then A 
also directs a tie to C). So, there is really quite a lot that can be learned 
both about individual actors embeddedness, and about the whole 
network structure just by examining the adjacencies in dyadic and 
triadic structures.  
 An interesting concept in the analysis of smaller units is that of 
clique, that is a sub-set of a network in which the actors are more 
closely and intensely tied to one another than they are to other 
members of the network. The smallest ‘clique’ is that composed of 
two actors: the dyad can be ‘extended’ first to triads up to more 
inclusive subgroups, forming strong or closely connected components 
in graphs. 
 The strongest possible definition of a clique requires that all its 
actors (more than two, usually three is used) be tied to every other 
member directly, that is, all possible ties are present. This strict 
definition of a clique (as a maximal fully connected sub-graph) may 
be too strong for many applications, and for this reason cases of 
"cliques" where at least some members are not so tightly or closely 
connected have been proposed (4). For example: 
 (i) N-clique approach: an actor is a member of a clique if she/he 
is connected to every other member of the group at a distance greater 
than one. Usually, path distance 2 that corresponds to being ‘a friend 
of a friend’. N stands for the length of the path allowed to make a 
connection to all other members. 
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 (ii) K-Plex approach: a node is a member of a clique of size n if 
it has direct ties to n-k members of that clique. For example, if A has 
ties with B and C, but not D; while both B and C have ties with D, all 
four actors are members of the clique. This last approach,  which 
permits the existence of ‘overlapping social circles’, makes a good 
deal of sense for many problems. It requires that members of a group 
have ties to (most) other group members. If we relax this assumption, 
it may be possible to think that an actor who has ties to a sufficient 
number of members of a group may feel tied to that group even if 
she/he does not know many, or even most members. It may be that 
identity depends on connection, rather than on ‘immersion’ in a sub-
group. 
 A bottom-up approach, as the one we have followed when 
analysing local structures, may allow us to  see if and in which way 
this kind of tight structure can be extended outward. Consequently, the 
overall structure of the network can be seen as ‘emerging’ from 
overlaps and couplings of smaller components. Other approaches tend 
to look at the ‘whole’ structure and identify ‘substructures’ as parts 
that are locally denser than the field as a whole. In this way, they can 
look for ‘holes’ or ‘vulnerabilities’ or ‘weak spots’ in the overall 
structure that imply the emergence of lines of division or cleavage in 
the larger group (Burt 2000). 
 Going deeper into the analysis of social network graphs, the 
concept of density of the ties is of special interest, as it measures  the 
general level of connectedness among its nodes. In other terms, 
density is defined as the proportion of all ties that are actually 
present and those that could be present.  
Fully saturated networks (for example, ‘club’ in which all 
logically possible ties are actually present, so that all actors are 
directly connected to all others in the network) are empirically rare, 
particularly where there are more than a few actors in the 
population.  
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Generally in order to look at how closed a network is we can simply 
use the following formula: 
                         
     density of ties  =           L                                0 < d < 1                                                
                                     n(n-1)/2 
 
where L is the total number of linkages in the network  and the 
denominator (with undirected data) is given by the Σ of number of 
possible connections (n is the number of nodes in the network ). 
 In the presence of ‘valued lines’ (that provide information 
about the intensity of the corrisponding relational tie) this formula 
should also take into account this additional qualitative information. 
At the numerator we only have to consider linkages multiplied by 
their intensity, whereas at the denominator we face a problem related 
to the definition of the maximum degree of multeplicity of linkages 
(that is the maximum level of intensity achievable). This problem is 
related to the fact that, with a growing network  size, the degree of 
density tends to diminish because, as we have seen in the chapter II, 
channels and linkages have construction and maintenance cost, 
particularly high if the actor wants to maintain a high degree of 
intensity of the relation (See figure 4.2.4). 
In a social network structure, we are interested not only in the 
presence, density and intensity of connections but also in the role 
which this kind of structure attaches to different nodes and actors. In 
other terms, in order to consider the degree of horizontality and 
verticality of any given relations, we should pay attention to the 
degree of centrality of each actor in a network, that is, to his position 
regarding others and also, looking at the network in its entirety, to its 
centralization (given certain central nodes) and thus to the cohesion of 
the structure. 
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Figure 4.2.4: Examples of density of different graphs from chapter II 
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The respective adjacency matrix 
  A B C D E 
A          
B         
C           
D           
E          
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We may distinguish three main concepts of centrality (Lomi 1991; 
Soda, 1998; Hanneman 2001): 
(i) the degree of centrality: this is a relative concept that makes 
possible forms of comparison between networks given by the 
number of relational ties owned by an actor relatively to the 
number of connections that are possible. This indicator gives 
information about the involvement and the role of the actor in the 
network. Obviously it can be derived by the adjacency matrix. 
The power owned by an actor and his capacity to exert an influence in 
the network is related to two other kinds of centrality: 
(ii) absolute centrality: this index considers the centrality not in 
terms of number of relations owned but rather in terms of 
closeness centrality, in other terms nodes that are geographically 
more central to all other nodes are more prominent than those 
more distant from all others. In order to express this kind of 
synthetic information we need the matrix of distances, that is a 
matrix in which is possible to find for each couple of nodes the 
shorter path of connection 
(iii) betweenness centrality: nodes characterized by this particular 
type of prominence are those that are placed in strategic points in 
the network structure (for example when a node is the unique 
point of connection between two or more other nodes, or when it 
connects sub-groups). From this position, a mediatory and 
brokerage power derives, which allows specific actor to control 
the flow of resources and information. The broker can play a 
decisive role in the network of social relations by facilitating or 
discouraging transactions and interactions “among these actors 
that have no direct linkages of trust” (Mardsen 1982). We have a 
system of possible relations in a community of merchants or in 
village banks (this case was examined in the chapter I).  
Another example that suggests possible practical applications of these 
concepts is the study of the network of marriages between the key 
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families in Florence in the 1430s (Padget e Ansell 1993). These 
scholars have shown how the Medici’s rise to power can be explained 
by their high level of betweeness centrality (that is 0.522 in contrast 
with Guadagni’s 0.255 or Strozzi’s 0.103).  
 
Figure 4.2.5: 15th Century Florentine Marriages 
  
 
 
Source: Padgett and Ansell (1993) 
 
To the extent that marriage relationships were keys to communicating 
information, business deals, and reaching political decisions, the 
Medici were much better positioned than other families, playing in 
such way a role of broker in the network.  
 In the last decade the recognition that “social networks are the 
fabric of many of our interactions” (Jackson 2005, 1) has produced an 
explosion of economic studies that focus on economic networks. 
As a matter of fact the field of application of these concepts is 
very wide, including the relationships among friends, relatives and 
neighbours in which information and favours are shared, as well as the 
most sophisticated interactions among relevant economic actors at 
various levels. Researchers in this field have concentrated their efforts 
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especially in two directions: the first one is to define the process of 
network formation that has common points with the analysis of the 
process leading to the formation of enabling institutions; the second 
line of research tries to model social behaviour and economic 
outcomes as influenced by network structure.    
 Coming back to our main topic of microfinance institutions 
where we have faced social network structures such as ROSCAs as 
well as groups of microcredit, we will try in the next paragraph to use 
the analytical tools of social network analysis to understand 
mechanisms of peer monitoring and selection.  
 
 
 
4.3 A more general framework of analysis for microfinance 
methodologies 
 
In chapter one we have discussed models in which the information 
problem that structurally characterized the relation between lender and 
borrower is studied. Let us consider again the basic economic issue. 
 
The lender faces two main informative problems: 
(i) the first of adverse selection substantiates in the difficulty of 
selecting the potential credit worthy beneficiaries; as we have 
seen, each possible borrower may present an inherent 
characteristic of good or bad borrower.  
(ii)  the second is that of moral hazard. It is caused by the difficulty 
for the lender of monitoring and enforcing  the repayment of 
the loan. In particular the main problem is that the lender 
cannot monitor and constrain the borrower in doing all the 
possible so as the investment has a good end and therefore 
there is a return to refund the loan 
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The hypotheses behind are:  
(i) The borrower has no collateral and therefore the repayment 
of the loan will depend exclusively on the investment 
return; 
(ii)  We are in the presence of high transaction costs of selection 
and monitoring 
We have also seen that the introduction of a group methodology can 
solve both these kinds of problems. In the case of the ‘overlapped 
credit-debt relation’, the lender relates with a group of persons (the 
minimum is given by three subjects A,B,C) that needs a loan to make 
an investment and are linked by a form of joint liability.  
 In order to achieve the goal of solving the information problem 
the assumption behind is that A,B,C are persons related by a particular 
kind of meaningful horizontal relation.  
Before taking this relation into account we can use the social 
network graphs and adjacency matrix to look at the possible relational 
structures that we can observe before the constitution of the group (it 
is clear how considering a group of more members the network 
structure will be more complicated but the triadic example, as we have 
seen, can be expanded and permit to analyse the main relevant set of 
problems).  
As we can see in the following figure 4.3.1, given a group 
formed by three persons we can observe two situations: 
(i) all the members are directly related, and this is the 
first case of ‘clique’  
(ii) persons are not all directly related. For this reason 
one subject A presents a prominence in the structure 
because through A the other two, B and C, are 
connected. This will impact in the degree of density 
of the two groups. 
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Figure 4.3.1: two possible Triad Groups and some more complex 
relational structures 
 
 
 
 
 
At a first glance, the different degree of network density and 
the graphs presented suggest that the more the network is connected 
(high density) higher will be the degree of horizontality of the network 
and the relational capital shared by the members of the group.  
As a matter of fact, if each linkage between actors is in terms of 
information, beliefs and stabilized relation, a form of capital per se 
when it is inserted in a network can constitute a type of relational 
capital shared by all members of the group. 
However, if we look at the following graphs (see figure 4.3.2) 
we notice that we must take care of the combined effect of density and 
centrality. It is evident that it is not enough that there are the same 
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numbers of ties in the network, as centrality should be reduced to have 
a more horizontal configuration of the network. 
 
Figure 4.3.2 : The interplay between density and centrality 
 
  
                                                                                                                                         
 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
                                                                                                                                                  
                         
     
                        Density 0,5                                                  adjacency matrix 
                                                                                with distribution of ties (2,2,2,2,2)       
 
                                      
 
  
                                                   
 
                                                                                    
                                                
 
                         Density 0,5        adjacency matrix 
                                                                                with distribution of ties (4,2,2,1,1) 
 
 
 In order to analyse these different situations it is necessary to 
focus on what is the meaning of the tie between two actors in the 
network. In chapter I, when reviewing the microfinance literature, we 
have seen how some scholars emphasize the relevance of the group 
because through it the social capital embodied in the social network 
could become a sort of ‘social collateral’. Following this idea we may 
 A B C D E 
A  1 1   
B 1   1  
C 1    1 
D 1 1
E   1 1  
 A B C D E 
A  1 1 1 1 
B 1     
C 1     
D 1    1 
E 1   1  
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interpret these relational ties as linkages deriving by a certain degree 
of proximity between the two nodes-actors persons considered. If we 
look at the reality of rural developing countries, for example, to live in 
the same village and to be neighbours could be the base on which the 
relational channel is opened. In other cases the existence of 
complementarities in production processes as well as in the 
commercial field could be the occasion for the establishment of a 
channel of interaction. Finally, as we have underlined, just the 
intrinsic relational dimension of human beings can be the sources of 
these linkages that can emerge in various relational spaces.  
 Ties and system of ties, that is networks, substantiate in 
relations in which: 
 
(i) information about the other’s identity, characteristics and 
behaviours is channelled and shared;  
 
(ii) trust in terms of expectations and so a system of beliefs 
based on repeated interactions is developed; 
 
(iii) feelings (positive like mutual affection or negative related 
to asymmetries in the structure as different degree of 
centrality) arise developing the relational-emotional 
dimension  
 
The existence and the emergence of such relations implies: 
(i) the possibility of exploiting informational assets in the 
selection between ‘good’ or ‘bad’ potential borrowers and 
mechanisms of peer selection;  
(ii) the possibility of monitoring others’ behaviour and efforts;  
(iii) the possibility of enforcement of contract after the 
investment’s return; 
(iv) pro social disposition to reciprocate and the possibility to 
start a trust game (the mechanism of trustworthiness in an 
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horizontal dimension has be considered specifically in the 
context of credit debt relation in  the paragraph 3.3); 
(v) the exploitation of the relational dimension based on a face 
to face interactions where names matter to apply a 
punishment or discourage a certain behaviour. This form of 
punishment could impact ‘externally’ through social 
ostracism, lost of the reputational capital, the menace of 
closure of others overlapped relations as well as ‘internally’ 
on the identity of the person and her self esteem (see 
paragraph 3.3) 
In this attempt to define better the particular relevant meaning the 
relational tie assumes in the context of the group of microcredit two 
important issues arises.  
 The first is that, as we have seen in the basic example of the 
triadic structure, members of the same group cannot be all directly 
related. This aspect requires the investigation of the impact of a less 
dense network and so the presence of indirect ties on the information 
sharing and the capacity to exert the peer pressure. At the same time in 
the presence of a relation “friend of a friend” we have to consider in 
which way the level of personalized and generalized trust in the 
network will be affected.  
 The second is that, apart from the initial relational structures in 
which the actors are embedded, when the group of microcredit is 
formed all the members start to be related by a form of joint liability. 
This implies the possibility of a change in the relational structure of 
the network that can affect the original one as Arrow (2000, 4) 
explains ‘[…] the pre-existing network [of social relations] into which 
new parts of the economy (for example, development projects) have to 
be fitted […] will create their own unintended social relations, 
possibly destroying existing ones’.    
 The last quotation suggests the idea of a dynamic process that 
may change the relational structures behind the interactive game. In 
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other terms, the horizontal relational structure on which the bank rely 
in view of assessing a sort of social collateral, as we have seen in the 
first chapter, is something that change and is subjected to a continuous 
process of confirmation (or viceversa). This element will be 
reconsider in the last paragraph. 
 Taking into consideration the two models developed in the first 
chapters we can now expand them considering others relevant 
variables and trying to define payoff matrices in which relational 
variables are included. In order to construct these matrices we are 
going to use the same terminology used in the first chapter: 
 
4.3.1  Adverse selection and “Peer selection” in a game framework 
We have two possible kinds of borrowers (distinguished on the base 
of their inherent risk): 
(i) in the case of the safe subject: Investment =1 US$  
 Certain return = yS    
(ii) in the case of the risky subject: Investment =1 US$ 
    Return = yR    with probability     p     0<p<1 
    Return  = 0    with probability  (1-p) 
The bank will apply an interest rate R and so the payoffs matrix of all 
possible situations will be:  
 
 sss ssr srr rrr 
 
s 
 
yS – R 
 
yS – R + 
– (1/2R)(1–p) 
 
yS – R + 
– (2R)(1-p)2 – 2R p(1-p) 
 
 
 
 
r 
  
p[yR – R] 
 
p[yR – R – (1/2R)(1-p)] 
 
p[yR – R] + 
– (2R)(1-p)2 – 2Rp(1-p) 
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In the case of a complete triad (before called “clique” see figure 
4.3.1) the safe borrower can know directly the “types” of borrower 
and therefore he will be able to select those with whom constitute into 
a group. Such possibility implies that the safe type will form group of 
only safe types through self selection so that they do not have to 
support the risky types in case of insolvency. Consequently the risky 
types will be able to constitute only into groups with as many risky 
types. The bank, at this point, must only face the situation of a group 
of risk types and therefore must fix an interest rate that make the 
payoff (rrr) strictly negative. 
 
Figure 4.3.3:  two possible Triad Groups 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 
 If we consider the case of a group of three borrowers with an 
indirect tie, although a safe borrower B does not directly know the 
type of the borrower C the fact that knows that A is a good type can 
permit him to infer that also C is a safe type.  
But it is also possible that, if the payoff related to the group 
composed by ssr is positive, the subject A will help the subject C to 
constitute with B a group, although C is a risk type (for example the 
strong tie that link A with C can derives from the fact that C is a 
member of A’s family). This suggests that the relational structures 
behind the payoff matrix can impact on the possible equilibria that 
will emerge. 
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4.3.2  Moral Hazard and the mechanisms of “Peer Monitoring” and     
         “Peer Enforcement” in a game framework 
Unlike before where the riskiness was an intrinsic characteristic to the 
subject, here the agent can do actions or non actions which have an 
influence on the degree of riskiness of the investment and therefore on 
the possibility or less for the bank to have the loan refunded.  
Ex ante        
 The debtor-investor may choose of: 
(iii) to bear a cost in terms of working effort equal to c and to 
obtain with certainty (p=1) a return equal to y and therefore 
to be able to refund with certainty the debt of 1 US$. In 
such case the investor will have a net return equal to (y – R 
– c); 
(iv) not to bear any cost in terms of effort and obtain a return 
equal to y with the probability p <1 to which an expected 
net return equal to (y – R)p corresponds. 
The payoffs matrix of all possible situations will be: 
 
 All 
members 
sustain 
effort c 
2/3 members 
 sustain effort c 
1/3 members 
 sustains effort c 
Nobody 
sustains effort c 
 
Payoff of the 
agent who 
sustains the 
effort c 
 
 
(y – R – c) 
 
p(y – R – c) +  
+ (1-p)[(y-R-c)–1/2R] 
 
p2 (y – R – c) +  
+ 2p(1-p)[(y-R-c) –1/2R]  
+ (1-p)2[(y-R-c) – 2R] 
 
 
Payoff of the 
agent who 
does NOT 
sustain the 
effort c 
  
(y – R)p + 
+ (1-p)[0 – d]  
 
(y – R)p + 
+ (1-p)[0 – d]  
 
(y – R)p + 
+ (1-p)[0 – d]  
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In this payoff matrix the element d substantiates in a sanction 
(external and internal) that will be applied on the subject that choose 
to expose the others to a risk (1-p) of zero investment return. If the 
sanction d is applied by the members of the group in the last case (that 
is when nobody decide to sustain the effort), the sanction d may 
disappear. In this case the group can choose to collude against the 
bank. For this reason the bank would rely on a form of sanction that is 
not simply internal to the group. In our matrix we have considered a 
sanction expressed by the members of the group embedded in a social 
network from which the sanction d arises. 
Ex post 
In the first chapter we have seen that once the bank is able to satisfy 
the IC commitment and so to fix a R which allows to cover the unitary 
costs k, the borrowers linked by the joint liability will find 
conveniently the cost c and therefore all the projects will be 
succesfull. At this point let us consider how the group is able to 
monitorate and to oblige to payment each one of its members 
imposing a sanction d (external and internal). Let us suppose that each 
member of the group is able to know the true return of the investment. 
The payoff matrix will be:   
 
 All 
members 
pay 
2/3 members pay 
and 1 runs away 
1/3 members 
pay and 2 
run away 
Nobody 
pays 
(collusion!) 
 
Payoff of the 
agent who 
Pays 
 
 
y – R – c  
 
 
y – R – c – 1/2R 
 
 
y – R – c – 
2R 
 
 
Payoff of the 
agent who 
takes the money 
and run 
  
 
y – c – d  
 
 
y – c – d 
 
 
y – c – d  
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This model could be considered in a context where the 
monitoring as a certain cost z and this cost is related to the density of 
the network. Here in order to have an incentive to monitoring it is 
necessary that the cost z is not to high: in other terms the information 
cost would not exceed the benefit that such information produce. 
Another possible element that can change our payoff matrices is 
represented by the consideration of a sanction d but also the 
possibility of a relational positive payoff in terms for example of an 
increase in the reputation of the agent that sustain the effort c or 
choose to adopt the strategy “to pay”. 
 
   
4.3.3 Different scenarios: an index of ‘relationality’ and the 
matching with payoff matrix 
Until now we have sustained two thesis that we have detected both in 
the first chapter (see specifically paragraph 1.3) and in this last one. 
Here the introduction of a different framework has been done through 
the introduction of payoff matrix both for the adverse selection and 
the moral hazard problem. These matrix are traditionally constructed 
considering the expected payoff for each agent in different situations. 
And so for example in the case of groups of safe borrower rather then 
in the case of defection to cooperative strategy (sustain the effort c).  
In this framework, the first thesis is that the relational 
structures, the network of social ties (with their specific meanings in 
terms of information, trust, reputation, feelings, social pressure etc), 
allow to solve both the informative problems at the base of the credit 
debt relation. But as we have seen these systems of social ties may be 
different just in terms of their capacity to express peer selection, 
monitoring and enforcement of the contracts. In other terms according 
to the relational structures behind, agents will express different forms 
of peer pressure and will experience different equilibria. More deeply, 
a different frame of interaction will significantly affect the perception 
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of the ‘game’ as well as the possibility to apply sanctions and forms of 
internal and external psychological sanction. 
The second interconnected argument is that the relational 
structures that we are considering is a dynamic subject that will 
change with the evolution (in a certain part unintented) of the system 
of economic and social interactions existing among the agents. 
Moreover this change can be direct and internally expressed among 
the member of the group but also indirect if we remember how the 
member of the group are embedded in a social network. 
This suggests also that the system of beliefs, on the base of 
which agents act, will constantly are updated and tested on the base of 
the effective results of interactions.    
 A possible way to combine these reflections and the standard 
representation of the problem in payoff matrix, could be to introduce 
an index representing the relational structures behind our space of 
interaction. This index, which would reflect the relational complexity 
and the different stage of interaction, could be applied to the payoff 
matrix suggesting a different payoff matrix for different relational 
structures.  
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Notes chapter 4 
 
(1) See also Polanyi on ‘markets embedded in society’ 
 
(2)   The theory of graphs is the result of a sophistication and 
systematization of the sociometric analysis started by Moreno (1934) 
 
(3) Observing these graphs,  it is worth to remember that for some 
authors there is an equilibrium tendency toward dyadic relationships 
to be either null or reciprocated, and that asymmetric ties may be 
unstable. 
 
(4) For a wide analysis of these different approaches see 
Hanneman and Riddle, 2005 
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Concluding remarks 
 
 
In the last years, microfinance institutions have acquired a more 
and more important role. 
The first reason is that they have been recognised by 
international institutions and many scholars to be effective 
development tools. The solutions proposed to the informative problem 
behind the credit-debt relation have been successfully applied 
everywhere in the world. This has been the best proof that it is 
possible to overcome one of the first barriers to economic inclusion: 
the access to credit.  
Another reason, that has at first inspired this work, is that 
microfinance is a field of research that requires the adoption of a 
multidisciplinary approach. It represents a challenge for economics 
because it implies the study of some problems at the frontier of 
economic research. Here the importance of a mutual fertilization 
among different disciplines such as economics, history, psychology, 
sociology, etc appears to be more and more critical. 
As a matter of fact, the study of the credit-debt relation 
presupposes the consideration of  the economics of social interactions 
and how different relational structures can generate different 
institutional arrangements.  
In this work we have placed a particular emphasis on the 
analysis of relational structures. Starting from this perspective, we 
have provided an original framework in which, the credit-debt relation 
and the methodologies developed in microfinance institutions can be 
understood in their complexity.  
We have also detected four different levels and dimensions of 
interaction. The first two are represented by the ‘institutional matrix’ 
and the objective feature of an economic structure. We have stressed 
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that both these dimensions, especially in their interplay, originate the 
space in which interpersonal relations realize.  
The credit-debt relation has itself led to recognize that the 
dynamic of the productive process has a critical impact on the 
emergence of particular kinds of institutional arrangements and 
relational structures. For this reason, we cannot understand economic 
and social interactions without the analysis of this interplay.  
Finally, the study of the other two dimensions, the interpersonal 
and the fundamental ones, has highlighted the important role played 
by processes of mirroring. 
 The last relevant result of this work, arising from a critical 
analysis of the concept of social capital, is the identification of spaces 
of enablement. As a matter of fact, only by considering these spaces it 
is possible to introduce the concept of enabling institutions. The 
relevance of  this concept, especially in a normative perspective, has 
been also analysed in the field of microfinance. 
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